THOMAS
AQUINAS
CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM/ THOMISM
Thomas (the 'Doctor Angelicus') was born near Naples
in the castle of Rocasecca (owned by his father, the Count of Aquino). He was educated first in the Monastery of
Monte Cassino and then studied Liberal Arts at the University of Naples. Influenced there by the Dominicans he joined
the Order of Preachers in 1244, despite family opposition. He studied philosophy and theology at
Dominican schools in Paris and Cologne (where his teacher was Albertus Magnus)
and then returned to Paris, gaining his bachelor's degree in theology in
1252. While continuing advanced studies
he lectured there and in Cologne. However, he did not receive his Master of Theology (teaching) degree
until 1257 because of the hostility of the Paris University authorities to the
mendicant orders. He was highly regarded
by several popes, who sought his advice, but he refused the offer of the
Archbishopric of Naples in favour of the religious life. He spent ten years from 1259 preparing
commentaries on Aristotle's works, teaching again at Paris and becoming
embroiled in several academic and administrative controversies. He lectured at Naples in 1272 and became a
member of the papal court. He died while
on the way to attend the Council of Lyons where he would have defended the use
of Aristotle in theology.
Sources: A variety of texts are
referred to in this Profile (see the Reading list), but the primary sources are
Aquinas's major texts, the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra
Gentiles. The standard reference
notation has been employed: I, II, etc.
are the numbers of the books within a
work; 1, 2, 3, etc. are the chapters; 'q' refers to the 'questions', and 'a' to the 'articles'.
METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[1] [See especially Summary
against the Gentiles, I, 4.] Philosophy for Aquinas enjoys a
degree of autonomy relative to theology. He distinguishes between divinely revealed truths, for example, the
doctrine of the Trinity, which are the proper concern of the dogmatic
theologian, and non-revealed truths, which the philosopher examines by means of
the "natural light of the reason". He
also accepts that some truths, for example, that God is the creator, are both
given in revelation and determinable by reason and thus falls within the
purview of philosophy as 'natural' or 'philosophical' theology. However, for Aquinas human reason has its limits: while it gives us knowledge [see sec. 6], there is much
that it cannot grasp unaided about the nature of God and man's supernatural
purpose. Any rationally constructed metaphysical system without reference to
revelation must therefore be incomplete and imperfect. Philosophy is the 'handmaid' of theology: it is not incompatible with faith but
complements it [a]. Nevertheless Aquinas stresses that man should
make the fullest use of his reason, not only for the sake of acquiring
knowledge itself but also, more importantly, in so far as, in conjunction with
the exercise of natural virtue, it will enable him to attain to a degree of
happiness, albeit imperfect, in this life.
Metaphysics
is the 'First Philosophy', in the sense that it deals with what comes first in
the 'real order' of things, namely Being as such, manifested in
sensible reality, unlike the various 'sciences' which study different kinds of
beings. It is the quest for an ultimate explanation of
everything a first 'cause' or
principle [b]. But what is meant by the term 'being'? To make this clear we need to look at Aquinas's use of a number of technical terms.
(1) [Commentary on the
Metaphysics, V, lect. 9, 1ff.] All particular things, whether
spiritual or corporeal, are said to be beings, that is, entities (entia) or existents. An entity (ens) is 'that which is' (quod est). Aquinas distinguishes between essential being (ens per se) and coincidental
being (ens per accidens). Entities possessing being in this first sense
are individuals, that is, substances (for example, Socrates), and real properties (accidents), such as qualities,
quantities, relations, and so on (pale, heavy, son of, for example) [ibid., V, 19; VII, 1; also Summa Theologia, I, q.29 a.2]. While paleness, heaviness, and so on, although and inseparable
from and dependent on a substance for their existence, are yet real existents
in their own right [c], nevertheless the
being or state of affairs represented
by, say, the complex 'Socrates is pale' is only coincidental. When we predicate 'pale'
of 'Socrates' we are saying the accident coincides in the existent subject. [See also Quodlibetal
Questions, II.]
(2) Entities have essence (essentia). In
Aquinas's early writings essence is that by which a thing is what it is. But later and
more generally he thinks of it as that which determines the nature or 'quiddity' ('whatness') of an
entity, that which makes it a particular kind of being [ibid; also On Being and Essence].
