HARE
(1919 2002)
PRESCRIPTIVISM
Richard Hare was born
in Backwater, Avon and educated at Rugby School and Balliol College,
Oxford. He started writing philosophy
when a prisoner of the Japanese in Singapore during the war. After his repatriation he took his degree and
was elected a Fellow of Balliol in 1947. In 1966 he was appointed White's Professor of Moral Philosophy and
elected to a Fellowship at Corpus Christi College. He taught at Stanford in 1981, and from 1983
until his retirement he was Graduate Research Professor at the University of
Florida. He was elected Fellow of the
British Academy in 1964.
ETHICS
[1] Hare's main aim [see The Language of Morals and Freedom
and Reason] is to
reconcile 'non-descriptivist' theories of moral philosophy such as emotivism,
which generally deny rationality to ethics, and naturalist and non-naturalist 'descriptivist'
theories, which take moral judgements to be logically equivalent to factual
ones [a], and which he thinks tend to preserve
rationality but only at the expense of our freedom to form opinions. His approach is grounded in a detailed
examination of the 'language of morals' and in particular of three central
claims.
(1) He distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive judgements [Freedom and Reason, chs 1 and 2]. What makes predicate terms descriptive is their determination by rules
of discourse and consistency of usage. Hare argues that value terms such as 'good' and 'right' are descriptive
just as, say, 'red' is. However, he
denies that value words can be defined completely, whether in terms of
natural properties (such as pleasure) or other non-natural value terms. Moral terms additionally have prescriptive meaning. By this he means that they are commendatory. For example, to say something or someone is
good is to put it/ him/ her forward as a standard of rectitude, to be imitated by
others. Descriptive meaning rules thus become synthetic moral
principles. He also says that evaluative meaning changes as
social attitudes change [b].
(2) Because moral judgements have descriptive meaning, they are, Hare says, universalizable (unlike other
prescriptive judgements such as commands) [chs 2 and 3]. Thus, if we call
something good (or red, say), the meaning-rules of our discourse [c] commit
us to calling something like it in relevant respects good (or red) also. Hare stresses [3.3] that his universalism is
a logical and not a moral thesis. (In Language of Morals [11.5] he had tended
rather to think of universalizability as characterizing moral principles.)
(3) There are logical relations between prescriptive
judgements; and this enables moral arguments to be developed. Hare offers an analysis of the logic of moral
inferences. [See chs 4, 6, and 10.] He accepts that one cannot validly infer from logical premisses to
evaluative conclusions from an 'is' to an 'ought' [LM 2.5; FR 6.9]. But although he
maintains that ethical premisses are neutral as between different moral
opinions (in so far as the job of ethical theory is only to provide conceptual
clarification), he argues that we can move to imperative conclusions from premisses, one of which is
imperative and the other indicative (a 'practical' syllogism), by invoking the
two central notions of prescriptivity and universalizability as the rules of
moral reasoning [LM 4.1 &
4.2; cf. FM ch. 10] [d].
In a given situation we must decide on
what we ought to do by looking for an action to which we can commit ourselves
(thus acknowledging its prescriptivity) and which is also an action which can
be universalized thus exemplifying a principle to be prescribed for others in
like circumstances. To test a moral
principle Hare also suggests three other requirements: the facts of the case, the inclination of
people to reject evaluative propositions forced on them by the logic of the
argument, and their readiness to use imagination. [See FM 6.3.]
Hare argues further [ch. 5] that support
for his distinction between prescriptivism and descriptivism is provided by the
existence of the problem
of weakness of will ('backsliding'). Individuals who are weak and fail to act in accordance with their
perceived obligations show by their remorse and feelings of guilt that they
have in fact recognised the prescriptivity of a moral judgement. Their not being able to act appropriately is, Hare says, a psychological impossibility; assent to
an imperative does not entail that they
must (logically, analytically) act on it [e], for
there are indeed occasions when they 'physically' or 'pathologically' cannot.
Instances of weakness of will do not therefore constitute counter-examples to
his prescriptivism. Of course, if a
person believes it to be in his power to act on a moral imperative and yet does
not act on it, then for Hare it must follow that that individual could not
genuinely have been assenting to the imperative. [See also LM 2.2 & 11.2.]
