DAVIDSON
(1917 2003)
ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY
Donald Davidson was
born in Springfield, Massachusetts. He
was educated at Harvard University, where he studied literature and classics
and then, as a graduate student, philosophy under Quine. He has been Professor of Philosophy at
Princeton and latterly at the University of California, Berkeley.
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LOGIC
[1] [See especially 'Truth
and Meaning' and 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics'.] A major concern of Davidson's is to
develop an adequate theory of
meaning. Such a theory, he says, must
show how the meanings of words contribute to the meanings of sentences of a
natural language, and must explain how speakers can produce and understand
sentences they have never heard before (he calls this 'semantic
productivity'). The theory must also be
empirically testable. In general the
theory must produce all sentences of the form 'S means m', where 'S' is a description of the
sentence, and reveals its structure, and
'm' denotes the meaning. What can it
tell us to say that S means a meaning? To reformulate this as 'S means that p', where 'p' is the sentence
described by 'S' is equally unhelpful. Following Tarski's semantic theory of truth, Davidson therefore proposes a truth theory of meaning,
that is, he seeks to show that truth is
the central concept in the theory of meaning [a]. He argues that the theory that
assigns meaning must be extensional, that is, it must allow for
expressions which have the same reference (for example, singular terms which
denote the same entity, sentences which have the same truth-value) to be
substitutable for each other without changing the truth-value of the
totality. These are to be contrasted
with intensional expressions, such as 'necessarily' and 'X believes that...'. An intensional theory, he says, would lead to
difficulties, as in the case, for example, when an attempt is made to
infer from 'X believes that p' to 'X believes that q', given that 'p' and 'q'
have the same truth-value. The fact that
I believe that Venus is the morning star does not license me to believe that
Venus is the evening star (although 'morning star' and 'evening star' do in
fact denote one and the same entity). An approach to meaning, which
itself involves intensional notions, is thus likely to be more satisfactorily
dealt with in terms of an extensional account of 'truth' in terms of reference [b].
So what would such a
theory of meaning be like? We need a
criterion of success, a 'condition of adequacy' for the theory, which can
generate for every sentence of the language a formula of the form 'S is T if
and only if p' (where 'S' stands for the sentence, T stands for an arbitrary
predicate, and 'p' states what must be the case if S is to be used
correctly). Davidson says that any
predicate which satisfies this condition must be a materially adequate truth-predicate, and this allows his
theory of meaning to provide a definition for such a predicate. The formula can
then be reformulated as 'S is true if and only if p' 'S' being the name of 'p' and 'p' giving the truth
conditions of S. The meaning of the sentence is thus in effect
given by its truth conditions. All sentences in the language of the form " 'Snow is white' is true if
and only if snow is white" can now be generated. However, Davidson makes it clear that his
theory provides only a test or criterion of adequacy; he is not attempting to define 'meaning' in terms of
'truth'. The meaning of the sentence is given in terms of what the
sentence states [c]. It is discovered by supposing that there is a constancy in the speaker's
beliefs (he calls this the 'principle of
charity').
Underlying Davidson's
general approach is a
commitment to 'objective truth'; and he is particularly concerned to reject any kind of conceptual relativism [see 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'] [d]. As he says ['The Method of Truth'], "In
sharing a language, in whatever sense this is required for communication, we
share a picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true". There can be no 'theory-free'
foundation for experience a position which would allow a variety of
permissible theories. Rather belief, he
says, is causally connected with experience. And he rejects the
'sceptical' empiricist critique of claims to direct knowledge of the world and
the preservation of a gap between our linguistic schemes and 'reality' [e]. He supposes further that it is the language as a whole
which is the basic unit of interpretation. This is the doctrine of holism [f]. And to
investigate these notions of objectivism and holism and the associated
metaphysical issues concerning our linguistic schemes and their relation to the
'real' world he utilizes
formal languages (or 'canonical notations'), which he sees as devices for
exploring the structure of natural languages (rather than to 'improve' them) ['The Method of Truth in Metaphysics] [g], and which he has employed to construct his truth theory
of meaning.
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
ANOMALOUS
MONISM
He distinguishes between
mental events and physical events. The
physical realm is a closed system, but the mental is open. Different kinds of constitutive principles
operate in each case. Thus rationality
is appropriate to the mental realm. Reasons, intentions, coherence in attitudes and actions, for example,
are prerequisites for people to be treated as persons. Physical events, on the other hand, are
constrained by quite different constitutive elements, such as strict
deterministic laws. Davidson therefore concludes that there cannot be strict
psychophysical 'bridging' laws correlating the mental and the physical; and he
also rules out reductive analyses of mental terms to physical ones. Nevertheless he wants to maintain that mental events are also causes
and effects and therefore are subject to laws. So they must be covered by physical descriptions, because there are no
psychophysical laws. When there
is a causal connection between the mental and physical realms the mental event
must be supposed to be a physical event. This theory is
therefore materialist but non-reductive [b]. Purely psychological laws, he thinks, are improbable. Davidson argues further that although a causal analysis of
the conditions of intentional actions may not be possible, freedom to act can
still be regarded as a causal power of the agent. [See 'Freedom to
Act'.] As for weakness of will, he attributes this to
irrationality [c]. We perceive a creature as rational, he says,
in so far as we are able to view his movements as part of a rational pattern
comprising also thoughts, desires, emotions, and volitions. But if we want to account for the fact that
an agent does an action a when he
believes it would be better to do another thing, we can only say that he has no
reason. He has a reason for doing a, but what he lacks is a reason for not
letting his better reason for not doing a prevail. [See 'How is Weakness of the
Will Possible?'].
CRITICAL
SUMMARY
Davidson is
important largely for his contributions to the theory of meaning and truth and
his account of causation, action and mind.
(1) Meaning and
truth. He aims to develop a criterion
of adequacy for meaning in a natural language, which is based on Tarski's
semantic theory of truth. He is not
attempting to define either truth or meaning. But even his limited aims have been criticized on the grounds that
natural languages are not fully amenable to a comprehensive treatment by the
techniques of formal logic. Moreover, it
is argued that an extensional treatment of meaning (in terms of observational
truth-conditions) is inadequate in so far as it presupposes that the
circumstances in which a supposedly truthful speaker of the language assents or
dissents from its sentences can be identified by the interpreter. Indeed, his approach to the holistic
interpretation or translation of language, while appropriate for 'truth', is
mistaken in that it belongs to his theory of meaning rather than being a
consequence of it.
(2) Philosophy of
mind. For Davidson events are the basic
particulars. Explanations of actions in
terms of mental events (beliefs, reasons, desires) are not causal; they conform
to normative rationality but as such still require to be brought under laws. As
there are no psychological laws mental events must admit of physical but
non-reductive counterpart descriptions. It is a current concern of many philosophers whether Davidson's
'anomaly' is sustainable and indeed whether it is genuinely 'monistic'.
CONNECTIONS
Davidson