(3) He also uses the term 'esse'. Esse (existence or
'present actuality') is an 'act' of being (actus
essendi) by which essence has being [see also S.G., I, 22,
4]. Existence is to essence as form is
to matter [sec. 2 below]. Esse and essentia are therefore distinct but correlative (esse gives being to essentia, while essentia, we may say, limits esse), and are thus inseparable in individual things. (Essences may not of course actually exist,
though we can still grasp their nature intellectually. Thus we can understand what is meant by a
phoenix even though no such creature exists in reality. We can perhaps talk here of a mental
existence. But he rejects any notion of an essence having a prior
existence in some kind of eternal Platonic realm ). Existence for Aquinas is an 'accident' in
the sense that it is the actuality of any substance it is not an accident 'in
itself' [Quodlib., II, a. 3] [d].
(4) Individual
being is composed of actual and potential being [On
Power I, l; see also Comm. Metaphys V, lectio 9, 13]. 'Actuality' and 'potentiality' relate to the degree to which an entity
has been fully realized or fulfilled in accordance with its nature. Actuality is thus prior to potentiality
ontologically, in the sense that the becoming of a thing only makes sense with
reference to what it is to become (an acorn becomes an oak tree, for
example). It follows that existence is superior to essence in so far as actuality
is superior to potentiality [e].
(5) Aquinas also
uses the term 'esse' to express the truth of a proposition, as when
we say 'it is true that Socrates exists' or 'it is a fact that Socrates is
pale' [Comm. Metaphys. V, lectio 9, 11-12]. The truth (which Aquinas calls esse ut verum) of such judgements does,
however, depend on what actually exists. Indeed true and existent, he says [On
Truth q.1 a.2, 1], are 'convertible' terms. He thinks of truth as a cognitive power
(awareness) implicit in a relation of conformity of 'adequacy' (aedequatio) of a thought (as
individualization of a form in the intellect) to the individualization of the
form in the world [f].
Essence, existence, truth, and beauty for Aquinas are essential
attributes of being. He calls them transcendentals [On
Truth, q.1 a.1 Whereas substance and the various accidents such as quality, quantity, and the like are categories which apply to particular kinds of
being, the transcendentals apply to all types or degrees of being. They are not predicates in that they are
already themselves attributes or principles of being. In addition to essence, existence, and truth
Aquinas identifies other
transcendentals: one or unity
(which is "undivided being"); distinctness, in so far as being in revealing
itself as a something implies some other thing; and the good, which Aquinas understands as the object
of desire for all things and is manifested in a harmonious relation to the will [g].
[2] Finite beings. [See Comm. Metaphysics,
VIII lect. 2; also S.T. I q.66 aa. 1 & 2.] What makes an
individual a human being, or a particular thing red, heavy, and so on? According to Aquinas it is, respectively, a substantial and an
accidental form. That feature of
a substance which is 'informed' is its 'prime matter'. It is the form which actualizes the matter as
potentiality to give rise to the individual thing. In the case of substances the (substantial)
form and the matter together constitute its nature (hylomorphism): but Aquinas confines hylomorphism to the
corporeal world [a]. Prime matter cannot
of course exist on its own without being 'informed': it is itself only potentiality to all forms. The matter is the principle of individuation [b]. Socrates and Plato are different bits of
matter but having the same human form which although formally identical in
each person is nevertheless a distinct individual in that it 'informs' a
particular piece of matter. Aquinas also argues in favour of there
being only one substantial
form in any substance. And he rejects
any doctrine of potential forms of non-spiritual things ('seminal reasons', for example) as prior to
prime matter which in itself lacks act [c]. While form and matter are inseparable in the corporeal world, Aquinas
says that between the created and embodied souls of men and the uncreated
infinite God there are immaterial, created but disembodied pure forms angels,
each of which is also uniquely specific (there being no matter to individuate
them).
Aquinas identifies several different kinds of change. We can talk of a change of position in
space. Of more interest, however, are changes of accidents and changes
of substance [d]. The
change of colour of a leaf in autumn from green to red is an example of the
former. In such cases we have an
enduring individual substance losing one accident but acquiring another. Changes of substance occur when a given 'piece' of matter takes on a
different substantial form. Consider a
tree. When the tree dies the matter
remains but is redistributed and becomes the material of other substances air, plants growing
in the soul, animals, and so on. As for
angels, although they are immaterial they still have the capacity for non-substantial
change.
