VICO
(1668 1744)
CONSTRUCTIVISM
Born in Naples, where
his father was a bookseller, Giovanni Vico was mainly self-educated but did
attend a Jesuit College for a short time. After a stint as a private tutor
he became Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Naples in 1699. In 1735 he was appointed historian to the
King of Naples. However, despite his
highly original intellectual achievements, he was largely ignored by
contemporary thinkers and spent most of his life close to poverty.
KNOWLEDGE
[1] Vico rejected Cartesian
rationalism. (1) We have no knowledge of the thinking mind as such [a]; there is self-awareness and 'supposed'
certainty only at the primitive level of "unreflecting consciousness". (2) Clarity and distinctness
of an idea cannot be criteria of truth [b] not
least because propositions which seem to be clearly and distinctly true can in
fact be doubted and shown later to be false. (3) We can have no
demonstrative or a priori knowledge
of God's existence [c]. What then
is to be put in the place of Descartes' assumptions? Vico distinguishes between a ('Platonic') scienza and coscienza [external 'awareness']. Scienza involves certain knowledge only of what
we ourselves have 'made'. The
true (verum) is the made (factum). Vico
is supposing here that we
have the capacity to create or construct concepts, especially in
mathematics (but also in other fields, including political science), which give
us complete certainty. He does not mean
that the mind actually brings mathematical entities into existence, but that we
make up in an arbitrary way the rules or conventions which govern the use and application of
mathematical ideas. Even in physics (coscienza), although we do not create
nature in the sense that God does, we do exercise a degree of control and
ordering of concepts through our hypotheses and experiments, which enable us to
"imitate nature" by recreating the conditions in which phenomena occur. And
Vico rejects any appeal to purposes or ends supposedly given through pure
reason. Physics nevertheless remains less certain than mathematics. In general his view is that we have no direct insight or
knowledge into Nature as it really is; this is available only to God [d].
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY/ CULTURE
[2] Although
we lack complete insight into nature in itself, we do have an intimate grasp and knowledge of history. This is because history is essentially the
continuous unfolding and expression of man's nature and will. But Vico nevertheless thinks it is a mistake to look for a
specific unchanging human essence which is the same in all places and times,
and in different cultures. Thus,
while assuming universal law of development, he rejects the concept of a static
natural law which implies or is grounded in the concept of a fixed human nature
or purpose.
He identifies three stages through which, he thinks, societies pass and
which exhibit different mental outlooks [a], as
mediated through religion, law, social organization, literature, and so
on. He stresses the importance of forms of language,
especially those of myth and poetry, for an understanding of the earliest
stages; for it is through these modes that we can appreciate the role played by imagination and
feeling, rather than abstract reason [b], in the lives and
cultures of ancient peoples. The first stage, the "age of the gods", is that of
a patriarchal society in which the primary concerns are religion, marriage, and
burial. As a result of alliances between
the 'fathers' against both internal and external strife, the age gave way to an
unstable "age of heroes" characterized by rigid division between patrician
rulers and plebeian slaves. This in turn
led to class conflict and hence to the third stage, the "age of men", which was
essentially 'democratic' and 'humanistic', emphasizing reason and
intellect. In due course this type of
society therefore gave rise to scepticism, became decadent and corrupt, and
reverted to primitive barbarism thus beginning a new triadic cycle. Although Vico has stressed history as a human construct, he also sees
the hand of God at work, operating through man's will and intellect. But he does not believe there to be any
incompatibility between human freedom
and divine purpose [c].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Vico's importance was not
really appreciated until the nineteenth century. Today his Scienza
Nuova is regarded as a seminal, albeit somewhat obscure text for the
philosophy of history, culture, aesthetics, and philosophical
anthropology. Noteworthy features of his
thought are his anti-Cartesianism; his view that certainty in all branches of
knowledge is to be located in the 'products' or construct of our own creative
activity in the vera facta. He
was perhaps the earliest thinker to draw attention to a different type of explanation appropriate to the
'human sciences' [a] (involving empathy or the "imaginative
recreation of the past" Isaiah Berlin] ). Perhaps even more important are his views concerning the role of
language. The stress he laid on the
historical process was also to be influential. However, such notions as historical cycles, historicism, or historical
inevitability have been severely criticized in this century. Indeed Vico's own emphasis on man's creative
role may be regarded as not fitting too well with his view of history or of
divine providence.
CONNECTIONS
Vico