SARTRE
(1905 1980)
EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGY
His father having
died at an early age, Jean-Paul Sartre was brought up by his grandparents. (Albert Schweitzer was a cousin.) He was educated at the Lycée Henri IV in
Paris, the Lycée in La Rochelle, and at the École Normale Supérieure, gaining
his agrégation in Philosophy in
1929. He taught philosophy in various
schools before becoming a research student (1933-5) in Berlin and at the
University of Freiburg. His novel La Nausée was published in 1938. After a short time as a prisoner of war he
resumed his teaching career. He was
active in the resistance movement while working on L'Étre et le Néant.
PSYCHOLOGY/ ONTOLOGY/ KNOWLEDGE
[1] [Being
and Nothingness, Introd. III; also The Psychology of the Imagination.] When we perceive objects
trees, clouds, and so on, we are engaging in intentional
acts positing these objects as existing in the world. They are not to be regarded as reducible to
appearances or sensibilia. Neither are
they mental as the 'idealists' maintain, or as 'immanent' (the result of a
'bracketing' procedure). Rather, they
are transphenomenal, transcendent. The
imagining consciousness is also understood by Sartre as positing objects [a], but he argues that the agent is free
to intend its objects in a variety of ways. (a) Certainly actual images may be
taken to be the posited objects. But
this is the consequence of reflection at a second level, as it were. (b) For the first order imagining
consciousness, however, an object is posited which is not the image
itself. Sartre thinks of this object as
absent but imagined as if it were present. The actual image is then considered as a relation between consciousness
and the object. (c) As a further
possibility Sartre suggests the imaginary consciousness can posit an object
which does not really exist at all a fictional one, for example; and he
refers paradoxically to such non-existent objects as 'negations' of reality but
yet as 'existing' . In other words, they
are posited as 'unreal' or 'inactive'.
Sartre also developed an original analysis of emotions in terms of intentionality.
[See Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions.] He thinks of emotion as a way of apprehending the world whereby significance is projected
onto a person or thing [b]. This consciousness of others as possessing
certain qualities (which they may not actually possess) constitutes what he
calls a "magical world". He sees both
this and the exercising of imagination as the agent's manifestation of freedom
and as attempts to evade causal determinism.
Implicit in Sartre's account of
imagination and emotion is a central distinction between what he called the reflective and the
non-reflective consciousness [Being
and Nothingness]. This is of particular importance in his analysis of self-consciousness [II, ch. 1; see also On the Transcendence of the Ego]. The
positing of actual transphenomenal or transcendental objects is the activity of
the pre-reflective consciousness. However, he rejects
the notion of a transcendent Ego as
the residuum of intentionality and 'bracketing' [c]. It is nothing more than a "centre of opacity"
within consciousness. The pre-reflective
consciousness is indeed accompanied by a 'self'-consciousness but this is an
awareness by consciousness itself as consciousness: no 'Ego' or 'self' is
'seen' or intuited as being involved. (Sartre talks of such self-consciousness as 'non-thetic',
non-positing.) But when we treat this
phenomenological perceptual consciousness itself as an intentionally posited object at the level of reflective
consciousness we must regard this as the manifestation of an Ego, in so far
as it arises through the self-reflection of consciousness and thereby
objectifies itself. It cannot therefore
be regarded as having created that consciousness. It is, however, posited as the unity and source
of our experiences and actions, and as such is correlative to the world
considered as the posited ideal unity of all the objects of consciousness. And in this correlation the 'gap' between a
reflective consciousness and the external world is overcome. His position is
thus as follows. The basic pre-reflective consciousness is a
transphenomenal, transcendental activity
or agency which confers meaning in positing (1) transphenomenal objects, and (2) through its reflection on its
own intentional acts posits and 'objectifies' the Ego. But this posited 'Ego' belonging to reflective consciousness is seen to be correlative to the world (as the posited ideal
unity of our experiences and actions the Ego being responsible for the
unifying process) [c]. What Sartre seems to mean can be illustrated
by an example. When I perceive (or
imagine), say, a tree my active 'mind' (as 'pre-reflective' consciousness)
'intends' this as an object. If now this
consciousness reflects on its own activity (the act of perceiving) it turns
that activity itself into an 'object' (this is the 'Ego' considered as
belonging to the 'reflective' consciousness). He then says that the perceived
tree (the unified 'object' in my consciousness) and the 'subjective' reflected
Ego (that which does the unifying) are inseparable.
