| Philo |
| Sophos |
philosophy is for everyone
and not just philosophers
philosophers should know lots
of things besides philosophy
Philosophical Connections Home
Preface by Anthony Harrison-Barbet
Alphabetical list of philosophers
Dr Anthony Harrison-Barbet In Memoriam
Philosophical Connections
Compiled by Anthony Harrison-Barbet
WILLIAM of OCKHAM
NOMINALISM/ EMPIRICISM
William (of) Ockham was born in the village of that name in Surrey, England. He entered the Franciscan order before studying theology at Oxford, c. 1310-18. He was accused of heresy (his writings were condemned in 1326 and he was excommunicated); and he came into conflict with the Holy See at Avignon (1324-8) over the issue of evangelical poverty. Later, in Munich, where he was supported by the Emperor, he was again embroiled in controversy, this time concerning the issue of the relation of Church power to the state. Because of the interruption of his career he never attained professorial rank, and he therefore became known as Venerabilis Inceptor ('inceptor' being the term used to describe those awaiting the award of their teaching licence). He is said to have died of the plague.
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE/ LOGIC
[1] [See especially Commentaries on the Sentences, I, 2 passim.] Ockham contributed greatly to the development of the 'logic of terms' which had been introduced in the twelfth century and developed in the thirteeenth. Propositions consist of terms. These are of two kinds: (1) categorematic terms, which have meaning because of their reference to real things; (2) syncategorematic terms, which have only a logical function — to link categorematic terms. Thus, in 'All men are mortal' 'men' and 'mortal (thing)' are categorematic, while 'all' is syncategorematic. Categorematic terms or words, whether spoken or written, are called conventional signs in so far as it is a linguistic convention that a given thing is referred to by a particular name ( the species 'man' in English, 'homo' in Latin, for example). But these different signs express the same state of mind (intentio) and thus have something in common. This common feature is called a natural sign and is the concept or meaning (terminus conceptus) of the conventional sign [Comms I, 2, vii] [a]. Ockham adopted also the distinction between 'first intention' and 'second intention' [see also Quodlibetal Questions IV, 19]. Terms of first intention refer to things which are not signs of a language, for example, dog, tree. But terms of second intention refer to signs of other signs in the language (for example the word 'dog') or to natural signs (concepts). In other words, terms of second intention stand for terms of first intention. The referring characteristic of terms is brought into play when the terms are used in propositions. Ockham says they then have a 'suppositio': they can 'stand for' things in a variety of ways. And he adopted the classification which had been current in the thirteenth century [ibid. 2, iv]. (1) A term can be said to be 'material' (suppositio materialis). This is the word itself considered as a sound — the sound made when we utter 'man'. (2) A term can signify a particular individual, whether outside or within the mind (Socrates, this man, for example). Words functioning in this way are called 'personal' (suppositio personalis). (3) A term can be the actual concept in the mind [b] (man as that which is common to all individual men — the species man). Such terms are called 'simple' (suppositio simplex). It is only in its second function that a word actually relates to something other than itself. Building on Aristotelian foundations, Ockham also examined formally and extensively the logic of modalities, modal terms such as as contingency, possibility, and necessity being regarded by him as properly applicable only to propositions. Contingent propositions state facts about things actually existing (as determinable by the user of the proposition). But if such propositions can be translated into negative or hypothetical propositions involving possibility, then they are said to be necessary [c], for example, 'All the tables in this room are brown' is contingent, while 'All men are mortal' is necessary (because it means 'If there is a man he is mortal'). As for the truth-values of propositions, Ockham says all propositions must be determinately true or false [d]: there can be no propositions which do not have a truth-value.
