MARX
(1818 1883)
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
Karl Marx was born in Trier,
Germany. His parents were Jewish
converts to Lutheranism. He studied law
at Bonn University, philosophy and history at Berlin, and philosophy at Jena,
gaining his doctorate in 1841. As a
known atheist he was unable to pursue an academic career, so he entered
journalism and soon became a newspaper editor. When the paper was closed down in 1843 he went to Paris, where he met
Friedrich Engels who was to become his lifelong collaborator. He was successively expelled from Paris,
Brussels, Paris again, and then Cologne,
but he finally settled in London in 1849. Throughout this time he studied economics, became deeply involved with
labour movements, and wrote extensively on political, economic, and social
issues. Although helped by Engels, he
and his family experienced considerable hardship and illness.
PHILOSOPHY OF MAN AND NATURE/ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
[1] [See The German Ideology, I A.] Marx objected to Hegel's subordination of the concrete,
living individual to abstract conceptualization [a]. However, he differed in his analysis of religion, which, in his early writings, he saw as alienating man. God is regarded as a human creation and as a projection which then
stands against as supposedly 'weak and sinful' man [b]. Marx rejected also the identification by the
'right' Hegelians of Hegel's rational state with contemporary Prussia. Both the State and the Christian religion are
viewed by Marx and the 'left' Hegelians as imperfect and thus far
irrational; there is an inherent tension
between the individual and the state and between man and his religious
beliefs. The task of philosophy for
Marx, therefore, is to push Hegel's
philosophy further so that such conflicts might be overcome and a perfect, rational
world be achieved for man. Thought is inseparable from
action which means social revolution. As he says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it" [Theses on Feuerbach, XI]. Such a social revolution
will enable man to overcome the alienation from the products of his manual labour (brought about because ownership of them
has been denied to him) [c].
[2] [gen 2] Central to Marx's
account is a view of history which is both materialist and dialectical [see especially The German Ideology, I A, 2-4]. He is a materialist in the sense that he rejects the idealist view that
Nature (and therefore the historical process) is the unconscious external
manifestation of Spirit or the Absolute. Nature, not the Idea or Logos, is the primary reality. Likewise philosophy and values must be
grounded in analysis of concrete historical situations; he rejects all a
priori metaphysical speculation (and, of course, implicitly such a notion
that individuals possess an immortal spiritual 'soul'). The historical process of Nature is dialectical and is reflected in the
dialectical movement of human thought [a]. Marx stresses the
interdependence of man and Nature. It exists for him in so far as (a) he differentiates himself from it,
and (b) it provides the means for satisfying man's needs through his productive
activity in work. This, however, presupposes that man is a social being. He relates therefore not only to Nature but
also to other men. Indeed, it is only in their
social and political relationships or intercourse (Verkehr), grounded in material activity, that individuals can be genuinely defined as
'free' and 'real' [b]. The nature of individuals, he says, depends on the material conditions
determining what they produce; what they are coincides with their
production. Together, Nature, as the
means of production, and man's relations to others constitute a dynamic process
of history. In both Nature and in human
history the processes of change are dialectical in the sense that underlying
them are laws of movement which involve progressive transformations of
opposites, "negations of negations", and so on. A seed, for example, is 'negated' when it forms a shoot; the new plant
is itself 'negated' when it in turn produces seeds. Human (scientific) knowledge, reflecting these processes, does not,
however, attain to any final or absolute view [c]; it
must always be open to revision or development.