[2] The importance of Sartre's subtle analysis of
self-consciousness lies in its relevance to the problem of existence. This is best
approached through his concept of Being. By 'Being' Sartre means that which is: "Being is in itself, Being is
what it is", he writes [BN, Introd. VI]. The concept of
Being as the In-itself (l'être en-soi) is arrived at through a process of
elimination of attributes or differentiations. When we perceive an object, say, a table we are conscious of it as something to be used for a particular
purpose. (We can write on it, chop it up
for firewood, and so on.) It has instrumental meaning a
meaning conferred on it by consciousness itself. If we abstract all these instrumental features, what is left is
Being-in-itself [a] contingent,
opaque, solid (massif),
uncaused. It is in a sense superfluity (de trop). It is characterized just by 'being
there'.
What then of the status of consciousness which Sartre now calls Being-for-itself
(l'être pour soi)? [See BN, Pt II.] Consider again our experience of the
table. In differentiating the table as a
table consciousness introduces a negation (négatité)
in so far as the table is identified and differentiated as not being something else (chair, cupboard, etc.). Similarly to say something is near is to say
it is not distant; to say it is present is to imply it is not past. Indeed consciousness itself is conceived as
separable, distant from being, and as such is not-Being with nothing between
Being and itself. Consciousness
is characterized by this activity of nihilation introducing into
Being-in-itself nothingness, a 'hole', non-Being. [On 'negation' and 'nihilation' see BN,
Pt I, ch. 1.] The relationship between Being and non-Being is
thus not a mere logical one; Being is in a sense already 'in' non-Being, and
through the negating capacity of consciousness Being introduces a 'hole' within
Being-in-itself and thereby, as it were, instantiates or particularizes
not-Being [b] (the
table is picked out from the 'other'). Now there would seem to be a paradox here. The being of consciousness
(Being-for-itself), whereby nothingness comes into the world, must be its own
non-being or nothingness. Arguably this
can be resolved by saying that for Sartre consciousness is Being-for-itself as
intentional activity, yet it is not-Being in so far as it is not
Being-in-itself.
As for the object, it is now neither an
in-itself (because it is differentiated,
defined) nor a for-itself (which characterizes consciousness). How can this be? To deal with this Sartre extends his dialectic by a further negation [Pt II, 3,
V]. The For-itself negates itself. As a result the object ceases to belong
(immanently) to the For-itself but is 'affirmed' by it; and the For-itself
becomes the affirmation of the In-itself. "It is the 'adventure' of the In-itself to be affirmed." Correspondingly the For-itself, as it were,
tends to 'lose' itself in becoming the affirmation of the In-itself. From the point of view of knowledge, the first negation may be taken
to be an idealist position: the
differentiated object exists in or for the conscious subject; "Knowledge is
nothing other than the presence of Being to the For-itself". However, through the "radical reversal" brought about by the
second negation "knowledge is reabsorbed in Being" there is only being, Sartre says. Knowledge is thus to be understood as a mode of Being in terms of
the relationship between the For-itself and the In-itself. At the same time there is an 'existential'
aspect, in that it is "an absolute and primitive event" "the absolute upsurge" of the For-itself [c], which is not only the "absolute event"
of the For-itself but is also something which happens to the In-itself. As he says, "the For-itself by its
self-negation becomes the affirmation of the In-itself" [ibid.].
[3] There are two features of
Being-for-itself which relate to his central claim that "existence is prior to
essence". Firstly, the mode of being
peculiar to being-for-itself is the activity of temporality: past, present and future are internal
structures of conscious being. This enables consciousness to transcend
itself and to introduce negation into the world. What we are now is the consequence of our
making ourselves, and in so doing Being-for-itself separates itself from and
negates what it has made of itself in the past which becomes Being-in-itself,
that is, essence. As Being-for-itself
it remains transcendent, 'ahead of itself' as past, and herein lies its
existence. As existence consciousness is
thus undetermined by the past; it is continuously making itself. (This is
characterized most starkly in death when our existence ceases.) Secondly, consciousness is also characterized by its freedom: "we are necessarily free". Thus for Sartre [Existentialism is a Humanism]: "Man first of all exists, encounters himself,
surges up in the world, and defines himself afterwards." "Man is nothing else but that which he makes
of himself." It is clear that this is the logical consequence
of his view that man does not have a 'human nature'. People who think
there is a God usually think of him/it as a 'supernal artisan' who holds in his
mind a universal conception of Man, each
individual man being a particular realization of this universal. But for Sartre there is no God and therefore no human nature [a]. Even those atheist
thinkers who adhere to the notion of human nature common to all men assume that
an essence precedes that "historic existence which we confront in experience".