.Ockham's views on logic and language, underpin his conceptualism (or 'nominalism') and his attack on what he sees as redundant or superfluous abstract entities. This is important for an understanding of his metaphysics [sec. 3] and theory of knowledge [sec. 2]. His criterion is implicit in 'Ockham's Razor' — "entities are not to be multiplied more than is necessary". (There is no evidence that he actually used these words, though he did write "plurality is never to be assumed unless required" [Comms., I, 27, 2] ). He says that misunderstanding of the way language works often leads us to postulate the existence of such, abstract entities. Consider, for example, the proposition 'Socrates is wise'. 'Socrates' always 'supposits' the same entity — the term is absolute. But 'wise' is a connotative term; and although it primarily qualifies Socrates we may also take it to refer secondarily to something else, namely wisdom. It is this tendency that Ockham criticizes, for it shows that we have failed to appreciate the nature of logical predication. However, he does allow the use of abstract names of sensible qualities of things such as whiteness and sweetness. Otherwise he wants to eliminate references to abstract entities by rephrasing or 'reducing' the language in which they occur or are implied. Thus general names are turned into connotative predicates and proper names become descriptions [e].
KNOWLEDGE
[2] [See especially Comms I, Prologue.] Knowledge as a 'science' (a body of propositions based on universal principles) is divided by Ockham into real science and rational science [Comms I, 2, iv]. It is said to be real when its propositions are about actual things, but rational when the propositions are just about other terms, as in logic [a]. The first principles are demonstrable or non-demonstrable. They are the latter if their truth is evident to the mind, either as soon as we understand the meaning of their terms (as in necessary truths such as 'The whole is greater than the part'), or through experience alone (as in the contingent propositions such as 'All heat gives warmth'). Demonstrable knowledge, however, involves syllogistic argument grounded in non-demonstrable knowledge. Non-demonstrable knowledge is thus foundational for Ockham. At the heart of his account is the notion of intuitive knowledge [see, for example, Comms Prologue, 1, ii]. Intuitive knowledge of an individual thing is that knowledge by virtue of which it can be known whether a thing exists or not. It involves a direct awareness, an act of immediate apprehension, of a mental or real object. It may arise from sensation or it may be an intellectual intuition — which can also include reflexive intuitions of ourselves as acting or willing and of our own awareness of our mental acts. Truths known intuitively are contingent in that they provide demonstrable evidence of contingent but not of necessary things. Perfect intuitive knowledge, Ockham says, is experiential and is the basis of universal propositions and is thus the 'principle of art and science'. We can also have knowledge which is concerned with understanding and not with demonstration. This is abstractive knowledge: this deals not with facts but with universals and propositions or judgements about objects — without regard to the question of their actual existence. Abstractive knowledge of an object, however, must derive from some intuitive knowledge of it. All knowledge is thus grounded in verifiable sensible or intellectual experience, with no appeal to any kind of external 'illumination'. And experience defines the limits of our knowledge [b]. There can be no inference from causes to effects except through experience [Comms I, Prologue 9] [c]. But Ockham does allow that God has the power to cause in us an intuition of an object even though it is not actually present to us, or, in other words, without any mediation of secondary causes [Quod. VI, 6]. By definition such knowledge could not of course be 'evident'.
It is clear that given Ockham's views on logic and language and his emphasis on the individual concrete particular we can have knowledge of universals only in so far as they have mental existence alone — being but signs predicable commonly of several things signified; they do not have real existence [d]. Likewise, while we can have intuitive knowledge of our mental acts and may suppose they are acts of an 'extended and corporeal form', we can have no knowledge of an immaterial soul; nor can we prove its existence philosophically. Instead we must rely on revealed truth and faith [e]. As for God, we can have neither intuitive nor abstractive knowledge of His nature, though Ockham says we can have conceptual knowledge of Him [Comms. I, 2, ix]. However, any such concepts are not what he calls 'quidditative' concepts, that is, concepts which denote a single reality 'directly', but are either connotative (for example, God is non-finite) or are extrapolations from concepts applying univocally to our experience (as when we attribute infinite wisdom to Him on the basis of our experience of wisdom). Nevertheless such conceptual knowledge is still confined to nominal representation in propositions [f].
METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[3] Metaphysics is the 'science of being', but according to Ockham being is to be understood as a concept or natural sign for what all existing things have in common, namely that they exist [a]. For him, 'essence' or 'being' has the same meaning as 'existence'; existence and essence are distinguishable only mentally [a]. In a narrower sense metaphysics may be said to have different branches, each concerned with different kinds of things — substances, qualities, God. The term 'being' is thus both univocal and equivocal. It is univocal when it is used as a predicate with the same meaning for all things, that is, they 'have' being, they exist. But it is equivocal when applied to different kinds of things; it has a different meaning in each case [Comms I, Prologue, 9; I, 2 and 3; III, 9] [b].
Because of his 'nominalism' and 'empiricist' theory of knowledge, metaphysics for Ockham tends to be negative — a critique of previous views. Of special significance is the consequent separating of faith from reason and the extreme limitations imposed on the scope of reason itself [c]. The content of Ockham's own positive position is in general confined to the notion of the individual thing. Thus a substance is regarded as individual; it is neither an 'essence' nor a category in itself. We can know nothing of substances in themselves other than what is given to us in sensible experience. We then understand it only by means of connotative and negative predicates (respectively, 'self-subsistent being' and 'being which is not in something else'). But Ockham also supposes that the sensible qualities are distinct from substances (and can be separated from them by God), while predicates denoting qualities ('large', 'heavy', etc.) are in fact just ways of referring to substances — the way substances exist [d]. Likewise, in his account of 'common natures' he rejects all kinds of realism. The 'common nature' is neither really distinct from that which 'individuates', nor is it formally distinct; nor can the 'common nature' be both singular and universal (depending on the way we think about it). The universal (first and second 'intention') for Ockham [see, for example, Comms I, 2, vi - viii; Quodlibet. IV, 9] is an signifying 'act of the understanding' and has no real existence. It is simply a concept of a collection of signified individuals and known in a confused manner. He talks of nature as being known in the universal 'occultly'. There can be no extramental existent universals. Everything general in the created world — species, forms, judgements, relations, and so on, exist only in the intellect. This constitutes a separate order of being from real things in the world [e]. Relations, for example, 'being the father of', have no real existence; they are names or concepts which stand for 'absolutes' in the natural world. The relationship of creatures to God or vice versa is likewise neither real nor 'mental'; it is but the way we talk about how created beings depend on a relative Being. A similar 'nominalist' rejection of essentialism is to be found in Ockham's account of motion, space, and time [f]. No thing is denoted by these terms. Rather it is individual things which move, that is, change their place, time being inseparable from motion and signifying the soul's knowledge of before and after. Ockham thinks of individual things or 'absolutes' (substances, sensible qualities) as distinct and independent of each other. Their existence is contingent — dependent on God's will, and there is no necessary connection between them [g].
Ockham's approach to the doctrine of four causes is consistently empirical and anti-metaphysical. [See, for example, Comms I, I, iii; II, 2 and 3.] Matter, he says, is not pure potentiality but is physical body — its extension being corporeal form; while form is simply the way the material body is shaped or structured. Matter and form are thus not strictly causes in Aristotle's sense. Ockham admits efficient causality but interprets it empirically: to say that A is the efficient cause of B is to say that B regularly follows when A occurs but otherwise does not. Moreover, knowledge that A is the cause of B presupposes intuitive cognition of both the cause and effect, and that we have repeated experience of their conjunction. As for the notion of final cause, Ockham dismisses this as metaphorical. We have no evidence that natural bodies act to bring about some end, only that they behave as if, they were. In reality they act in a particular way (depending on circumstances) because it is of their nature to do so. Causal relationships in general are contingent in that they have to be verified empirically [h].
