SEARLE
(b.
1932)
ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY
John Searle was born in Denver,
Colorado, and educated at the Universities of Wisconsin and Oxford, where he
was a Rhodes Scholar. A lecturer at
Christ Church, Oxford, 1957-9, he subsequently became Professor of Mind and
Language at the University of California, Berkeley, and has been a visiting
professor at many other universities in the U.S.A. and Europe.
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
[1] [Speech
Acts; see also Expression and Meaning.] Central to Searle's account of language is the concept of a speech-act, which he sees as a type of human action. His philosophy of language is thus a branch
of the philosophy of mind (though he draws on his views of language for his
exposition of the latter). The production of a 'sentence
token' in a performance of a speech-act is an illocutionary act, and the
basic unit of linguistic communication. The performance of illocutionary acts is a rule-grounded form of
behaviour and is constitutive (as opposed to the regulative employment of
rules). Illocutionary acts in general have (1) propositional content, that is, meaning,
and (2) illocutionary force [a],
that is, how propositions are to be taken as stating, warning, questioning,
and so on.
A theory of meaning for Searle
must involve rules for the use of expressions in speech-acts [b]. Illocutionary acts have both intentional and
conventional aspects. A speaker intends
to produce certain effects by means of getting a hearer to recognise the
intention, and intends the recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact
that rules for use associate expressions with the production of effects. Searle argues in favour of the view that meanings are, as it were, 'in
the head' grounded in the intentional mental states of speakers and hearers,
but he rejects the necessity to postulate the existence of a 'third realm' [c] of senses or propositions, and so on. And he subscribes to the theory that the meaning or sense of a proper
names is expressed by a 'cluster' of associated descriptions which thereby determines the reference of the
name. Such a theory is said to avoid the
problem of linking the name to a single definite description [see
especially 'Proper names'] [d].
He also argues that identity
sentences (for example, 'Tully = Cicero') could be used to make either analytic
or synthetic statements [e], depending
on which descriptive statements are associated with each name [ibid.].
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
[2] [See Mind, Language and
Society and The Rediscovery of the Mind.] Searle's
philosophy of mind underpins his views in most of the branches of philosophy he
has been interested in. His main concern is to account for what he identifies
as four features of mental phenomena: consciousness, intentionality, the subjectivity of mental states, and
mental causation; and to solve the mind-body problem,
to defeat dualism, he argues in favour of a revision of conceptual categories [a] and refuses "to accept the system of
categories that makes consciousness out as something nonbiological, not part of
the natural world" [MLS, p. 52]. He does not believe there is an
intrinsic opposition between the vocabulary of 'mental' and 'physical' [Rediscovery of the Mind, chs 2, 5]. Intentionality perhaps the central concept
for Searle is that which our mental states are directed at or are 'about',
that is, represent objects, states of affairs in the world. It applies to beliefs, desires, perceptions,
feelings, as well as intentions and actions [see Intentionality and MLS, ch. 4] [b]. To explain how intentionality
'represents' Searle appeals to the linguistic concepts of 'propositional content' and 'direction of fit'. The propositional content or 'sense' of a
mental state determines what he calls 'conditions of
satisfaction' [Intentionality, ch. 6, MLS, ch.
4]. In the case of belief these are
conditions for truth; in the case of intentions they are conditions for the
intentions to be effected; while for desires fulfilment is the condition. The relevant psychological mode determines the direction of fit [c]. Beliefs,
for example, are intended to match the world (the direction of fit is then
mind-to-world). If there is a match then
we can say the belief is true: there is
a word-to-world direction of fit. Desires and intentions, however, have world-to-mind direction of fit; it
is, as it were, the responsibility of the world if it satisfies or does not
satisfy the desire or intention.
Searle
extends his theory of intentionality to perception and action [Intentionality, chs, 2 & 3]. Particular states of affairs in the world give the conditions of
satisfaction required for a perceptual experience to be veridical. (He thus subscribes to a realist view of the
world and to a correspondence theory of truth) [d]. Similarly he accounts for human action in
terms of 'mental' and 'physical' aspects. When we act we are
conscious of physical changes, as in, for example, exertions; but also involved
is a mental component an intention characterized by intentionality. The content and type of the mental state
relates it to the world; and if the state is successful, that is, leads to the
intended action, it is satisfied. The
world, Searle says, matches the content of the state. He recognises, however, that many of our
actions, especially those involved in speech, occur without prior reflection,
though in such cases there is 'intention-in-action'. It follows that observed physical behaviour is compatible with different
intentions, and that therefore a variety of descriptions may apply and are
known especially to the agent [e].