Individual beings and events in general have the tendency to move from
possibility to actuality. Aquinas
talks here of such potentiality as active, having existence in the subject, and
as 'first actuality'.
(This is to be contrasted with potentiality as 'second actuality' [e], which is a potentiality arising out of and
dependent on the functioning of the former. Socrates's potentiality to commit
suicide by drinking hemlock would be an example.) The transition from possibility to actuality
is closely connected with Aquinas's account of causation [See On the Principles of Nature and On
Causes.] The matter a thing is made
out of is the material
cause (or 'causal factor'). That
which makes the thing what it is, gives it its characteristic shape and nature,
is the formal cause. The efficient cause is the agency which brings about a
change (turning a lump of stone into a piece of sculpture, for example). Lastly, there is the final cause. This is the goal or end (telos) towards which an action is directed, its function or purpose (the
sculptor has it in mind to produce this particular work of art). The actuality, we may say, is the 'goal' or purpose of the potentiality [f]. The end is finality of being.
[3] The nature of God. [See especially S.G., I
13.]. All finite things are beings and
have being. God, however, as infinite is not a being but is
absolute transcendent Being, separate from His creation. In God alone existence is included in
essence. His nature is 'act itself' (ipsum esse); it belongs to His essence
to be. He is also the eternal, free, 'necessary being', the ultimate final and
formal cause. And in so far as he is a
simple being there are no distinctions in him as between intellect and will [a]. This raises problems about the relationship of finite beings to
God and of the meaning of finite 'being' to infinite 'Being'. As to the former Aquinas appeals to the concept of participation [see. for
example, S.T. I 44, 1; S.G., I 22, 9; also Comm. on Boethius's De Hebdomadibus, 2]. All finite beings participate in existence in general (esse commune) to varying degrees
according to their place in the 'hierarchy of being'. Esse
commune participates in the divine existence or Being ('subsistent
existence' esse subsistens), who
contains within Himself and knows the divine ideas, that is, His ideas of all
things he has created. In so far as
these ideas, as 'exemplary forms', share in the diivine essence they are not
distinct from each other. Plurality lies
in God's knowledge of them (considered as rationes) [b]. Aquinas
avoids pantheism, because whereas God is Being, finite created things are not;
they only 'have' it in the sense that
they are actualized within the limits imposed by their essentiae. It follows that 'Being' (and its transcendental attributes) as
applied to God is neither a univocal nor an equivocal term. Rather, for Aquinas, it is used analogously. [See On Truth, q.2 a.11
and S.T. I q.13, aa.1-6 & 12; S.G. I 34] [c]. He argues that when we
apply the term 'being' or some other quality both to God and to a finite being
we are not using them in the same sense, but neither are the senses totally
different. To illustrate analogical
usage he gives the example of the sun's heat. We call hot both the sun itself and the heat generated by it. He in fact distinguishes between what he
calls 'Analogy of Proportionality' and the 'Analogy of Attribution'. By means of the first we move from a
statement about the way in which the qualities of a created being are related
to its nature to a statement about how the attributes of uncreated Being (God)
are related to its nature. This involves an extrapolation of a
relationship from finite being to infinite Being. The difficulty here, Aquinas recognises, is
that this does not tell us anything about what God is actually like. So it is necessary to extend the analogy by
attributing to God properties experienced in ourselves. Thus we may talk of human wisdom or
fatherhood and then apply these terms to the relationship we say obtains
between us and God. This presupposes for
Aquinas that there is a relation of causal dependence between creature and
creator. Indeed the concept of causality
is central to his proofs for God's existence.
Aquinas rejected Anselm's proofs
on the grounds that he had moved illegitimately from the realm of concepts or
thought to the realm of being [d]. He supposed instead that the existence of God as
the ultimate final cause could be
demonstrated by natural reason, starting from our experience of the existing
real world [e]. His arguments are called
the Five Ways [On Power, III 5c; S.G., I 13; S.T. I q. 2, a.3.]
(1) The argument
from motion or change (efficient causation). We observe change everywhere. This has to be explained, that is, we must
find a cause which possesses the 'perfection' (property, characteristic) to pass on to the thing which is changed (the effect). A thing cannot change itself; it cannot at
the same time both possess and gain a property. So motion has to be produced by something else. But there cannot be an infinite chain of "intermediate causes". So there has to be an unchanged First Cause,
namely, God; otherwise there would be no change to impart.
