BRENTANO
(1838 1917)
PHENOMENOLOGY
Born in Marienburg, Germany, Franz
Brentano studied Aristotelian philosophy at Berlin before being ordained as a
Roman Catholic priest in 1864. Two years
later he was appointed lecturer and in 1872 professor of philosophy at the
University of Würzburg only to give up
his religious and academic posts the next year. He accepted the Chair at Vienna in 1874 but again resigned four years
afterwards so as to marry, though he returned as lecturer in 1895. Among his many distinguished pupils were
Freud, Meinong, and Husserl.
PHENOMENOLOGY/ KNOWLEDGE/ LANGUAGE
[1] [Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint.] Brentano's descriptive psychology (he was
later to call it descriptive
phenomenology) is essentially an examination of mental phenomena or acts. He distinguished three classes: (1) representations (Vorstellungen),
including ideas, images, thoughts, and sensations; (2) judgements; (3) emotions. Common to all these is
"intentional (and mental) inexistence", that is, intentionality, thereby making a distinction between the mental and
the physical. 'Representations' ('ideas'
in a broad sense) are thus not definitive of our mental life; they have
"reference to a content" and "direction upon [or pointing towards] an object". Intentionality is the characterizing feature
of mental acts. In a mental act we are aware both of its content
and of our awareness of the act itself. However, he rejects the view that we can 'observe' our mental processes
by some kind of introspection. Rather, we 'perceive' our mental acts (as opposed to the
empirical or scientific 'observing' of 'ideas', such as colours, shapes,
sounds) each act being simultaneously an awareness of the
representation and of the act of awareness itself [a]. Leaving aside the common feature of
intentionality, Brentano
regards the three classes of mental acts as quite distinct. Representations and judgements are not to be
considered as themselves both falling under the concept of thinking. Representations and judgements have the same
'content' (within which he distinguishes between the intentional object,
towards which the mental act is directed, and the 'immanent objectivity' of a
mental phenomenon or act). But objects given to us as bare
representations are accepted without any consideration of their truth or
falsity, whereas judgements involve our adopting an 'intellectual stance'; we
recognise, that is, accept, assent to the objects of a mental phenomenon [b]. These 'objects' are distinct from judgements but are not to be regarded as any kind of propositional 'entity'
or 'fact'. This means that Brentano's
view of judgement is that it is non-propositional and non-factual, and that the
term is sufficient for the expression of its content. To judge that there is, say, a black cat is
just to acknowledge an object. To judge
all cats are black is to reject non-black objects. In this context Brentano rejected the correspondence theory of truth on the grounds that (1) in geometry, for example, nothing 'corresponds' to true
judgements; (2) it cannot account for false judgements (we cannot invoke
'negative facts' for truths to corrspond to); (3) it leads to an infinite
regress. In general he was unwilling to commit himself to propositional
'entities' except as a matter of convenience. Underlying his non-propositional view of judgement is Brentano's
assertion that predicative
judgements (such, as S is P) are a sub-class of existential ones, for example,
'An S (which is P) exists' or 'Some Ss (which are Ps) exist' [c]. As for the third class
(emotions), towards these we take up an attitude of loving or hating according
as to whether we feel pleased or displeased with the phenomenon. But representations remain primary in that
judgements and emotions presuppose them. Brentano's account of judgement not
only underpins his epistemology but also reflects his view that logic and the drawing of inferences are grounded in
empirical psychology [d].
[2] Brentano argues that language consists of three kinds
of terms: (1) referential, (2) 'synsemantic' (both of which would seem to refer to
'entities'; of some kind) and (3) syncategorematic (terms such as 'and', 'is'). The function of the first type
is to identify particulars [a]. These may be either concrete, that
is, 'real', or abstract. Only concrete
things are objects of our thought. However, he says that abstract terms can always be reformulated so as to
have concrete reference. Thus, 'Red is a
colour' becomes 'A red thing is as such a coloured thing'. He also presents a theory of the
'genuineness' of concepts which appeals to a criterion of asymmetrical
dependence. For example, the concept of
a 'whole' is genuine, whereas 'part' and 'that which affects or produces' are
not. This is because a part can cease
without changing itself, while a whole will change itself into a part.
