ABELARD
(1079 1142)
CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM (DIALECTICS)
Peter Abelard, the
son of a knight, was born near Nantes
and studied in Paris and later in Laon. He established schools of his own and came to be recognised as a
brilliant but controversial dialectician. A liaison with Heloise led to his being castrated at the instigation of
her uncle. Abelard continued to teach,
and in 1125 became Abbot of St Gilas in Brittany. His theological writings were denounced by
Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens in 1040 on the questionable grounds
that his intellectualism was undermining the faith.
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[1] [See 'Thus
and Not.] Although
a powerful dialectician Abelard recognised that human reason, in attempting to grapple with the mysteries
of the faith has its limits, and that it should where necessary give way to
authority [a]. He conventionally regarded God as the supreme good and as
the omnipotent creator of the world. We
can have no knowledge of God's essence, but we can suppose Him positively to
possess all attributes to an infinite degree [b]. And we can infer that He exists from a recognition of the
impermanence of the world as contrasted with the eternal, and from the
dependence of the body on the mind [c]. As for the world, Abelard said that God created it necessarily from His
own nature in accordance with pre-existing ideas or exemplary forms (formae exemplares) which are both in His
mind and identical with the Divine Essence [d].
KNOWLEDGE/ LOGIC
[2] [See especially Dialectical Treatises.] Abelard made a major contribution to the theory of universals. Two positions in particular were current in
his own day. (1) Realists held that 'universal' terms, such as, for example, 'man'
(a genus) and 'rational' (a species), as in 'X is a man; X is
rational', correspond to realities ('manness', rationality), which actually
exist outside the mind. (2) Nominalists argued that universals are but words (or, at the most, concepts which exist
solely in the mind all things in the world being individual substances
lacking any real shared universal
features). Abelard rejected both realism and nominalism and said
that, while the universal is a name (nomen) or term (sermo),
it exists as a 'common nature' in individual things. We recognise a number of things as being
alike in various respects. For example,
different individuals Socrates, Aristotle, etc. are all human; This and that object are red. Such logical predicates refer to universal features or images of things
which can be 'abstracted' and thus have some kind of 'mental' existence as adequate representations of the
properties each thing possesses individually. These common representations the mind attends to while ignoring other
accidental features of the individuals. However, for Abelard these
'mental' universals have essentially psychological and logical rather than
metaphysical status [a].
Abelard's contribution to logic which underlies his theory of
universals is also important. Building
on the work of Aristotle and Boethius, he examined the syllogism and especially conditional
propositions and the concept of implication [b]. He also studied signification. He said that signs are used primarily to refer to 'facts' in the world
and thence to thoughts about them. It
follows that propositions are true or false by virtue of their relation to
their 'contents'. Abelard also
allowed that we can talk
of truth and falsity in a secondary sense as applicable to propositions
themselves a categorical proposition being true if both the subject term and
predicate terms have the same referent. (This was to influence the later doctrine of the suppositio of terms) [c]. As for
modalities, such as necessity, possibility, contingency, he said that these
terms might be applied to propositions with reference to their meaning (sensus), but strictly modalities are de rebus concerned with things. 'Contingency' can be defined as 'possibility' which is 'non-necessity' [d]. But in a wider sense, especially
when applied to future events, contingency means not necessary; and he
seemed to believe that such propositions
are indeterminately true in the sense that they could be true on some occasions
but false on others. If Aristotle could
be understood as making this claim, then he would not be in breach of the principle of bivalence [e].
ETHICS
[3] [See Know Thyself.] Abelard rejected the 'privation' view of evil as having no content [a]. He said that the rightness or wrongness of actions depended on the intentions of an agent [b]; and
although an objective good is presupposed, he stressed individual certainty as the basis of moral
judgement. As a result he saw no
role for divine grace; morality
was a matter for individual conscience [c].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
The significance of Abelard
lies primarily in his skill as a dialectician, both within philosophy itself
and for explaining the faith to the unbeliever; and for his employment of
reason while recognising its limits and the superiority of authority. Although he is not generally regarded as a
particularly original thinker, his treatment of the problem of universals was a
stimulus to subsequent thought, as was his emphasis on the role of intentions
in ethics. There has been much dispute
as to whether he was a 'moderate realist' or a 'conceptualist'. He was certainly criticized by Aquinas for
regarding universals only as mental 'constructs', but it seems correct to
regard him as having attempted to steer a middle path between realism and
nominalism, and as holding universals to be real 'mental' concepts which yet relate to an extra-mental reality. Nevertheless it has been argued that in so
far as his account of universals as genera and species, predicable of particular
things, remained at the level of logic, he gave little if any consideration to
the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the problem. He was also criticized in his own day for his
apparent subordination of the mysteries of faith to the demands of his dialectic. However, this accusation was probably unjustified. He himself protested both his orthodoxy and
his acceptance of the supremacy of faith over (an intrinsically limited)
reason; and it is arguable that his concern was not to question faith as such
but rather to apply his dialectic to its theological and thus linguistic
expression. As he wrote in a letter to
Heloise in 1041 after his condemnation, "I shall never be a philosopher if this
means to speak against St Paul; I should not wish to be Aristotle if this were
to separate me from Christ" [Letter 17].
Abelard: Dialectical Treatises; Scito te ipsum [or Ethica] (Know Thyself); Letters
of Abelard and Eloise. Selections in
R. McKeon, op. cit., vol. I, ch. 6, and P. Spade
(trans. and ed.), Abelard's Ethics and Other Writings. There is a Penguin edition of the Letters.
Studies
J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard.
J. Marenbon, 'Abelard',
in J. J. E. Garcia (ed.), A Companion to
Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
J. G.
Sikes, Peter Abailard.
Collection of Essays
J. E. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds), The Cambridge Companion to
Abelard.
CONNECTIONS
Abelard