In the light of his own thesis Hare argues
that the supposed
distinction between deontological and teleological theories is a false
one. It is possible to distinguish only
between different sorts of intended effects. He therefore sees his own prescriptivism as providing a formal basis for
utilitarianism [ch. 7] [f]. However, he recognises a number of
difficulties in the traditional doctrine that need to be resolved. Firstly, there are problems concerning
desires whether equal weight should be given to the same desires had by
different persons; or to supposedly 'higher' and 'lower' desires; and how desires
relate to inclinations and interests. Secondly, in view of the difficulties with the utilitarian concepts of
happiness and pleasure, it might be preferable to reformulate the theory in
terms of the interests of different parties. Thirdly, Hare argues that the distinction between act- and
rule-utilitarianism collapses once the universalizability of moral judgements
is granted.
However, implicit in the linking of his
theory with utilitarianism is a conflict between interests and ideals [chs 8
and 9]. Moral disagreements arising at the intuitive level can be
transcended at the level of critical thought through the provision of a
standard of adequacy for moral principles in terms of satisfaction of interests
and universalizability [see also Moral
Thinking] [g]. Nevertheless there may still be moral
disagreements if 'fanatics' seemingly disregard the preferences of other people
and justify their own by appeals to 'ideals', even if the consequence is
persecution of others or themselves. But Hare says that the number of fanatics is relatively small and that a
moral philosophy grounded in universalizability, imagination, clear critical
thinking, and a genuine concern for facts will afford self-protection against
propaganda, even if it will not undermine the commitment of determined
fanatics.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Hare's impressive achievement is to have developed a subtle analysis
of the language of morals and in-depth examinations of particular moral
conflicts to show how his concepts can be applied. His key distinction is that between
descriptivity and prescriptivity of judgements, the former facilitating
universalizability, the latter being the commendatory function of moral
terms. More generally, with his broadly
utilitarian thesis he attempts to reconcile teleological and deontological
theories of ethics. The acceptability of
Hare's approach clearly depends on the tenability of his fundamental
assumptions and distinctions about which there has been much discussion. The following are some of the main issues.
(1) If a distinction between
descriptivity and prescriptivity is sustainable in the way Hare suggests (and
many would dispute this), there would seem to be difficulties for a
non-naturalistic ethics in that (a) commendations are arguably in some sense
private or subjective (unlike describable properties); and (b) commendation is
not a uniquely differentiating feature of moral discourse.
(2) Hare follows Hume in his
acceptance of the fact-value distinction. But in so far as he recognises that both our concepts and evaluations
may change, depending on circumstances and context, it might be supposed that a
language could be formulated in which it would be legitimate to reason from
non-imperative premisses to imperative conclusions.
(3) Hare appeals to universalizability. but some commentators argue that this should
be understood in a weak sense reflecting linguistic usage rather than
underpinning a Kantian type of ethics. If this is so, then the moral force of Hare's concept would have to be
weakened. In any case, in so far as he
seems to be committed to the view that having a desire to perform an action is
a necessary condition of one's assenting to a moral judgement, it would seem
that any personal moral belief has to be universalized; and clearly this can
lead to many impractical consequences. In the light of this his assertion that only fanatics will perform such
actions is somewhat optimistic, and indeed his position must lend support to
fanaticism and intolerance.
Hare: The Language of Morals (1952); Freedom and Reason (1962); Moral Thinking (1981). Hare was also the author of many articles.
Studies
There
does not seem to be any comprehensive study of his work. However, there are numerous articles in
various philosophical journals. The
following, published in Ethics, will be found informative and helpful:
W.
Frankena, 'Hare on Moral Weakness and the Definition of Morality'.
R. K.
Fullwinder, 'Fanaticism and Hare's
Moral Theory'.
A.
Gettner, 'Hare and Fanaticism'.
W. Lyons,
'Is Hare's Prescriptivism Morally Neutral?'.
J.
Narveson, 'Liberalism, Utilitarianism, and Fanaticism'.
D. S.
Scarrow, 'Hare's Account of Moral Reasoning'.
See also:
W. D.
Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, ch. 5, II, 'Hare's Account of
Prescriptivism', ch. 5, III, 'Criticism', and ch. 8, II, 'Hare's Recent Moral
Philosophy'.
J. L.
Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and
Wrong, ch. 4, 'Universalization'.
CONNECTIONS
Hare