(2) The argument
from causation in general. This
is similar to the first argument. The
fact that there is causation in general in the world requires a First uncaused
Cause again because of the impossibility of an unending chain.
(3) The argument
from contingency (possibility) and necessity. Many things we observe in Nature are generated
and decay, cease to be. Their existence is contingent
and not necessary [e]. If all things were like this, there would
have been a time when nothing existed, in which case there would be nothing
existing now. So something must exist
of a necessity which it has of itself
and does not get from something else. Otherwise, once again, there would be an infinite regress.
Aquinas says God created the world freely in
time out of nothing as a direct manifestation of His Goodness. He does not in fact deny that the world may in fact be
eternal, but he says it cannot be proved philosophically one way or the other,
though he rejects it as a matter of faith [see S.T. I q.10, aa.1,4; On Power,
III 17]. And it seems that, while the first three 'proofs'
are based on the alleged impossibility of an infinite sequence of contingent causes, there would be no
contradiction in asserting both that the world is eternal and that there can be
no infinite series of causes. We
may conceive of the possibility that series of dependent events (for example, one's existence by virtue of one's parents, and their parents
before them, and so on) may
be endless, but we still have to account for the existence of that total
infinite series [f]; and, for
Aquinas, an explanation in the strict sense requires a first principle which
brings about change but is itself unchanged. This is God, the prime unmoved
mover not in a temporal sense but in the ontological order.
(4) The argument
from the gradation of things [g]. Some things,
Aquinas says, are more good, more true, and so on than others. Comparative states require there to be
superlative states, that is, there must be a best, a truest, and so on, which
act as standards for all things in the hierarchy. There must therefore be an ultimate being in
which all these absolutes are combined. This is the One or God.
(5) The teleological argument [h]. We can see in
the activity of all natural things and processes an end or purpose, whether or
not they have awareness. Those that lack awareness, however, are directed by
beings that are aware, that possess a mind. Ultimately there must be a single intelligence which directs all things,
in other words God.
[4] Evil, human freedom, and God's providence [S.G., III
10 and 97-8; On Evil, III 1-2, and
VI; On Evil, VI; S.T. I q.83 a.1 and
q.103 aa. 7-8; see also Comm. on
Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, lect.
14]. Now
if God has created and directs all things, how can we account for the presence
of evil? Is this compatible with His omniscience and omnipotence? The world as God's creation is necessarily good. But as God's
goodness and power are infinite we can certainly conceive of his being able to
create a better world, that is, one from
which certain kinds situations or events had been omitted. So why did he not do so? According to Aquinas we finite beings cannot
know what lay behind God's decision to create as he did. However, while recognising evil as real Aquinas says it is a privation, in the sense that it
is an absence or deficiency of goodness in human nature, but that this is a consequence of man's
free choice. God knows all future
events by virtue of their being coexistent in eternity and thus foresees human actions. To that extent they might be supposed to be
predetermined. However, although in that sense
necessitated, man's actions remain contingently free considered from the
temporal standpoint, and for the sake of that freedom and its proper use
to love him and to do His will God permits even evil actions. As for physical or
natural evil, this is
a necessary consequence of the existence of sentient creatures living in a
dynamic changing universe [a]. Aquinas
seems in effect to be saying that only in a static universe could there be no
earthquakes, disease, and so on. The universe as a whole is good. Moreover, man's suffering can be borne with
God's assistance.
PSYCHOLOGY
[5] [S.T. I qq.75-90; On the Soul, I; S.G., II 58-90; Comm.
