ALBERTUS MAGNUS
CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM
Albertus Magnus (the 'Great'), known
as Doctor Universalis (universal
teacher) on account of his wide learning, was born at Lauingen (Swabia) in
Germany, and studied at Padua and Cologne. He entered the Dominican Order in 1223 and then taught for many years in
Germany, then in Paris as Regent Master (1240-48) before returning to
Cologne. He was Bishop of Ratisbon
1260-62. Like Aristotle, he was
interested in the physical sciences, and he had considerable knowledge of
Arabian and Jewish philosophy. He wrote
many commentaries on Aristotle and other philosophers. He is particularly notable for having been
the teacher of Aquinas.
METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[1] Albert distinguished clearly between
faith and reason. Each has a particular
role to play in its own sphere. Theology
is concerned with revelation [for example, Compendium
of Theology, I, iv] while reason deals with Being, which is manifested in natural
experience, and is the the
object of metaphysics. (This for
him included natural phenomena; he placed great value on the observation of
nature and on scientific knowledge.) There is no incompatibility
between faith and reason, but reason is recognised as having limits [ibid., I, iii, 13] [a]. God is the 'first Being (ens)'
or Principle and First Intelligence. He
is also omnipotent, self-knowing, pure act, and free to create. His existence is His substance and essence
which is indistinguishable from His will [b]. All these attributes are in reality but abstractions which we cannot
predicate of Him because He transcends all our concepts; we can refer to Him
only analogically [for example, Book
of Causes, I, iii, 6] [c]. However, Albert believes we can prove that God exists
because of the presence of motion in the world: an infinite chain of 'beginnings'
would be contradictory; there must be a first mover [ibid.,
I, i, 7]. But he rejects the ontological argument [d]. He supposes the
world was created freely by God in time and not from eternity, but this remains
a probability and cannot be proved [e]. He also describes creation in terms of an emanation from God as first
principle and Agent Intelligence [ibid.,
I, iv, 1] and accepted the
existence of 'seminal reasons' [f]. Further successive
'intelligences', exhibiting ever greater diffusion of goodness [g], produce their own sphere of the universe, ending in the
formation of the Earth, but God
is in no way lessened by the creative process [g]. As
for the production of
individual beings, Albert says that this is brought about through the imposition of forms
(which are images of God's Ideas) on matter as potentiality and by which it is
actualized [h]. Forms are thus ante rem as
the Divine Ideas, and also in re as
universals in things. In so far as the
soul can 'abstract' forms from
individual things they are also said to be post
rem [i]. It is matter which makes a thing a particular individual [Metaphysics, 12, I, 7] [j]. He is uncertain as to whether there is a multiplicity of forms in
individuals but he rejects
hylomorphism in so far as he considers form as dependent on a separate
intelligence [k] and as not in
itself constituting a composite with matter.
PSYCHOLOGY/KNOWLEDGE
[2] [See especially On the Nature and Origin of the Soul.] What the soul is (quod est)
is a non-material spiritual substance: that by which it is (quo est), as possibility, actualized and given its function as
soul is form which it receives from God, of whom it is
thereby the image. The soul is the
'animating' principle of the body [a]. Because it does not depend on the body for
its proper operations Albert reasons that the soul is immortal [2, vi] [b]. He says each individual has both a possible and a separate active
intellect but argues that there is not a single active intellect for all men [c]. This would be inconsistent with
the possession by each man of his own individual being (esse), that is, the act of the rational soul.
[3] The forms in things are knowable by virtue of God's agent intellect
which contains His Ideas [Metaphysics, 12, I, 9] [a]. This illuminates the active intellect of the individual soul thus
enabling it to 'abstract' images from experience of sensible objects [b]. The possible intellect
can thereby come to understand the sensible forms in things. From the understanding of sensible forms we
can move on to ultimate knowledge of God. But we are here at the limits of our abstractive power. God as transcendent can be known
only negatively or through His Ideas. Strictly
speaking He lies beyond such predications as 'being' or 'substance' [c].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Albert is important for his
clear demarcation of faith from reason and for his eclectic system which,
perhaps to a greater extent than in any previous philosophy, attempted to
incorporate Aristotelian elements into a framework which drew on both
Neoplatonist and Arabian thought. While
he did go some way towards resolving the conflict between illumination and
sense-experience as the source of knowledge (supported by his emphasis on
scientific observation and experimentation) by limiting the role of the former,
it is arguable that his philosophy remains essentially Neoplatonic and open to
the standard objections, and that genuine Aristotelian features are not
adequately integrated. Indeed there are
often serious inconsistencies in some of Albert's positions (for example, in
relation to creation). Some scholars also claim that he was not an original
thinker so much as an encyclopaedic but only partially successful
systematizer. Nevertheless, Albert
undoubtedly laid the foundations for the more coherent synthesis of his pupil
Thomas Aquinas.
F. Kovach
and R. Shahan (eds.), Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays.
CONNECTIONS
Albertus Magnus