God as conventionally understood (in, say,
the Christian tradition) is the ultimate being, eternal, transcendent,
uncaused, omniscient, omnipotent, and self-conscious "all positivity and the
foundation of the world", as Sartre puts it [BN, Pt II, ch. 1, III]. But according to him there
is an inherent self-contradiction in this concept of God. Human reality, coming into existence, grasps
itself as an incomplete being. By virtue
of this lack it reaches towards being which defines man's lack or imperfection
"the being which is the foundation of its own nothingness (that is, the pour-soi) surpasses itself toward the
being which is the foundation of its being (the en-soi)" [ibid.]. However, this being-in-itself cannot be a transcendent God. If it were the pure in-itself it would
coincide with the annihilation of consciousness. Put simply, if God were self-conscious, there
would be 'distancing' between consciousness and being-in-itself. Such a being would not be presence-to-itself
but identity-with-itself; and such a self, Sartre says, can exist only as a "perpetually
evanescent relation". In short, Sartre's
view is that God
considered as the totality which reveals the lack of human totality combines in
itself incompatible characteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself [b].
[4] Now what of the 'Other'? On this issue Sartre is not a sceptic. He claims that the intentionality of being-for-itself can establish the
existence of other minds. But it
is not through an appeal to any argument by analogy that this is to be
achieved. Rather, he invokes the notion of
intersubjectivity [a]. In Existentialism
is a Humanism he argues that when we say 'I think' we are just as certain
of the other as we are of ourselves: in
discovering ourselves in the cogito we also discover all the others, and as a condition of our own existence". In Being
and Nothingness [Pt III, ch. 1,
IV] he relates this to our experiences of our own feelings. Suppose I am looking through a
keyhole. I am totally unaware of
myself. This is the state of pre-reflective
consciousness. If I now become aware
that I am being observed by somebody, I experience shame (or guilt,
embarrassment depending on circumstances), and I thereby become aware of
myself as an object of someone else's consciousness as subject. In reflective consciousness my 'cogito'
manifests itself. The look (regard) of the Other (autrui) makes one his object. The presence of
the Other is thus a precondition for my recognising myself as an object for
that Other. Now Sartre recognises there is a conflict here between
the individual's intuition of himself as totally free (in the sense of being
able to choose to 'make himself', to fill the 'gap' between the en-soi and the pour-soi) and his recognition of himself as an 'object' for the
'Other'. His initial solution is
to seek to restore his freedom by in turn 'possessing' the Other. To illustrate this he examines the relationship between two lovers considered psychologically [BN, Pt III, 3]. He has to concede, however, that though his freedom be reaffirmed
the fundamental conflict between the self and the other can never be terminated [b]. In seeking to appropriate the freedom of his beloved the lover
will treat her either as an automaton or as a being whose love for him is the
consequence of free commitment. Both
alternatives, Sartre says, are unsatisfactory. Clearly the lover does not wish to be loved by a person whom he has
enslaved. Neither does he wish to be
loved by someone who does not desire him for himself but because of her "pure loyalty to a sworn oath". If he adopts the first alternative, it will
lead to sadism. If he adopts the second
and allow himself to become an 'object' for the beloved, this will result in
masochism. But in both cases his freedom
is affirmed; and if he does become 'being-for-the-other', this will give rise
to the further problem of frustration in so far as by virtue of his free choice
he cannot in fact be just an object. He
could of course remain indifferent to the beloved, observing her behaviour
without involvement. But from the point
of view of the relationship this would be equally unsatisfactory.
It might
seem from this account that for Sartre freedom is equivalent to indeterminacy
and is therefore arbitrary; so he would appear to be advocating a policy
of commitment without motive. However, this is not Sartre's view. He argues [BN, Pt IV, 1] that
conscious being is able to conceive of an as yet non-existent future. As we have seen, through the intentionality
of being-for-itself, the world, that is, being-in-itself, is 'negated' or
'set-off' from it. The individual's awareness of
the need to eliminate this 'nothingness' or non-being, that is, to fill the
'gap', itself constitutes the motive for
action [c]. Sartre makes it clear
that it is not a 'factual state' (the political and economic structure of
society, one's psychological condition, etc.) that can be a motive (motif) but the recognition that the
state of affairs must be changed. "The
motive [mobile] is understood only by
the end; that is, by the non-existent" [ibid.].
