BACON (Francis)
EMPIRICISM
Philosopher,
essayist, statesman, Bacon was born in London. He was educated by private tutors there and in his father's country
house at Gorhambury, St Albans, and from the age of ten possibly also at the
recently refounded St Albans Abbey School (of which his father, Sir Nicholas
Bacon was the prime benefactor) before he went up to Trinity College,
Cambridge in 1573. He studied law and in 1582 became a barrister
of Gray's Inn. He sat in Parliament for
a number of constituencies. Knighted in
1603, he was appointed Lord Chancellor
in 1618, and created Baron Verulam and then Viscount St Albans in 1621. In that same year he fell from grace and,
having been found guilty of bribery (not uncommon in his day), was imprisoned briefly in the Tower. He spent his remaining years researching and
writing at Gorhambury. He died of
bronchitis allegedly as a result of exposure to wintry conditions when carrying
out an investigation into the preservative properties of snow.
KNOWLEDGE/ SCIENCE
[1] [gen. 1] At the age of
thirty, in a letter to his uncle, Lord Burleigh, Bacon declared that he had
taken all knowledge to be his province; and in his De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Part I of the Instauratio Magna or Great
Renewal) he set out a complete
scheme of classification of human knowledge.
[See Advancement
of Science.] The world of learning
is divided into history, poetry, and philosophy corresponding respectively to
the three faculties of the soul, memory, imagination, and reason. Philosophy, the "one universal science" [sec. 1],
as "first philosophy" concerned with fundamental axioms and 'transcendental'
concepts (for example, being, possibility) is subdivided into three classes:
(1) the study of the nature and existence of God as known indirectly through
his creatures (this is natural or rational theology, as contrasted with
revelation and divine theology, which is not a science); (2) Nature known directly;
and (3) Man known through self-reflection. The philosophy of Nature in turn
is split into (a) speculative or theoretical and (b) 'operative' or philosophy. The former deals with (i) efficient and material causes (physics), and (ii) formal causes (metaphysics).
Operative natural philosophy (in effect applied or practical speculative
philosophy) involves mechanics and 'natural magic' by which Bacon means the
science of 'latent' (hidden or
underlying) forms or laws, and is an enquiry into the production of
effects. The philosophy of Man is
divided into 'anthropology' (of body and soul) and political philosophy
(relating to man in society, and concepts such as prudence, justice, and
government). Examination of the soul
leads to logic and ethics the latter being concerned with private and common
good and with the 'cultivation' of the soul. Logic is itself divided into (a) ars
inveniendi interpretation of Nature by means of explanations and axioms (examined in Part II of the Instauratio Magna, called the Novum
Organum); (b) ars
judicandi investigation of syllogisms and errors, and of induction (the
method to be used for the ars inveniendi);
(c) ars retinendi et tradendi, which
is concerned mainly with education.
Bacon rejects traditional (that is, scholastic) metaphysics. For him the quest
for final causes leads nowhere and to nothing [a]. No knowledge is possible of either man's soul or of God, though the
philosopher may be able to prove the existence of the latter as the first cause [b]. Bacon thus makes a clear separation between
'natural' philosophy (or science) and theology/ metaphysics [c]. The aim of 'natural philosophy' is "to
make latent things sensible" [as the eighteenth century philosopher and
scientist, Georg Lichtenberg put it, referring to Bacon]. The natural
philosopher starts out by investigating 'concrete bodies' with a view to (1) discovering (making visible)
efficient and material causes the latent processes of change [New Organon II,
6]; (2) investigating the
"latent schematism" or inner structure of
bodies [ibid. 7]. He may then move towards greater generality and discover latent forms [d] (non-Platonic and
non-Aristotelian formal causes or laws which give a thing
its peculiar features or inmost 'nature'), and general principles [9] [d]. This is acceptable metaphysics. In this way the natural philosopher will
gain greater control of Nature; and it
is this which Bacon regards as the primary purpose of both natural philosophy
and (proper) metaphysics. To have knowledge is to have power over Nature [e].
LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY
[2] In our reasonings we are, says Bacon, prone to errors. Many of these, which he
calls 'idols and false
notions', cause us to be prejudiced and must therefore be avoided if
true science is to be attained. He
divides these into four kinds [ibid. I, 38-68].
(1) Idols of the tribe (idola
tribus). These arise from uncritical reliance on the
senses [a],
on received ideas, abstractions, and on anthropomorphic interpretations of
Nature. We must therefore back up sense observations with
suitable experiments, and we must avoid attributing purpose (final causes) to
Nature [a].
(2) Idols of the den (idola
specus). These involve personal prejudice [b] resulting from one's temperament or
upbringing.
(3) Idols of the market-place (idola fori) arise as a result of insensitivity to or the misuse
of language. We often fail to see the
ambiguity of words or use words which have no reference [c].
(4) Idols of the theatre (idola
theatri). Bacon refers here to
previous philosophical systems such as the 'sophistical' dialectical philosophy of Aristotle, the 'empiricism' of certain
[al]chemists, and the 'superstition' [d][d] of Pythagoreans and Platonists.
Other kinds
of errors are found in syllogistic
arguments. Bacon rejects the use of
purely deductive and rationalistic methods, because they not only make
permanent the fallacies in our reasoning and our conceptual confusions but also fail to give us knowledge
about the world. Science must therefore
be inductive. It must also be
'eliminative', starting, not from what he calls [I, 26] "rash and premature
anticipations [anticipationes] of nature" based on enumerative induction,
typical of scholasticism, but from a careful examination of particulars by means of sense and
perception. Enumeration, he says, can
verify only restricted, finite claims, such as 'All swans in this
particular spot are white'. Bacon thinks
of this as essentially an 'interrogation' of nature. Through eliminative induction we can move to well-founded general axioms
(a process he calls 'eduction'). In this way we achieve an interpretatio
naturae, [I, 26-33]. The value of these general laws can then be demonstrated
when we are able to derive further 'experiments' from them [e]. We thereby obtain a "sufficient and good natural and experimental history"
[II, 10].
The various stages of Bacon's method are
illustrated by his discussion of heat [II, 10ff]. We look for situations in which heat is
found, for example, rays of light from the sun, sparks from a flint when
struck; and we search for similar phenomena where heat is absent (for example,
rays of light from the moon). We then
look for variations (animals get hotter when they exercise or when they are
ill). By means of processes of 'rejection' or 'exclusion', and by examining
all the 'tables' or lists of instances we arrive at a "provisional
affirmation". Thus heat is located in a special 'expanding' (expansivius) or 'restraining' (cohibitus) motion, which 'presses forward' (nitens) through smaller parts. This affirmation can be made more certain,
and can provide an adequate foundation for inductive generalization or
eduction, through an examination of special cases in which the only common
element is the participation of things in the 'nature' under investigation. Bacon says we can then make use of a number
of "helps to the intellect" before
moving on to the latent processes and schemata. But there is no discussion of this in the Novum Organum after he deals with the special cases.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Despite his use of
Aristotelian terminology ('formal cause', 'forms', 'first philosophy'), Bacon
consciously rejects the assumptions and methods of Aristotelian
metaphysics. His importance lies in his
emphasis on empirical data, his rejection of final causality in science, his
appeal to inductive rather than deductive reasoning in his search for the
'forms', that is, 'fixed laws' he supposed to be latent in phenomena, his
identification of knowledge with power, and not least for his recognition of
errors arising out of received ideas or prejudices, or as a result of an
uncritical use of language. As against
these positive features of his thought, it might be said that Bacon was not a
great philosopher of science. He certainly
underestimated the importance of mathematics in science. And one could argue that his scientific
methodology was unsophisticated by
today's standards though this is hardly a criticism. But in recognising the need for a "new organ"
or logic in natural philosophy to replace the syllogism he marks himself off as
a radical thinker and a modernizer even though he may not have explored the
full implications of his inductive method, or recognised the part that can be
played in science by imagination.
CONNECTIONS
Francis Bacon