on Aristotle's 'Peri Psuche'; On Truth, q.8 a.6.] Plants can grow, take in food,
reproduce. This is because they have a
vegetative principle or 'soul'. Animals have a sensitive 'soul' which allows
them, additionally, to perceive, feel, and move around. But man not only can do all these things but also has
distinct intellectual and volitional faculties by virtue of his possession of a
rational soul. Nevertheless this is
single and unitary [a] assimilating the vegetative and sensitive functions. The faculties or powers are subdivided and
analysed in some detail by Aquinas. Thus, he distinguishes at the sensory level five external functions (sight,
hearing, taste, smell, and touch); four internal functions: 'common sense' (which involves the grasping in perception of
the whole object), imagination, memory, and particular 'cogitations' of
individual things; and two sensory appetites comprising respectively six 'concupiscible' and five 'irascible'
appetites the former (for example, love, hate) being tendencies towards or
away from what is felt to be good or evil; the latter (for example, fear,
anger) tendencies to meet perceived danger by attack, retreat, or
acceptance. At the cognitive level the intellect (or understanding),
which is responsible for apprehending, judging, and reasoning about
'universals', is divided
into the active intellect and the passive intellect [On Truth, q.10 aa.4-6; S.T. I
q.84 aa.1 & 6, and q.86 a.1]. These are not separate intellects but rather different functions of the
one intellect in the individual soul [b]. Aquinas also identifies intellectual
appetites, which are either (i) natural tendencies to approve of, for example,
justice, and which are adjudged as good without qualification; or (ii) willed
movements towards or away from things which are judged to be partly desirable
or undesirable. The
deliberating will for Aquinas is subordinate to intellect [c]; and he says that
while man necessarily wills the end of his actions (happiness) he has free will
in that he can choose the means to that end. Despite the language of 'powers' or 'faculties' Aquinas stresses that it is the whole man, the
animated or 'ensouled' body which thinks, acts, desires, perceives, and knows [d]. But in so far as the
rational soul has the capacity to know bodies in general (unlike, say,
vision and hearing, which are dependent on a particular sense organ) it must, he says, be immaterial and
spiritual, a single 'subsistent form' of the body, and therefore is
incorruptible. It follows that it possesses personal
immortality [On the Soul, 14; S.T. I q.75 a.6] for which
man has a natural desire, but
he does not believe the survival of the human person can be established by
philosophical argument [e]. (A resurrected body is also required if the immortal soul is to realise
its capacity to inform the body after the latter's death: but again acceptance of this is a matter of
faith.) Accordingly he argues against the idea of a
single universal human agent intellect (monopsychism) [f], as this would be
inconsistent with the survival of individual thinking souls.
KNOWLEDGE
[6] [S.T. I qq.79-85; On Truth, q.10. aa.4-6.] For
Aquinas the human
intellect has as its primary object essences of being in material things [S.T. I, q.12. a.4] [a]; and knowledge is an
activity of the ensouled body as a whole [a]. But he says the rational
soul cannot be affected directly by material things. So how does he account for knowledge? He distinguishes three operations of the intellect. The first is simple apprehension (intelligentia
indivisibilium 'understanding of non-complex things'), an abstractive
capacity by means of which it can form or grasp the 'essences', that is, common
features of things. The second is judgement (compositio
et divisio 'putting together and dividing'). This involves the attributing of properties to things and gives rise to
propositions bearers of truth or falsity. Lastly he talks of reasoning (ratiocinatio). Here the mind structures syllogistically the
propositions obtained by means of the second operation and attains either
certain or probable conclusions. Complete and certain 'seeing' of
the truth of something, which includes both conceptualization and judgement,
constitutes knowledge (scientia). 'Cognition' which is the result of
non-demonstrative dialectical or probable reasoning constitutes 'opinion'. (Faith, like scientia
and in contrast to opinion or belief requires an 'assent' to its object but differs from knowledge in that
the will is required to effect the assent because the truth of the object is
not adequately 'seen' by the intellect) [b].
All knowledge is grounded in sense-experience and
derivative memory images: "there is nothing in the intellect which was
not first in the senses" [S.T. I q.1.