ETHICS
[5] [Existentialism and Humanism.] In so far as, for Sartre, man is nothing else but
what he makes of himself his philosophy can be called 'subjectivist'. Sartre understands this to
mean the individual subject is totally free and that this is definitive man
cannot be unfree. It follows
from this that the entire responsibility for our existence is placed directly
upon our own shoulders, and further that when we make a choice between one
course of action and another we thereby affirm the value of that which is chosen. This latter claim is central to Sartre's ethics. He rejects as inauthentic actions which are undertaken in accordance
with systems of externally imposed values. To act is to endow our actions
with value. To act in accordance with the dictates of a God, the doctrines of
Christianity, or the principles of philosophical systems is to be guilty of
'bad faith (mauvaise foi) or
'self-deception' [a]. [On 'bad faith'
see also BN, Pt I, ch. 2.] In
other words, to refuse to face up to what Sartre calls 'abandonment' (that is
deciding one's being for oneself), to shy away from one's total responsibility
for one's actions, to hide behind
externally defined values, or to invent some deterministic doctrine, is to deny
that freedom which is the very definition and condition of man: "Man is free, man is freedom". Sartre illustrates his doctrine [EH] by telling the story of one of his pupils
who (in 1940) cannot make up his mind whether he should go to England to fight
for the Free French or should stay at home to look after his mother While
conventionally there are standards or criteria he might appeal to, in the last
analysis it is in his actual choice that he, as it were, gives his action
value. Only thus can his choice be
authentic. Furthermore, when we make a
decision and choose a course of action, says Sartre, we commit not only ourselves but humanity as a whole. In
legislating for the whole of mankind the individual man cannot escape from a
sense of complete responsibility, and he consequently experiences
'anguish'. Sartre attempts to provide
support for his view when he says that the Cartesian cogito provides us with an absolute truth one's immediate sense
of oneself. However, he goes on to
affirm that in the 'I think' is contained also knowledge of other people. The discovery of oneself is also a revelation
of the 'other' as a freedom which confronts mine and which cannot think or will
without doing so either for or against me. We find ourselves in a world of 'intersubjectivity'. Now what is characteristic of man is that he
is 'self-surpassing'. Although we find ourselves in different historical
situations, we are all constrained by certain material, social, and political
limitations. These are 'objective', that
is, they are met with and recognised everywhere, but in so far as they are lived they are 'subjective': man freely determines himself and his existence
in relation to them; and in this respect we can identify a common or universal
purpose self-realization. Free being, as existence
choosing its essence, is identical with absolute being, which is at once
temporarily localized in history and universally intelligible. It is on this basis that Sartre feels
justified in universalizing his commitment and commitment obliges him to will
the liberty of others at the same time [b]. Freedom, he says, is
willed in community. However, he denies he is adopting a Kantian position, not
least because principles which are too abstract break down and we have to
'invent' our own rule or authority because in concrete cases there are no
criteria we can appeal to determine how
best to act.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY/ PHILOSOPHY OF MAN
[6] Although Sartre has expressly rejected
Kantianism as being too abstract, the 'rule' which he invents for himself,
which is grounded in the concept of freedom, nevertheless owes something to
Kant's philosophy. And it is here that the inconsistency with the
theory developed in Being and Nothingness becomes evident; for he makes it clear [Pt III, ch, 3] that by attributing freedom to
the 'Other' that Other becomes a threat or obstacle to us. Moreover, we can never approach the Other on
the basis of equality, where the "recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the recognition of our
freedom". It seems in fact that any kind of altruistic or social ethics, whether of the
Aristotelian, Kantian, or utilitarian variety, which might just conceivably be
consistent with the premisses of Existentialism
and Humanism, is ruled
out by the pessimistic analysis of human relationships [a]. Sartre supplies in his
major work. Nevertheless, he does
contemplate a way out: but the
possibility of an ethics of "deliverance
and salvation" can be achieved, he thinks, only after a "radical conversion" [BN, III, 3, footnote 14]. This proved in due course to be a conversion
to Marxism. This brings us to his
political philosophy. (The projected
work on ethics was never written.)