Dialectical materialism
can now be applied to man's economic, social, and cultural life in general [ibid., I B]. Marx distinguishes between
(a) the material forces of production, and (b) productive relations. By the former he means not only the material
things needed to make something but also both 'forces of nature' and groups of
men themselves the proletariat, in
so far as their working together contributes to production. By productive relations he means the social
relations that obtain between the collaborators. Productive relations depend on productive
forces; and the two combined make up the economic substructure. The economic substructure 'conditions' the superstructure the
"social, political and mental life-process in general", which comprise
laws, ethics, religion, and so on. Life, Marx says, is not
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [d] [German
Ideology, I A], that is, by the "social being" of humans. However, he seems to accept that there is a
two-way process at work here, in that human ideas, especially of religion and
ideologies, can in turn have a role to play in channelling or modifying human
action; and can thereby affect the economic substructure. But the primacy of the latter is never
denied. At a particular stage in their
development a society's
productive forces come to 'contradict' existing productive relations. The
conflict can be resolved only through a qualitative change in the economic
substructure (and hence in the cultural superstructure). We thus have what Marx calls the class struggle or war. He identifies four such stages [ibid. I C and D].
(1) Primitive communism. A tribe as a whole owns and works the
land. But with the introduction of
private property there is class division, especially between rich and poor.
(2) The ancient period. The rich acquire slaves through war. This leads to class conflict between the
slaves and the freemen.
(3) The feudal (mediaeval)
epoch came into being as a result of a decline in agriculture and industry, and
the rise of German militarism. Various
conflicts now arise between barons and serfs, the directly producing class of
property owners and the small peasantry (in the countryside) or journeymen and
casual labourers (in the towns).
(4) The capitalist society
resulting from the overthrow of the guild system and the industrial
revolution. By its very nature, the
system is exploitational, in that the worker the means of production does
not own what he produces (regardless of wages or working conditions). Class struggle between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat ensues. The latter must
therefore become a revolutionary class to overthrow the former so as to
establish the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" and lead to a
genuinely communist society in which all property and class divisions will have
been abolished [e]. The revolutionary class is thus "the greatest of all productive
forces". [See also Communist Manifesto and Capital.]
At the philosophical
level, Marx also suggests that it is through the dialectical process that man can 'realize' himself
(objectified in his labour rather than 'pure' thought). If self-alienation in the social-economic
sphere is overcome, so too will religious alienation; and man will overcome
division within himself and achieve 'wholeness' his true self. Marx thus sees his system as providing a basis for an ethic which is
not grounded in eternal laws or ideal a priori categories [f].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Although most communist regimes had been 'deconstructed' by the end
of the twentieth century, the Marxist ideology to which they all in one form or
another subscribed remains as an autonomous philosophical 'world-view', and
deserves as much or as little critical respect as other philosophical
systems. And it should be judged by the
usual philosophical standards, though the fact that in practice it seems to
have been so often unsuccessful might also suggest there is something wrong
with the dialectic. The general
framework of Marx's philosophy is of course Hegelian. (It should also be noted that the application
of the 'necessary' dialectic to material nature was largely the work of
Engels.) But there are several key
differences: (1) Marx's interpretation
of consciousness as the superstructure grounded in an economic infrastructure;
(2) his substitution of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and the
'withering away of the state' for Hegel's realization by reason of the 'Idea';
(3) the subordination of thought to action, the aim of philosophy being seen as to change the world rather than to
interpret it. Not surprisingly, there are many difficulties with his
philosophy.
(1) As with most ideologies,
Marxism has spawned a multitude of 'orthodoxies', heresies, and 'deviant'
intepretations. (Marx would probably
have felt much the same about these as Jesus would have done about the
proliferation of Christian sects.) For
the greater part of this century there has been a fundamental disagreement
among Marxists as to how the Master's thesis should be interpreted. So-called 'orthodox' thinkers and
revolutionaries Lenin, Stalin, Mao, for example, have generally understood his
social and political philosophy in terms of a scientific materialism. This is probably a consequence of the
influence of his collaborator Engels. However, from the 1920s onwards, philosophers of the 'Frankfurt
School' Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, all following Georg Lukacs set out
to rediscover the more 'humanist', 'material idealist', anti-positivist
Hegelian Marx, which would be both more flexible, more self-critical that the
strict orthodoxy prevailing in the Soviet Union. Their efforts were facilitated by the belated
publication of Marx's German Ideology in 1932. (The 'revisionists' also
include Sartre; and more recently the aims of the Frankfurt founders have been
revitalized by the work of Habermas.)