a.9]. The exterior senses (sight, hearing, and so on) are concerned
with the perceiver's own body. Corporeal objects in general are the proper object of the interior
senses the 'common sense' and the imagination through which 'phantasms' (perceptions,
images, memories), representing external objects, arise [c]. The 'active' or agent intellect 'illuminates'
(metaphorically speaking) the phantasms in the passive intellect and
then abstracts from them what Aquinas calls 'intelligible species'. (The human intellect having its own 'natural
light', Aquinas has no need of a divine illumination to obtain certain knowledge
n though this light may perhaps be conceived of as a vestige or remnant of the
divine.) The intelligible species are, as it were, formal 'likenesses', which
are potentially universal aspects of the phantasms [S.T. I q.85 a.1], and are non-material as is the intellect. "Whatever is
received is received after the manner in which the recipient exists" [On
Truth, q. 10, a.4]. What he means
is that the cognising soul
is 'assimilated' to the cognised object in so far as the object's
particular form enters the soul as a universal intelligible species. [See ibid.,
aa. 4, 5; and, for example, ST I q.17, a. 3; q.75, a.5.] As objects of thought they are said to have 'intentional existence' (esse intentionale) [d]. Presented to the 'passive' intellect as species impressa Aquinas talks of the agent intellect as
'turning' (conversio) towards the
phantasms [S.T. I q. 83, a.1] the universal elements become species expressa or universal concepts. These concepts, which
have real existence only in so far as they are individuated in natural things [On the Soul, aa.l & 2] are the
means whereby the forms of material objects are cognised by the intellect. Knowledge for Aquinas is thus of particulars, although it is indirect, being
gained through knowledge of the universals (forms, essences) in
them. Moreover, this latter knowledge is
of universals as the formal element in
the particulars. In so far as universals do not exist apart from
particulars they are not in themselves proper objects of knowledge; and
considered as 'abstracted' ideas they are known only in a secondary sense. They are, however, real in so far as they are
grounded in extramental being; and in this respect Aquinas is a 'moderate realist' [e]. It follows from his account that he rejects innate ideas except
in the trivial sense that the human mind has the capacity for abstraction and
formation of concepts [f]. Likewise the soul can have no knowledge of itself except in its
acts of abstracting intelligible species. Knowledge for Aquinas is thus ultimately
dependent on sense-perception as converted into phantasms. Nevertheless he makes it clear that while in this life the mind
needs the body as its natural object, it is capable of being active qua mind even when separate from the
body, and indeed it can then know itself and other souls perfectly [g].
[7] Knowledge of God [Comm. on Boethius's De Trinitate, q.6
a.3; S.T. I, qq.86-8; S.G. I 14.] Granted that God's existence can be proved, can we know anything of
His nature? If, as Aquinas says,
knowledge is ultimately dependent on sense-experience, does this mean we can
have no knowledge of God (or of other
non-corporeal beings) at least in this life? His answer is that it is particular material things which are approached
through the senses; the
rational soul is directed towards Being in general. And although while embodied it cannot know
non-corporeal beings directly it does have imperfect analogical knowledge revealed through sensory experience. He identifies both an affirmative way (per excessum) and a negative way (per remotionem) [a]. The former involves attributing to God without limit properties
possessed by a finite being. However, in
so far as God cannot be directly known we may also say He possesses various
properties a finite being has, but not to a lesser degree. This is the negative approach. Aquinas seems to advocate the use of both
ways. [See also sec. 3 above.]
ETHICS
[8] [See,
for example, Comm. on Aristotle's Ethics,
9-10; S.T. I-ii qq.18-20, 55-6, 90-4; S.G., III 114-38.] All acts of a
rational human being, when done deliberately and freely, are directed to the
attainment of some end perceived as good, such as wealth, knowledge,
pleasure. But none of these 'goods'
fully satisfies the human will. According to Aquinas there
is only one final end which can give man 'well-being', or 'happiness' (felicitas), namely, the universal good, which he identifies
with God. To do good and avoid evil is the fundamental principle of practical
reasoning and is intuited intellectually by means of the quality of
'synderesis' [a]. To achieve this end one's actions must be morally good,
and this requires three factors to be taken into account: (i) [S.T. I-ii q.18 a.2] their objective must be
'fitting' and agree with "the reasonable order of life" (just as the
basic goodness of a natural thing is provided by its specific form which
makes it the kind of thing it is); (ii) [ibid., a.8] 'special
circumstances' these are comparable to the qualities which characterize the
specific nature given to man by his substantial form; (iii) [ibid. aa.4
& 6] the end (finis
operantis), that is
the motive or agent's intention, intended by the will. This formally specifies the act pointing to
its objective (its purpose, finis operis). The test of the moral goodness or rightness of an
action is the mean, to achieve which one must avoid excess or defect. What