[4] As might be expected, Ockham criticizes traditional proofs for the existence of God — in the sense of the absolutely perfect, infinite being. [See Comms I, 2 and 3 passim.] Because he has rejected final causation in natural things, he says we cannot argue to the existence of an end towards which individual actions are directed. Still less could we show that there is but one end, namely, God. As for the argument from efficient causality, we cannot prove that there is not an infinite regress. And even if we can show there is a first efficient cause we can know nothing of its nature; it is therefore not God [a]. It follows from his criticisms of such arguments that, for Ockham, the philosopher can say nothing about God's nature except imperfectly and inaccurately by the use of 'connotative' or negative terms [Ibid. I, 35, v] [b]. Thus if God is a being, then we can affirm that he must be good, as this is a property common to himself and his creatures. In general Ockham said that God's attributes can be demonstrated provided the middle term of the relevant syllogism is a concept which is common in this sense, that is, a connotative term. Otherwise the middle term forms the definition of what we seek to establish, and the argument is then circular (as, for example, with the concept of creativity). To claim that God can produce something out of nothing, that He is omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, and so on is a matter for theology not philosophy; and therefore no proof is possible [c]. This position also informs Ockham's discussion of the treatment by earlier philosophers of divine ideas, divine knowledge, and will. He rejects the view that there is any real plurality or distinction in God's intellect. Divine ideas exist only in the sense that they are identifiable with His creatures — individual things, substances and qualities, matter and form, which of course He knows [d]. Given Ockham's nominalism and emphasis on individuality, there can be no such ideas if equated with the universal, species, negations, and so on. The number of 'individuals', however, is infinite. If God knows His creatures, He must also have perfect intuitive knowledge of past and future contingent events directly through His essence: but Ockham says we cannot say how precisely God accomplishes this. All we can affirm is that either A is true or not-A is true and that God knows which is the case [Ibid I, 35, v; 38, i]. However, Ockham rejects fatalism [e]. He says further that there is no distinction between God's intellect and His will — both of which are identical with the divine essence and therefore have the same meaning [f]. However, we may talk of will with reference to God's omnipotence and his ability to cause directly anything to occur without intermediate or secondary causes, provided it is logically possible [Ibid., I, 42 and 45]. Moreover, it is because God's power is absolute (potentia absoluta) — even to the extent of dispensing with the natural order, if that be His will — that matters of faith lie beyond the purview of philosophy [see ibid. I, 17] [g].
PSYCHOLOGY
[5] [See, for example, Quod. I, 10, 12, and 16; II, 10 and 11; Comms I, 3 and 4; II 22 and 26.] According to Ockham, there are three distinct 'forms' or souls. At the lowest level we have a corporeal soul (as do animals in general). Then there is a corruptible sensitive soul — to which we tend to attribute our acts of understanding and willing. Lastly there is the intellectual soul [a]. This is regarded as incorruptible and therefore cannot inform corruptible matter directly. However, the soul's nature and its immortality cannot be demonstrated philosophically [b]. Ockham says also that each soul is integral. Thus the intellectual soul cannot be divided into parts or faculties, though it can bring about different kinds of act. Similarly the sensitive soul can 'perfect' different parts of a body — the organs of sight, hearing, and so on — without itself possessing distinct powers. He also maintains that the sensitive and rational souls are not only distinct but also separable from each other. At the same time he continues to regard man as a unity. And he says there is no proof of a universal active intellect; this is a matter of faith [c]. He also places emphasis on the ensouled man's freedom to accept or reject the dictates of both the sensitive appetites and the judgements of the intellect.