Both perception and bodily
actions have to be caused in an appropriate manner respectively by the state
of affairs (world-to-mind) and the agent's intention (mind-to-world). There is thus an internal connection between
causes and effects. Perception
and action, he says, are "causally self-referential". His theory is one of efficient causation [f]. He argues that all mental phenomena, conscious
or unconscious, are caused by brain processes, but at the same time are features of the brain. He clarifies this by means of an
analogy. The liquidity of water is a
'surface' phenomenon realized in the system but yet explained in terms of
interactions between water molecules, that is, the microstructure. The four aspects of mental phenomena thus have a
biological explanation; and the interaction of mind and body, he thinks, ceases
to be a problem [g].
As might be expected, Searle rejects functionalist and
exclusively physicalist or materialist accounts of mental phenomena, as well as
'strong' theories of artificial intelligence [MLS, ch. 2]. Central to his argument is the view that mental phenomena have semantic
content, whereas computer programs are defined entirely by their syntactical,
that is, formal structures. Similarly he
attacks cognitivist theories designed to fill the supposed gap between
neurophysiological explanations of human behaviour and commonsense accounts in
terms of desires, hopes, and so on. The key argument here is that human
rule-following differs from the following of rules by computers in that the semantic content has a
causal role in the bringing about of what one does [h]. Strictly, computers do not 'follow' rules at
all; only human behaviour is meaningful. (Searle compares the implementation of a formal computer program to the
manipulation of Chinese symbols by a person who has no understanding of the
language.)
[3] Freedom. [MLS,
ch. 4.] While it is true, he says, that the surface features of the world are
both caused by and are realized in microstructures different levels of atoms,
molecules, neurons, etc. (he calls this 'bottom-up' explanation), he argues
also for 'top-down' causation from the mind to the body. We intend, decide to perform particular
actions. However, top-down causation
works only because it is already grounded in neurophysiology. So how can there be room for or belief in
'freedom of the will'? Searle's
suggestion is that our
conviction of freedom is inseparable from our consciousness that we engage in
intentional voluntary actions. The evidence available suggests that the hypothesis of psychological
determinism is false. Radical
libertarianism, however, is ruled out by the bottom-up approaches of physical
explanation. Freedom has to operate within a restricted
framework. But in the last analysis,
Searle admits that his own
approach does not overcome the gap between the causes of one's decision in the
form of beliefs and desires and the actual decision, and the gap between the
decision and the performance of an action [a]: "It remains an unsolved problem in philosophy
how there can be freedom of the will, given that there are no corresponding
gaps in the brain" [MLS, p. 107].
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY/ METHODOLOGY
[4] [MLS, ch. 5; see also The Construction of Social Reality.] Language for Searle
is a social phenomenon and as such provides the 'Background' or network or non-representational abilities in the
context of which meanings and mental states of an individual speaker or hearer
can operate [a]. Searle thinks of linguistic rules as relating
to individuals in society. The symbols
of language are components of 'institutional' facts. So what account does he give of social phenomena? Like psychological phenomena they possess a 'mental' character,
that is, they are aspects of intentionality [b]. Social phenomena are not grounded in
micro-level behaviour, primarily because the concepts that name such phenomena
are themselves constituent of them. Thus, money, marriage, property, and modes of
behaviour involving, say, promising, refer to whatever people regard as money, and so on. Thoughts and psychological attitudes belong
to the definitions of such concepts.
Searle
argues for a radical discontinuity between the social and natural sciences [c]. There are no systematic
correlations between phenomena identified in social and psychological terms and
those identified in physical terms. As
social/ psychological categories are physically open-ended (there is no physical
limit to what we stipulate to be, for example, money), there are no 'bridge
principles' between social and physical features of the world; and indeed there
cannot be, because there is an indefinite range of stimulus conditions for
social concepts.
ETHICS NATURALISM
[5] In his moral
philosophy Searle draws on distinctions already made in his philosophy of
language and society. As against both
emotivists and prescriptivists, he argues in favour of a descriptivist and naturalist (and 'realist') view of moral judgements. For him 'evaluative' emotivism and 'factual' descriptivism are
not reconcilable. Those who have
made this distinction have conflated the distinction between various kinds of
illocutionary force and utterances which make truth claims are which are are
mattrers of opinion. The job of language
(in the form of moral judgements) is to describe real values and obligations and which are part of the
natural world [a]. He is
therefore particularly concerned to undermine his opponents by rejecting the supposed dichotomy between facts and values and
attempting to show that 'ought' can be derived from 'is' [b]. Consider the example of promising. This, Searle argues, is an institutionalized
fact, that is, it exists within a system of constitutive rules that the
legitimacy of the inference to 'I ought to do x' is effected. The only additional statements required in
the argument, Searle says, are empirical assumptions, tautologies, and descriptions
of word usage. [See 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" '.]