[Critique of Dialectical
Reason: Search for a Method.] A
philosophy for Sartre is not a self-indulgent cerebral activity which has
relevance only to an individual's own life and personal circumstances. It is, he says [ch. I], simultaneously a way
in which the 'rising class' becomes conscious of itself, a totalization of
knowledge, a method, a regulative Idea, an offensive weapon, and a community of
language. It can 'ferment rotten
societies'. and it can become the culture and sometimes the nature of a whole
class". Each period, he thinks, has its
own 'dominant philosophy'. Just as the
philosophies of Descartes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel have in turn performed this
role so it is now Marxism
that Sartre sees as being the dominant philosophy of the present day. However, he is at the same time severely
critical of contemporary Marxists. They treat as concrete truths what should be
taken as heuristic (guiding) principles or regulative ideas; their method does
not derive concepts from experience but is certain of their truth and treats
them as constitutive schemata. The sole purpose of the method is "to force the
events, the persons, or the acts considered into prefabricated moulds".
Moreover, the 'intellectual' or 'lazy' Marxist interprets history
teleologically, in terms of a mechanistic movement towards a moment of final
completion, a 'totality'; and thereby subsumes the concrete particular
especially man, whom Sartre sees as free and creative under the universal.
The Marxist is here guilty of 'bad faith'; for while he is employing a
mechanistic concept to make it appear that ends have disappeared he is at the
same tune attempting to preserve a teleological interpretation. This leads,
Sartre says, to "that tedious vacillation in Marxist explanations". What he wants to do is to get back to what he
sees as the Hegelian roots of the original Marx. And he seeks a Marxist philosophy which is not a predetermined totality
but a continuous totalizing process.
To put concrete man back into history it is necessary to make the
historical object pass through a process of 'mediation'. Sartre thinks that contemporary Marxism
lacks the means which would allow it grasp or facilitate this process, and he
turns to existentialism to bring this about without being unfaithful to pure
Marxist principles. To place man in his 'proper
framework', the method to be employed is what Sartre calls 'progressive-regressive'. By 'regressive'
he means that it is concerned with the uncovering of the fundamental structures
that link men to each other and to Nature [ch. III]. This is achieved by
the making of what he calls 'cross-references'. And it is 'progressive' in that it is a continuous process
of 'totalization'. A biography,
for example (Sartre examines in detail the writer Flaubert) is progressively
determined through an empathetic
examination of the period and of the person's life. The method, he says, holds the life and the period apart until the
reciprocal involvement comes to pass of itself and puts a temporary end to the
research]. Regression is a move back to
an original condition: progression is the movement towards the objective
result. What is achieved is an 'understanding' of the individual
and period. Moreover, the method, Sartre insists is
heuristic and not a priori like the 'synthetic progression' of the 'lazy Marxists' [b]. He is concerned to show
how the individual
actually makes his free choices in the context of his social grouping but at
the same time 'transcends' himself within the dialectical historical process.
This purposive activity Sartre refers to by the technical term praxis [c]. It consists of three aspects: (a)
the plan or intention (the project); (b)
the factual or objective situation man seeks to alter; (c) the 'passing beyond'
(dépassement) that situation. The
objective situation is called the 'practico-inert'. But it is not just a material structure which limits man; it
may be a class, or indeed anything produced by him which as an en-soi is found to be in opposition
to the freedom of man himself, the pour-soi and which thus becomes the
source of alienation as expressed in what Sartre calls need or scarcity (besoin) [d]. The full significance of praxis is
revealed in the Conclusion. Sartre
thinks Marxism is the only
possible anthropology which can be at once historical and structural, and the
only one which at the same time takes man in his totality, that is, in terms of
the 'materiality of his condition'. But anthropological disciplines (namely, history, sociology, ethnology,
and Marxism the 'sciences' of man) only study the development and relation of
human facts; they do not question themselves about man as such. Intellectual Knowledge is in
opposition to Being. So Sartre
argues that if
anthropology is to be an organized whole, it must overcome this contradiction
(which originates in reality itself not in a 'Knowledge') and on its own
constitute itself as a 'structural, historical' anthropology. What is needed, therefore is a process of
'interiorization' or 'internalization' by means of which existence can be
reintegrated into knowledge. It is here
that praxis has a role to play, for the 'determinations of the person'
(that is, those economic and cultural factors which oppose or condition him)
are sustained, internalized and lived by the personal project; and it is in his comprehending of the
project that man makes his own reality, 'existentializes' the ideology.