ETHICS
[6] [For example, Comms II, 19; III, 12 and 13.] The created world, according to Ockham, is contingent not only with respect to the individuals it consists of and their causal relationships but also in its moral foundations. By virtue of his 'appointed power' (potentia ordinata) God has laid down a particular moral code for His creatures to follow. But this is a consequence of His will not his essence; and Ockham says God, by virtue of His absolute power, can demand obedience to acts quite opposite to those He has established, though we are obliged to obey whatever ordinances He has in fact determined. Ockham thus rejects the idea of an immutable natural law grounded in God's Reason [a]. Nevertheless, our wills remain free to obey or disobey both revealed truths and judgements of our rational intellects [b]. Our acts are virtuous only when they both conform to our conscience, that is, what we believe to be right reason, and are done because they accord with it [Ordinatio, I, d. 41] [c]. They are not virtuous when done for other motives. Even if one's conscience is erroneous one is obliged to follow it, for the Divine Will wills that creatures should follow the dictates of non-blameworthy reason. Indeed not to do so would be a sin [Reportatio, III q. 13]. As for the proper end of virtuous action, this is perfect happiness — ultimately achieved in our enjoyment of the Divine Essence (though Ockham does not think this is philosophically provable) [d].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
While he shared some points in common with Scotus, Ockham was generally a vigorous critic not only of the Subtle Doctor's metaphysical realism but also of certain aspects of Aristotelianism. There has been some dispute as to whether Ockham should be regarded as a conceptualist or as a nominalist. However, given his emphasis on the primacy of natural signs (as states of mind but not as entities existing ante rem) rather than on words, 'conceptualist' would seem to be the more appropriate description. As a corollary of this conceptualist philosophy (which also exhibits both empiricist and rationalist features) Ockham regarded individual things as the only reality. He thus goes further than Scotus in rejecting not only natural theology but also metaphysics. Metaphysical concepts, such as substance, species, relations, are now only mental constructs. Essence is the same as existence; knowledge is confined to intuitions (of objects or facts) or abstractions (of propositions). Causality is understood solely in terms of regular sequences. Physical concepts (motion, space, time) are to be dealt with quantitatively not qualitatively. There can be no certain proofs of God's existence (though it is probable that He does exist) or that the soul is spiritual and immortal. Ockham's sceptical theology even led him to suppose that God is will, that He has absolute power to do anything that is not logically impossible. God's grace becomes redundant so far as human behaviour is concerned. This leads to a tension between Ockham's acceptance of the Aristotelian/ Thomistic idea of an immutable natural law knowable by the reason and his view that what is morally good can be arbitrarily decided by God. How could human reason discover this except through revelation and faith?
To the extent that Ockham was an empiricist and a realist (but not of the Scotist kind), he cannot be criticized for any form of phenomenalism or positivism. And arguably of all mediaeval thinkers he holds the greatest appeal for the majority of Anglo-American 'linguistic' and empiricist philosophers today, though it might fairly be said that, while he was critical of the metaphysics he had inherited, his commitment to individuality carries with it an implicit metaphysics of its own. From the standpoint of Thomism, of course, serious objections can be made against his positions, not least his sundering of faith from reason, his theory of knowledge, and his suggestion of Divine indeterminacy. But his impact on fourteenth century philosophy and theology was profound. To all intents and purposes it ended scholasticism. Reason led to empiricism, agnosticism, or scepticism, and a concentration on natural science. Faith was left to itself as irrational commitment, and often became assimilated to mysticism. Metaphysics in the full sense was not to be completely restored until the emergence of the modified Thomism of Suarez or the rationalism of Descartes. Ockham's terminist logic too was to be influential for some two hundred years.
READING
Ockham: Quodlibeta Septem (1487) (Quodlibetal Questions); Super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum — Questiones (1495) (Commentaries on Peter Lombard's 'Sentences'; Book I called Ordinatio; the other three books are called Reportatio); see also his Summa Totius Logicae (1488) (Compendium of Logic ). For a selection of his writings see P. Boehner (ed.), Philosophical Writings; also McKeon , op. cit. vol. II, ch. 6.
Studies
G. Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse.
M. McCord Adams, Ockham.
T. Noone, 'William of Ockham', in J. J. E. Garcia (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
Collections of essays
P. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham
P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham.
CONNECTIONS
William of Ockham
[1a] Formal logic of terms; signs and reference [1b]
[2b c]
[1a]
[2a]
[1b] 1st and 2nd 'intention'; suppositio and different functions of language; signification of terms [2a 3a 4a]
[2c]
[1b]
[1c]
[1a]
[1a]
[1c; cf. 2a] Contingent and necessary propositions; modal logic [1c]
[2d]
[1c]
[1c]
[1d; cf. 4e] Truth of propositions and bivalence [2a 3b]
[2e]
[2b]
[1e 3a; see also secs 2 & 3] Nominalism — rejection of abstract concepts and 'realism'; language 'analysis'; proper names and descriptions [14c 16d e et al.]