The second type of terms includes words such as 'exist', 'true', 'good' [on the last see sec. 4]; and Brentano says that their job is to express acceptance or rejection in
acts of judgement based on 'evidence'. So if we say, for example, 'x exists', what we are doing is expressing
our acceptance of x; while to say 'It is true that p' (where 'p' might be 'x
exists' or 'x is red') is to reject 'evident rejectors' of x or y as red. 'Truth' (and 'falsity') for Brentano thus belong to the mental act of
judging [b] and not to the object or the immanent
objectivity of judgements, or to propositions. By 'evident
rejectors' (and 'acceptors') Brentano
means those people who in their acts of judgement appeal to evidence (as
against 'blind' judgements). Evidence is indirect or direct,
the former being grounded ultimately in the latter. Direct evidence relates either to 'inner
perception' (involving immediate data of the senses) or to reason or insight (as in the case of judgements about mathematical propostions and logical
propositions such as 'a whole cannot exist without parts' or 'that which is of
one colour is, as such, other than that which is of a different colour'). All evident judgements are true.
The evidence of mathematical and logical judgements would seem to lie in the
analyticity of their propositions. We also have direct
evidence of our mental acts themselves: we know these as the 'second object'. As for judgements about the external
world ('outer perception'), although true they are not evident but
'blind'. However, Brentano allows that such judgements, as well as
those relating to memory, may be supposed to have a high degree of probability [c]. [See also The True and the Evident.]
ONTOLOGY
[3] [Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint.] Underpinning Brentano's 'descriptive'
psychology is a sophisticated but complex doctrine of categories,
which, he says, are the various ways in which a subject 'dwells in' (innewohnt) the 'accidental totality'.
(The accidental is that which a substance, as concrete individual or particular thing, includes
within itself at a particular time, and according to Brentano the subject can
exist without accidents but not conversely.) In so far as they
relate to both 'inner' and 'outer' perception Brentano's categories are a
posteriori [a]. The final 'differentia' of substances,
however, are not grasped in inner or outer perception because we have no
absolute intuition of time. Furthermore, the concept of unity of
consciousness is not a persuasive indicator of a non-spatial, simple 'soul-substance'
(he called it 'null-dimensional'), which he regards as the subject of
consciousness, although he thinks it might be united with its body or
'physical nature' without contradiction. The problem is that we
do not know whether the 'ultimate subject' of what is given to us in inner
perception is material or spiritual (seelische). Indeed we can know nothing of any transcendent soul, although he claimed, in the context of his proofs for he existence of God [see sec. 5],
that it was created by God
out of nothing and is immortal [b].
Like other entities, the soul is
understood by Brentano as being a concrete individual, that is, an entity from
which further differentia are excluded. However, because our attempts to 'access'
it must be made through 'outer' perception a 'universal' element is
involved. He argues that there cannot
be only universals, as this would lead to a contradiction between identity and
difference as applied to the same entity; and in any case sentences containing references
to universals as 'abstract' entities and other 'irreal' things can be
reformulated in such a way that they refer to real, concrete things [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,
II] [c].
