AVICENNA
ISLAMIC NEOPLATONISM
Avicenna (Ibn Sina)
came from Bokhara in Persia, where his father was a government official. A polymath from an early age (compiling an
encyclopaedia of the sciences when only 21), he practised medicine and wrote
over a hundred books, including the million word Canon of Medicine. He was
also a statesman, and in 1024 became a senior minister to the Emir of Hamdan. He is regarded as the first major
systematizer of philosophy in the Islamic world.
METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[1] Although generally
Neoplatonic, Avicenna's metaphysics was strongly influenced by Aristotle,
and he regarded metaphysics as the study of Being as being and
its transcendental attributes [a]. He considered there to be three modes or levels in which essences or 'intelligibles' can exist: (1) in God's Intellect as immaterial Ideas (ante rem); (2) in individual material things
(first 'intention', or 'natural sign in the soul' signifying things) (in rebus); and (3) as mental constructions or
abstractions, 'universals' (second 'intention' signifying concepts or other
signs) (post rem) [b]. Essences, however, are what they are
regardless of their mode of existence. Avicenna supposed existence in individual things
to be an accidental property of their essence. He meant by this that while in itself an
individual, say, Socrates exists as a
possible thing, its existence is
necessitated by the essence 'humanity' of which it is but one realization or
embodiment; there are no
essences without any existent instances. Essence is thus logically prior to existence and is thus far separable
from it [c]. Similarly essences,
although 'contingent' (they might not have existed), derive their existence
necessarily from other essences. An infinitely regressive chain is not possible; there must be a necessarily
existent essence to cause and sustain in existence the universe. This necessary essence is God, the uncaused and eternal being whose
essence and existence are identical [d]. All such derived beings may therefore also be said to be necessary by
virtue of this necessary relationship to their causes [d]. However, while for Avicenna 'being' is in general a univocal
concept, it would seem that these derived beings (including
Aristotle's 'primary substances') are necessary beings in a different and
analogical sense from the one truly necessary Being, that is, God [e][e]. Avicenna also supposed there to be a plurality of forms
constituting the essence of an individual [f]. Socrates, for example, possesses the forms of
corporeality, animality, and humanity (the soul), as well as accidents which
contribute to his individuality.
[2] Avicenna distinguished
between potency and
actuality, on which potency is dependent. Potentiality is the principle by which a thing can change into another. It can exist as active potency (in agents) or
as passive potency (in the patient, that is, what is acted upon); and he said
that there is a gradation
from pure potential, 'formless' being,
which is prime and eternal matter, to pure actuality which again is
identified with God alone [a]. Further, because God has no potentiality or
lack, He must be absolute
Goodness from which all other divine (and equally necessary) attributes, such
as Truth and Love, are indistinguishable [b].
[3] Avicenna
argued that 'creation' was an eternal and necessary generative emanation of the temporal world from
the eternal God as a result of His self-knowledge and the radiation of His
goodness out of the necessity of His own nature [a]. But because He is simple He can have no knowledge of
multiplicity; and because He is spirit He cannot create material things directly. He therefore 'creates' the First Intelligence [b]; that is, it 'proceeds' from him, and is thus like
Himself. However, in this First Intelligence
existence and essence are distinct and its knowledge of itself (as 'possible')
is separate from its knowledge of God (as 'necessary') [c]. Nine more
'intelligences' are supposed by Avicenna to emanate hierarchically from the
First Intelligence, the successive causal stages exhibiting ever greater
multiplicity [d]. The last
and tenth ('Active Intelligence') (1) gives the form of
corporeality and specific (essential) forms [e] to pure
potentiality (matter) [e] thus producing bodies composed
of form and matter [e] (this being that which individuates concrete objects, including
individuals sharing these forms) [e]; (2) serves as a single Active Intellect which enables each individual soul to grasp
through abstraction the 'intelligibles', that is, universal essences in the
mind (post rem) [f]. Consistent with his account of God's knowledge
and the necessity of his
acts that Avicenna rejected providence and free-will [g]; and
he regarded evil as a
privation [h].