CRITICAL
SUMMARY
Searle's writings on a wide
range of philosophical issues are characterized by vision and originality
combined with acute analysis. Of
particular interest is the emphasis he places on the philosophy of mind as the
basis for his views on perception, language, and social philosophy. The key features are his detailed treatment
of the concept of intentionality, his 'bottom-up' account of mental causation
as grounded in but not reducible to micro-physical structures; a rejection of
functionalist and materialist accounts of mind and 'strong' artificial
intelligence theories; a modified treatment of Austin's presentation of
speech-acts, and the advocacy of the primacy of sense over reference and
acceptance of the 'cluster' theory of descriptions; a view of meaning as based
on intentional mental states; an analysis of social phenomena in terms of
psychological attitudes, and his view that there is radical methodological discontinuity between the
social and the natural sciences; and his attempt to overcome the fact-value
distinction in ethics.
Understandably critical attacks have come from many
directions. Some of the more serious
objections are as follows.
(1) Language. Searle's account of
speech-acts probably marks an improvement on Austin's in that Searle argues
that a satisfactory theory of meaning requires an analysis not only of their
use (speaker's meaning) in speech-acts (intentions) but also the of semantic
rules followed in use (sentence meaning). Nevertheless some critics have said that this approach is still
inadequate in so far as it fails to clarify what it is to understand linguistic rules. Searle's espousal of a 'cluster of descriptions' account of names to
give sense and fix references has likewise been criticized on similar
grounds by philosophers wedded to
extensionalist assumptions and causal theories. Questions can also been asked about which descriptions are to be included
in a cluster, and whether ambiguity can be excluded.
(2) Mind. Searle's apparent claim
that the subjective view or first person standpoint is equivalent to
consciousness has been questioned. The
issue of 'understanding' has also been raised in relation to his 'Chinese room'
analogy. It has been suggested that he
seems to be assuming what is to be
proved, namely that a clear indication or criterion is available for
determining whether instructions are understood without being analysable in
computational terms. More seriously,
some of his opponents reject his claim altogether that intentionality is the
basic or definitive feature of mental states.
(3) Causation and freedom. Searle's biological naturalism, while promising much, arguably does not
provide a satisfactory account of the emergence of freedom though to be fair
to him it has to be recognised that he himself considers the problem to be
unresolved. A conscious conviction that
we engage in intentional voluntary action does not of itself seem to be
philosophically adequate. Likewise his
account of efficient and mental causation may not be as firmly based as one
would wish. The analogy of the liquidity
of water is not entirely convincing. As
a surface phenomenon it is no doubt correctly explained in terms of physical microstructures. But our perceptual experience (as a mental
state, consciousness) of liquidity,
which the analogy is intended to shed light on, seems to remain something of a
mystery.
(4) Ethics/ social philosophy. Searle's attempt to overcome the 'is-ought' dichotomy is commendable but
has not satisfied many critics. They
argue that the treatment of promising as an institutionalized fact within a
system of constitutive rules, which he claims legitimate inferences from
factual premises to evaluative conclusions, may obscure the 'gap' but does not
eliminate it. His commitment to 'real'
values has also been questioned by some philosophers. The notion of institutionalized facts (x
counting as y in C) has itself been criticized and stands or falls with his
fundamental concept of collective intentionality. Lastly one might mention that Searle's
treatment of social phenomena would (understandably) be opposed by philosophers
who seek to extend covering-law models of explanation to the social sciences.
Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969); Expression and Meaning: Essays in the Theory of Speech Acts (1979); Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983); Minds, Brains and Science (1984); The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992); The Construction of Social
Reality (1995); Mind, Language
and Society Philosophy in the Real World (1998) [this last book being an
excellent condensation of Searle's whole corpus of works]; and the following
articles: 'Proper Names' (1958), in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical
Logic, 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" ' (1964), in P. Foot (ed.), Theories
of Ethics, and 'What is a Speech Act?' (1965), in J. R. Searle (ed.), The
Philosophy of Language.
Studies
N. Fotion, John
Searle.
W.
Hirstein, On Searle.
W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, ch. 6, II (1), 'Searle's Derivation of "Ought" From
"Is".
Collections
of essays
E. Lepore
and R. van Gulick (eds), John Searle and his Critics.
B. Smith
(ed.), John Searle.
CONNECTIONS
Searle