constitutes a mean in a given situation will depend on the circumstances and
motives or intentions. Chastity,
for example, when pursued for selfish reasons (for example,
self-aggrandisement), might seem to be a defect (licentiousness being the
corresponding excess): but if
undertaken, say, for the love of God it is a mean. By adhering to the mean a man will acquire the moral virtues, which
when combined with the intellectual virtues of understanding and prudence will
develop practical judgement, that is, moral conscience [b] "a sort of dictate of reason... application of knowledge to action" [S.T. I-ii q.19 a.5] and this will enable him to live rightly. To perceive the mean presupposes conformity to the 'order of reason' as
manifested in the natural law which is grounded in human nature and
is concerned with guiding man towards the achieving of his natural end, that
is, his 'intellectual form' (his final and all-embracing value). This end is reasonable and good in so far as it agrees with reason which
is directing the will towards it. But
Aquinas allows that some actions (for example, taking a walk) may involve
nothing at all related to reason, as contrasted with, say, almsgiving which is
by definition good in so far as it is agreeable to reason. They are therefore morally 'neutral' [ibid. q.18
a.8]. (Natural law is contrasted with divine positive law, which
is concerned with man's supernatural end, and God's eternal law, which orders
the universe as a whole [S.T. I-ii qq.90ff.] ). Natural moral law,
Aquinas says, depends not on God's will but on the divine reason or essence in so far as God sees the law of human nature
in the eternal idea of man he possesses within himself; and thus it is in general not open to
alteration [c]. What exactly is the universal good and in what sense is it God? Man, says Aquinas, has a natural desire for
God which can be realized only in a 'beatific vision' of him. To have knowledge of God's essence is of
course not possible through philosophical demonstration; and the knowledge
implicit in 'vision' is more than can even be revealed to us through
faith. To achieve it supernatural grace
is required. [See Comm. on Peter Lombard's Sentences, Book 4, 49.]. However, he wished to keep moral theology
(and faith) separate from philosophy (and reason). [On the problem of evil see sec. 4.]
[9] [See, for
example, ST I q.81, 2 & 3; II
q.77 a2; I-ii qq.22-48.] If morality and the achieving of happiness by
aiming at the universal good is a matter of reason and knowledge, how does
Aquinas account for weakness of will? How is it that a man might perceive what is
properly good for him and yet act in a way contrary to his best interests? Aquinas distinguishes between involuntary
actions such as those in which one reacts instinctively out off, say, fear, and
voluntary actions where one is rationally aware of ends and the means required
to realize them. The problem of weakness
applies essentially to the latter. In
such cases the reason of the 'incontinent' man is hindered or
obscured by passion and therefore fails
to direct the will in the manner appropriate for the achieving of the right end [a]. Reason must therefore seek to harness the 'irascible' appetites inclinations which assist us to overcome
whatever inhibits our 'concupisciple'
appetites (inclinations to seek what is appropriate or to avoid what is
harmful). Proper exercise of the will
thus presupposes cultivation of the reason reinforced by the exercise of
moderation in one's actions in the light of natural law.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
[10] [Especially On the Governance
of Rulers and S.T. I-ii passim.] Man is by nature a social and political animal as is evident from his
possession of language. However,
he also needs society to provide a framework in which individual talents can be
developed and the virtuous
life achieved. Now, given the
egocentric tendencies of many people, a society needs to be ordered and
controlled by a wise government (just as the soul controls the passions and
appetites). In so far as human nature
was created by God, government is ultimately justified by Him; and the ideal
governance would be one which provides for the needs of its citizens, secures
peace and order in the interest of the common good. This would be a perfect society. Nevertheless, says Aquinas, even such a society must be subordinated to the authority of the Church
in matters spiritual or supernatural [a]. This is because man's natural end cannot be
achieved without God's grace. The role of the legislator is to
define and apply the natural law to specific concrete situations, and thereby
to enact human positive law which regulates the social behaviour
of the people. Laws which are unjust, in
that they are not derived from natural law, may be disobeyed in conscience. But it can never be right to disobey just laws, or laws which
run counter to the divine eternal law [b] (revealed through Christ). There are of
course many possible kinds of government. Aquinas identifies three good types
(law-abiding democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy), and three bad ones
('demagogic' democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny). He says monarchy is the most 'natural' in that it involves
the rule of one over many (as God rules
over his creation). But a wise monarch is not readily found; and Aquinas thinks
that in practice a 'mixed'
constitution (similar to Aristotle's 'polity') combining the best features of
democracy and aristocracy is preferable [c].