[2a]
[1b 6e et al.]
[2a]
[1a]
[1c]
[3c]
[1d]
[1d]
[2a] Science — 'real' and 'rational' Aristotle→ [16a]
[2b] Intuitive knowledge (of the 'individual') and abstractive knowledge: grounded in experiential limits; reflexive awareness of our mental acts [16a 16b 17a]
[6a 6c 6f]
[5a c d 5b]
[2a]
[1a 2c]
[2c; cf. 3h] Cause and effect: inference only via experience [sec. 9]
[2f]
[2g]
[2d; cf. 3d e] Knowledge of universals only as mental concepts/ names; primacy of individual/ particular [16a d]
[6e]
[5d]
[2e]
[1b]
[1b]
[3c]
[2e] Soul's knowledge of mental acts, not of itself [15b 16d]
[6g]
[5e]
[2c 3b]
[2f] No knowledge of God — only as nominal representation in propositions [7a]
[1a 5e]
[3a; cf. 4f] Metaphysics concerned with concept of being as common to all existents; essence and existence synonymous — distinction only mental [7b 13a]
[1b 1d]
[1a 2b]
[2a]
[3b] 'Being' univocal and equivocal (different contextual usages) [3c]
[1c]
[3c] Faith and reason separate; limits [1a]
[1a]
[1c]
[6c]
[1a]
[3d] Substance neither 'essence' nor category in itself but an individual possessing sensible qualities — through which it is known [4a b]
[1c]
[2c 5d]
[2b]
[3a]
[3e] 'Common natures'/ universals, relations, etc. have existence only in intellect — as signs ('anti realism') [16d]
[2a]
[2c]
[6e]
[2c 5d]
[3c 4a]
[1b]
[3c]
[3f] Motion, space, time — nominalist approach Aristotle→ [12b c]
[3g] Contingent existence of individual things (substances & qualities) [9b]
[1c 3e]
[3h] The four 'causes': matter (body not potentiality) and form (structure) not causes; efficient 'cause' as regularity; final 'cause' metaphorical; causal relations contingent, verifiable only empirically [9b 13c]
[2f]
[4a] God's existence: rejects ontological and teleological proofs, and efficient cause arguments (no knowledge of first cause); no proof there is no infinite regress [12d-f]
[1e]
[3d 3e g h]
[3a]
[5a]
[4b; cf. 2f] Nothing sayable about God except by connotative or negative terms [3c]
[3b]
[4c] God's creation of world ex nihilo not provable [12e]
[3f]
[3e]
[4d] Divine ideas: only as identifiable with created individuals known by God [4c]
[3b]
[3c]
[4e; cf. 1d] God's intuitive knowledge of past, present, future; rejection of fatalism [3b 10a]
[4a]
[4f] No distinction/ plurality in God's intellect, or between his intellect and will [3a]
[3b]
[4g] God's absolute power; will not subordinate to intellect; natural order alterable [8c]
[3d 6c]
[2b]
[5a] The soul: three distinct types; intellectual as form of body (but not provable); plurality of forms in man — form of corporeity [14a 15b c]
[2c 5a 5e]
[2d 4a b]
[5b] Soul in body; immortality not demonstrable [15e]
[5e]
[4c]
[5c] Integrity of each soul type: no faculties/ powers; no proof of universal active intellect; unity of man/ person [15b d]
[5a b 5d f]
[4b 4b]
[6a] God's moral code from his will not essence — can require his own code to be overridden; moral law contingent [8c]
[6c]
[6a]
[3c]
[6b] Human will not subordinate to intellect; free to disobey moral law [4a 5c]
[4d]
[6c; cf. 6a] Virtuous acts: reason as norm: conformity to conscience — no other motive [20a d]
[8b]
[6b]
[11a]
[6d] Happiness as end of virtue; enjoyment of divine essence [18d]
[8a]