(2) Despite Marx's own claims, dialectical materialism is a
'metaphysical' thesis and as such open to the same objections as apply to
Hegel's philosophy (an esoteric concept of contradiction, difficulty in
applying the dialectic to concrete experience, and so on). Moreover, it is unverifiable and therefore
(on the basis of Popper's thesis) not scientific.
(3) Consciousness is supposed
to have arisen out of the dialectic process. But it has been argued that Marx's treatment of this is inadequate
(though it is doubtful whether present day biologically based theories have been
any more successful in dealing with the 'first person' or subjective element).
(4) As in other dialectical and
positivist philosophies, there is a tension between the supposed
'inevitability' of the process and the role of the 'free' individual in
bringing about the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and the elimination of the
class system. Marx might say that human
activity is the dialectic in
action: but clearly the debate does not
stop at this point.
Marx:
'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie' (1844) ('Introduction to the
Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy
of the Right'); Die deutsche Ideologie (1845-6, published 1932) (The German
Ideology); (with Engels) Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (1847)
(The Communist Manifesto); Das Kapital (vol. 1, 1867; vols 2-3,
1885 & 1894) (trans. as Capital: A
Critique of Political Economy). See Karl Marx: Selected Writings (2nd edn) ed. D. McLellan. There is a
Penguin edition of Capital (vol. 1, ed. E. Mandel & B. Fowkes; vol
2, ed. E. Mandel & D. Fernbach); and there is an abridged version (World's
Classics).
Studies:
Introductory
I. Berlin, Karl Marx: his Life and
Environment, 4th edn.
D.
McLellan, Marx.
P.
Singer, Marx.
T. Sowell, Marxism: Philosophy and
Economics.
More advanced
H. P. Adams, Karl
Marx in his Earlier Writings.
S. Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of
Karl Marx.
H. B. Mayo, Introduction to
Marxist Theory.
D. McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought
K. Popper, The
Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2: Hegel and Marx.
Collection of essays
T. Carver, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Marx.
CONNECTIONS
Marx
[1a] |
Criticism
of subordination of
concrete individual to universal |
Hegel→
Kierkegaard |
[1c]
[1a] |
[1b] |
Religion
alienates; God as creation
and projection by man |
Hegel→
Sartre |
[7c 8c]
[3b] |
[2a] |
Nature
as primary reality dialectical
and material historical
process reflected in human
thought; not idealist manifestation
of Absolute Spirit;
implicit rejection of the
'soul' (and immortality) |
Hegel→
→Popper
→Sartre
→Merleau-Ponty
→Ricoeur
→Habermas |
[5a 5b 9a]
[3a]
[6b e f]
[6a]
[1c]
[2a] |
[2b] |
Interdependence
of man and nature,
and man as a social being;
individuals definable as
'free' and 'real' only through
social intercourse |
Hegel→
Spencer
→Sartre
→Merleau-Ponty
→Habermas |
[5e 7a b]
[2b]
[6c]
[6a]
[2c] |
[2c] |
Human knowledge ('scientific',
reflecting dialectical historical
process) never final
or absolute |
Hegel→ |
[9a] |
[2d] |
Economic infrastructure conditions
superstructure (social,
political, mental life- processes);
consciousness determined
by 'life' |
Hegel→
→Scheler
→Habermas |
[7a]
[4c]
[2c] |
[2e] |
Conflict between productive forces
and relations; class-struggle
but property and class-division
will be abolished in 'dictatorship
of proletariat |
Rousseau→
Fichte
Hegel→
Spencer
→Popper |
[1e]
[4c d]
[7a 7d]
[3b]
[3c] |
[2f; cf 2a b] |
Man (objectified through labour) 'realizes' himself in the
material dialectical process; basis
for a non-a priori ethics without
'eternal laws' or idea categories |
Locke
Hegel→
Sartre→
→Merleau-Ponty
→Habermas |
[4c]
[sec. 6]
[6c]
[6a]
[4a] |