AESTHETICS
[11] Beauty for Aquinas
exists objectively in things in so far as they reflect or participate in the
absolute beauty (pulchritudo) of God [a] [Commentary on the Divine Names IV,
5-6]. Like Truth it is a
transcendental attribute of Being [a]. We have a
'disinterested apprehension' of the beauty in things through our cognitive
perception; and we see it as an object of pleasure [ST 1a.q.5.a.4] (just as good is seen as the object of
desire). But he argues that the
'delight' we experience in the beautiful is different from that evinced by
truth or goodness in that it is a characteristic of the whole person. Beauty, as formal cause (as
contrasted with the good as final cause), is characterized by (a) 'proper
proportion', that is, harmony, (b) 'integrity' or perfection, and (c) 'clarity'
or brilliance [1a.q.39.a.8] [b]. As for art, Aquinas says this is a 'habit'
an application of the intellect to practical action, and involves "right reason
in making things" (just as in ethics it is a matter of exercising one's right
reason in doing things). The function of art is to
imitate nature, because nature is the reflection of God's intellect [c].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Generally regarded as the
greatest medieval thinker, Aquinas covered a vast range of philosophical
issues, and his thought is notable for its depth, acuity, judicious balance and
consistency. He drew on Neoplatonic elements,
but his philosophy is thoroughly Aristotelian the power of the Greek
philosopher's writings being appropriated in support of Christian
theology. Three significant features may
be singled out.
(1) The separation of faith and reason. While Aquinas regarded philosophy developed through reason alone as
incomplete without revelation, with him reason achieved autonomy not only in
philosophy but also in natural theology.
(2) The emphasis on sense experience and the natural world rather than
on an 'inner light' and the supernatural world, and on individuality rather
than the universal, as the starting-point for knowledge. This is reflected in particular in (a)
Aquinas's recognition of the parallelism between essence and existence, potency
and act, and matter and form in individuals. The individual is no longer a reflection of the universal but is regarded as a composite entity in its own
right. Aquinas thus claims to have
solved what were perceived to be a number of problems in Plato's
metaphysics. Being and becoming are
understood in terms of act and potentiality. Form actualizes matter; matter is the individuating principle. Universals are real but exist only in
individual things; and the individual does not contain a plurality of
forms. Moreover, the soul is now the
form of the body, although it remains dependent on matter. The centrality of individuality is seen also
in (b) Aquinas's ethics. The will is
subordinated to the intellect. Emphasis
is therefore placed on the individual's
deliberation and choice rather than on a will 'primed' by divine grace.
(3) His notions of metaphysical 'participation' and analogical
predication of being, which is neither equivocal nor univocal, and his attempt
to blend Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in his approach to the divine
ideas should also be noted as making an important contribution to the debate
concerning the relationship of created
beings to God.
Aquinas's assumptions and approach do of course lay his system
open to objections. Augustinians criticized
him for breaking the direct connection between God and his creatures. Knowledge is now to be acquired not through
divine illumination but through abstraction by the active intellect. God is no longer to be known directly;
knowledge through analogy is imperfect. Moreover, in his rejection of the ontological argument Aquinas will not
allow a transition from the 'idea' to the 'real'. His own 'Five Ways' for proving God's existence,
all of which are a posteriori and
start from sense experience, can themselves be criticized for at best only
establishing the existence of a first cause prime mover, not of a personal
God. These arguments are in any case
questionable. Given that contingent
beings are those which can cease to be, is there a necessary being at all? While he
allows that an infinite series of dependent causes may be possible (though not philosophically
provable), it remains an open question whether such a putative series itself
requires a prime mover or first cause. And would such a first cause have to possess the divine qualities
demanded by Aquinas? His accounts of the
relation between faith and reason and of the scope of metaphysics were also to
be challenged later by Duns Scotus and Ockham. Nevertheless, once the ecclesiastical authorities had overcome their
reservations and were satisfied that Aquinas's use of the new Aristotelian
scholarship did not lead to 'false' teaching, 'Thomism' became the 'official' philosophy of the
Catholic Church despite a rearguard action by the Augustinians. And in recent years there has been a renewed
interest in his metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of mind among
many philosophers who owe no allegiance
to the Church and indeed are in some case non-theists. As for his ethics, this exhibits the
strengths and weaknesses of Aristotle's moral philosophy. But whether Aquinas's relocation of Aristotle's ethics in an explicitly Christian
framework results in an improvement on the Greek master, or whether the
numerous philosophical problems that arise (concerning, say the existence of
God, or the possibility of a 'natural' law) make it less easy to defend
Aquinas's ethical system, remain open questions.
CONNECTIONS
Thomas Aquinas
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Proofs for God's existence:
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