PSYCHOLOGY
[4] There are three kinds of soul received from the Active Intelligence
by and within appropriate compositions of matter. The animal soul takes up the vegetative;
while the individual
human rational, 'possible' or potential
soul or intellect takes over the other two [a]. It is a separate spiritual substance but is not the form of the body (matter being the
principle of individuation) [b]. Through the agency of the Active Intellect (Intelligence) the
'possible' soul is transformed into the
'acquired' or material intellect [c]. The latter can survive bodily death and, depending on the kind
of life it has led (that is, its degree of 'actualization'), it exists as an
individual soul in a state of eternal happiness or of torment, seeking its body (Avicenna thus does not
accept the doctrine of monopsychism) [d].
KNOWLEDGE
[5] Avicenna
distinguished between primary
intelligibles, such as logical truths, and secondary intelligibles, which are concepts and
demonstrative inferences. Knowledge of secondary
intelligibles presupposes sense-experience as a starting-point. The 'possible' soul must pass through three
stages if knowledge is to be possible. It starts as pure
passive potentiality; it then becomes 'positive' (partially in act) when it
receives the images from sense experience; and finally, when it becomes the
'acquired' material intellect, it can receive the secondary intelligibles as 'intentional objects' and grasp
universal essences with the help of
the illuminating and 'actualizing' power of the Active Intelligence [a]. Knowledge of the primary intelligibles
is gained directly from the Divine emanation [b]. Avicenna also argued that the concepts of being and individual thing, although generally gained
through sense-impressions, can be grasped necessarily through one's
consciousness of the self [c]. He
supposed further that certain 'prophets' by means of their 'imaginative faculty' can acquire through
direct revelation what is reached and translated through philosophy, and can
express it in symbolic language; so, although philosophy and theology
are separate domains, there
is no incompatibility between faith and reason [d]. Avicenna says we can have no positive knowledge of God as he is in
Himself; our approach can only be negative. But appropriate spiritual exercises can
enable the prophets to achieve a superior mystical vision of
God which transcends knowledge and language altogether [e].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Avicenna's subtle blend of Neoplatonism with
Aristotelian concepts proved to be a major stimulus both to other Arabian
thinkers and to Christian scholastics of the thirteenth century. The key features of his philosophy are his
emphasis on essences as existing in three modes, and on existence as an accident
of essence (except in God). However,
many of his doctrines were not accepted uncritically. The more Platonic and rationalist elements in
particular were subjected to close scrutiny for possible conflict with Islamic
orthodoxy, and were also to prove problematical for later Christian philosophy
especially his view of the necessity of God's actions, his rejection of a
creation in time in favour of the emanation account, and his denial that God
has knowledge of multiplicity.
Avicenna: Al-Shifāt' (The Healing); Al-Najāt (The Deliverance); Al-Ishārāt
wa al-Tanbīhāt (The Directives and Remarks). There does not seem to be a convenient
collection of Avicenna's principal writings in English translation. But see O. Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic
Philosophy.
Studies
D. B. Burell, 'Avicenna', in J. J. E. Garcia
(ed.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
L. E. Goodman, Avicenna.
R. Wisnovsky, Aspects of Avicenna.
Collections of essays
P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor (eds), The Cambridge Companion to
Arabic Philosophy.
G. M. Wickens (ed.), Avicenna, Scientist and Philosopher: A Millenary Symposium.
CONNECTIONS
Avicenna
Note: The Neoplatonic influence on Avicenna can be
traced primarily to Books IV-VI of Plotinus's Enneads and to the Elements
of Theology of Proclus, both of which were translated into Arabic but were
believed by contemporary Muslim philosophers to be works of Aristotle. Many of the ideas contained in these works
were also utilized and transmitted to Avicenna by Al-Farabi (c. 873-950). However, in the following references the
Neoplatonic tendencies in Avicenna's philosophy will be attributed to Plotinus
for convenience. (See also the Profile
on Proclus.)