ETHICS
[4] [The
Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong.] Brentano's ethics derive from the third class of mental phenomena
emotions. These, like judgements, may be
'correct' or 'incorrect'. A good
action or thing is then defined 'synsemantically' in terms of the impossibility
of loving it incorrectly; and conversely the bad in terms of the impossibility
of hating it incorrectly. Thus, to call
an action good or bad is to reject (apodictically) incorrect lovers and
incorrect haters respectively. For Brentano
the correctness is objective in so far as it is not possible for one individual
to love correctly or incorrectly what is hated correctly/ incorrectly by
somebody else. However, he repudiated absolutist ethics
grounded in, for example, a formal categorical imperative. For him, love and hate possess essentially
the character of evaluative approval and are not to be regarded as akin to,
say, desire. And, indeed, Brentano rejected subjectivist and relativist ethics, and appeals to, for example, fear or
authority. The aim of morality is the choosing of the best of
all possibly attainable ends [a] (such as, perhaps, knowledge and
self-fulfilment). He also allowed
degrees of goodness, one end being better than another in the sense that it is
'correct' to prefer it. But ethical
knowledge is independent of metaphysics which alone can answer the question
whether the world is meaningful. The possibility of choice the
attribution to individuals of free will and responsibility is not in
doubt; he rejects both determinism and
indeterminism [b] (he accepts chance
but denies that it can be absolute) [Essay
on Knowledge].
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[5] [On
the Existence of God.] Brentano attempted to prove the existence of God as a necessary being
by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason (which he supposed to be
logically necessary) and starting from the contingency of the world. That God is also good and intelligent can be
proved from the evidence of design [a].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Brentano's theory of judgement and his
account of knowledge which would seem to combine something of the
'subjective' certainty of both Cartesianism and Humean empiricism with the more
'objective' moderate realist position characteristic of the Aristotelian
Thomist tradition are both of considerable interest. His importance, however, lies primarily in
the influence he had on the phenomenological movement (of which many have
regarded him as having been the founder). But his central concept of 'intentional inexistence' has given rise to much critical
discussion. Intentionality is supposed
to be uniquely characteristic of mental states, and can therefore be pointed to
as presenting a difficulty for physicalist accounts for mental life not least
because (it is claimed by some scholars, but contentiously) that Brentano
himself held that the language we use to refer to mental states cannot be about
real, that is, physical entities. Some
philosophers have also argued that if intentionality is essentially a feature
of language then it is in fact the
same as intensionality; and this leads to problems concerning the attribution
of truth-values to sentences when substitutions (of terms, predicates, other
sentences) are made in intensional contexts. Many physicalists (who tend to be extensionalists) have also maintained
that it is possible to adopt an 'intentional stance' towards physical systems
without attributing mental states of consciousness to them.
There are further difficulties with
Brentano's concept. (1) Some of our
mental states (for example, sensations) would seem not to be 'about' or
'directed' at anything. (2) Brentano
regarded intentionality as a characteristic of mental phenomena. But this raises
the problem of the mental realm itself: how this is to be understood
and whether this postulation can withstand the attacks of physicalists. (3) He
was also criticized by Husserl and Frege for his supposed 'psychologism' (a
position which Husserl himself had initially adopted). Some commentators, however, have argued that this disregards Brentano's
empirical account of 'evidence' and his rejection of 'introspectionist'
psychology in favour of 'descriptive' psychology.
Note also that Brentano [in his The
Psychology of Aristotle] supposed his central concept of intentionality
the distinction between the real
existence of external objects and their 'intentional' existence to have been
anticipated by Aristotle's account of sensation as involving reception of form
but not matter [On the Soul see
Aristotle 16c]. Recent scholarship [see especially R. Sorabji, Articles on Aristotle,
Vol. 4, pp. 51-3; see also Lawson-Tancred's Introduction to de Anima,
pp. 102-3] has tended to regard Brentano as having misinterpreted Aristotle's
account of perception and therefore being mistaken in his claim.
Brentano: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874) (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, & L. McAlister); Vom
Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889) (The Origin of our Knowledge of
Right and Wrong, trans. R. Chisholm & E. Schneewind); Vom Dasein
Gottes (1929) (On the Existence of God, trans. S. Krantz); Wahrheit
und Evidenz (1930, posthumously) (The True and the Evident, trans.
R. Chisholm, I. Politzer, & K. Fischer).
Studies
R. M. Chisholm, Realism
and the Background of Phenomenology.
L. L. McAlisdair, The
Philosophy of Franz Brentano.
D. Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology.
Collection of
essays
D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano.
CONNECTIONS
Brentano