The aim is 'comprehension', by which he mans both 'immediate existence' (since
it is produced as 'the movement of action') and as the foundation of an
'indirect knowing' of existence (since it comprehends the existence of the
other). And by 'indirect knowing' Sartre means the result of reflection on
existence. It is indirect in the sense
that it is presupposed by the concepts of anthropology without being itself
made the object of concepts. He makes it
clear that the process is
entirely rational and reproduces the dialectical movement from the 'given' to
'activity' [e]. (Hence his
substitution of 'Dialectical Reason' for 'Dialectical Materialism'.) Significantly, he claims that this demand for an existential
foundation for Marxist theory is already contained implicitly in Marx's own
Marxism. If Marxism does not reintegrate man into itself as its
foundation, it will degenerate into a 'non-human' anthropology. What Sartre seems to be saying is that existentialism and Marxism
require each other; existentialism will enliven Marxism and as it does so it
will be absorbed by Marxism and no longer exist as an independent philosophy [f].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Many professional
philosophers, even in France, have often tended to think of Sartre as passé, outmoded. Perhaps it is largely due to his often
uncritical presentation of his ideas, his seeming lack of rigour in argument,
and his over-reliance on prolix and metaphorical language that has contributed
to the negative neglect of his thought by most mainstream British and American
philosophers. But his appropriation of
Husserl's methodology, and the use he made of seminal ideas of Hegel,
Heidegger, and Marx are of significance, even if (as some might argue) he was
an eclectic synthesizer rather than an original thinker. Of the central features
of Sartre's philosophy the following should be mentioned:
(1) His emphasis on the primacy of existence over essence.
(2) His development of phenomenological techniques
to reinterpret the Cartesian ego.
(3) The distinction between en soi and pour soi, and his recognition that being should be the
object of intentionality.
(4) Intersubjectivity and other minds are
understood in terms of feeling rather than analogically.
(5) His concept of 'bad faith' and (in his mature work) his rejection of external criteria
for value. Each individual is held to be totally responsible for making his own
values as he 'makes' himself.
(6) The attempt to reconcile existentialism with
Marxist ideology, and his view of man as an agent grounded in history.
All of these aspects of his
thought have of course provoked a great deal of criticism. The following are some of the more important
objections.
(1) It has been claimed that 'existence before
essence' is an empty notion, and that Sartre has failed to account adequately
for genetic, environmental, and unconscious restraints on humus action.
However, it may be said that he recognised and attempted to come to terms with
these in his later political writings.
(2) He has a tendency to suppose that freedom is
unlimited. But he does not satisfactorily resolve the conflict between the free agency of the prereflective self
and the objective 'for itself' governed by causality. In this context he has likewise not really overcome Cartesian dualism. His account of the origins of consciousness
also seems obscure.
(3) Sartre's account of value is in
effect a radical 'situation ethics' [a] and is either incoherent or leads to the abnegation of all values, in so far as
all situations for action are unique. Moreover the subjectivity of his ethics is not readily reconcilable with
his appeal to universalizability.
(4) Despite the originality of his political writings, with their postulation of the
conscious project or praxis and purposive activity, it is arguable that the
existential aspect has not been fully integrated with his acceptance of the
material factors which motivate human behaviour or with the dialectic of
inevitability even allowing for his Hegelian modification of Marxism. It is also questionable whether he has
satisfactorily dealt with the methodological problem of how within a supposedly
unified system of thought a scientific mode of enquiry can simultaneously offer
a dialectical comprehension of the human
condition.
Sartre: La
Transcendance de l'ego, ésquisse d'une description phénoménologique (1936)
(Trans. as The Transcendence of the Ego. An Existentialist Theory of
Consciousness by F. Williams & R. Kirkpatrick);. L'Imagination (1936) (Trans. as Imagination,
a Psychological Critique by F. Williams); Esquisse d'une théorie des
Emotions (1939) (The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, trans. B. Frechtman); L'être et le néant. Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique (1943) (Being and Nothingness. An
Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. H. E. Barnes); L'Existentialism est un humanisme (1946) (Trans. as Existentialism is a Humanism by P. Mairet); Critique de la raison dialectique, précedé
de Question de méthode (1960) (Critique
of Dialectical Reason, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith, ed. J. Rée; Question de
Méthode trans. separately as Search for a Method by H. E.
Barnes).
Studies:
Introductory
A. C. Danto, Sartre.
I. Murdoch, Sartre,
Romantic Rationalist.
M.
Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre.
More advanced
H. Barnes, Sartre.
P. Caws, Sartre.
G. Cox, Sartre: A Guide for the Perplexed
A.
Manser, Sartre, A Philosophic Study.
Collections of essays
C. Howells (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Sartre.
P. Schilpp, The
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.
CONNECTIONS
Sartre