BONAVENTURA
AUGUSTINIANISM
Giovanni di Fidanza,
the Doctor Seraphicus ('Angelic
Teacher'), known as San Bonaventura (or St Bonaventure), was born in Bagnorea,
Tuscany. He entered the Franciscan Order
in 1238 and studied in Paris under Alexander of Hales. He taught theology there and was appointed to
the Franciscan Chair in 1257. As
Minister-General of the Order he was actively involved in worldly affairs. In 1273 he was made Bishop of Albano and
Cardinal by Pope Gregory X.
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS
[1] Although
Bonaventura makes a clear
distinction between faith and reason and grants that philosophy is a
rational activity and need not make use of theological dogma, he starts from
the assumption that philosophy
must be incomplete or erroneous unless guided by the light of faith [a]; all knowledge must presuppose and
depend on revelation [see, for example, Commentary
on the Sentences, II, 1; On the Six
Days, I, 13]. And in general he
tends to write as a theologian rather than as a philosopher interested in
philosophical problems as such. His primary concern is with the soul's ascent
to God. He accepts that God's existence can be proved
from the material world [Sentences I, 3; Six Days III, 4; On the Mystery of the Trinity I, 1], but he sees such proofs as
little more than reinforcing what he supposes to be the soul's prior awareness
of God's existence through its own reflection on itself. We do not, however, have such knowledge from birth; indeed in
many adults it may be only implicit or unclear. It is to them primarily that he addresses his proofs. Thus our recognition that the sensible world is finite and
imperfect draws our attention to and clarifies the awareness we have of
infinitude and perfection. He
argues further that there
must be a simple unchanging, self-caused Being to bring about composite and
changeable things. Another
argument starts from the human desire for happiness [Mystery I, 1]. This can be realized only when we possess the
supreme Good, that is, God. But the desire for happiness presupposes we have knowledge in our soul that
the Supreme Good exists [b]. Bonaventura also uses arguments which do not start from the sensible
world. Thus he adopts the ontological argument [Ibid.; Sentences I, 8]. (As soon as
we understand the idea of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought
we have to accept that God's existence cannot be doubted and that we cannot
think of Him as not existing. He rejects
Gaunilo's objection by saying that his assumption is self-contradictory: that
than which nothing greater can be thought is a perfect being, whereas 'island'
refers to an imperfect thing.) And he
appeals further to an
argument from truth [Sentences I, 8] [c]. Every affirmative
proposition presupposes a foundation for truth; and this, he says, can be understood only by reference to a first Truth
God.
[2] Bonaventura accepts the doctrine of exemplarism, the view that God
is seen as the supreme cause of
everything in that the
Ideas of all things possible, actual, universals, particulars are contained in the Divine Word [a]. He uses the term 'emanation' to describe the procession
of the world freely created by and from God [b],
but he stresses that this must be
understood in the context of the Christian account. Creation as a whole is a sign of God [Sentences II, 25]. Within God these infinitely various Ideas are
identical with the divine essence and are not therefore distinct from each
other: but as conceived by rational creatures they may be supposed to be
distinct in that they connote different things. [See Six Days I and XII; Sentences I, 35.] Everything that can happen, whether good,
evil, or possible, is already known to God in infinite and eternal act. While there is change and succession in the
things mirrored in divine knowledge, there is no time or motion in God's act
itself. Indeed, Bonaventura argues that the idea of creation requires
time to have had a beginning; the world cannot be eternal. And he offers several arguments against eternal motion. For example, he suggests that as it is impossible for something
to pass through an infinite series [c]; an eternal time would never have reached the present
moment. Likewise if the world were eternal there would now be an infinity of
rational souls and this is impossible
[Ibid. II, 1].
[3] As for individual creatures,
these are clearly dependent on God; and according to the doctrine of
exemplarism they must
resemble God in some way. [See, for example, ibid. I, 35 and 39; II, 16.] Bonaventura says this involves an imitation of
something in God and not a univocal participation. By this he means that what is in God is not
possessed by his creatures in the same sense; if it were it would lead to
pantheism. Rather we must understand resemblance
in terms of analogy [a] of proportionality (as between things
of different kinds) and especially of likeness. Creatures, he says, are 'traces' (vestigia)
of God as exemplata, that is, as effects of God, conforming to the
divine ideas, and in proportion in that creatures too can produce effects. Rational creatures resemble God more closely in so far as they can have
rational knowledge of Him and are thus images (imagines) of Him [b]. Irrational creatures on the other
hand are directed to God only mediately as effects and differ from rational
creatures proportionately. Bonaventura
thus accepts a hierarchy
of being [c]
though again of course this is a hierarchy only as viewed from the standpoint
of created beings. From a conception of
sensible beings we ascend to rational beings, rational beings in a state of
grace, and ultimately souls themselves in heaven enjoying the beatific vision
of God. Thus in the ascent we find an
ever closer likeness of the Divine, and ever greater expression of the
Word. The created world, Bonaventura
adds, is thus perfect in the sense that it serves the purpose God
intended. God could of course have created things differently [d]. He could, for example, have created a world in which all beings
have better essences. Indeed, one could
suppose that even within this actual world its substances could be changed into
a higher class (in which case He would be making a different world), or that
individual men might be improved morally or intellectually. Nevertheless we
finite creatures cannot know God's reasons for acting as He does.
[4] Bonaventura's account of
created beings and their production is subtle. Unlike God, who is
immaterial and pure act, all created beings (corporeal and spiritual) are said
to be composed of matter and form (the doctrine of hylomorphism) [Ibid. II, 3] [a]. Matter cannot exist on its own; it exists in
association with form: but it is potential
in so far as it is the basis of forms (having a disposition to receive them) of all beings [b]. Considered either in itself, abstracted from all forms, or potentially
as the foundation for being as such, matter is the same in all things. But in relation to motion it differs as
between substances that can change on receiving component forms (namely,
bodies) and substances which cannot change (for example, spiritual beings or angels). Bonaventura argues for a plurality of forms in all
bodies [c]. Moreover, in addition to their own forms they possess the form of light (lux) as the one
basic substantial form their position in the hierarchy of being
reflecting their degree of participation in the form of light. Light is a central concept in Bonaventura's
metaphysics. [Ibid. II, 13] He understands
it as the composite of
form and 'spiritual' matter. It is not
itself material in the bodily sense but it represents the form of corporeal matter;
and it is through light that corporeal matter is actualized, brought into being [d]. Light (lumen)
is the principle of activity. Radiating from the heavenly bodies it is a power which permeates the
universe as a kind of spiritual life-force, active in reproduction and in
effect mediating between
soul and body [e]. It also acts as an agent in the eliciting of 'seminal reasons' (rationes seminales) from matter [f]. Bonaventura explains the doctrine
of seminal reasons in the following way. Matter as potentiality contains within itself most natural forms which
are actualized through the action of light (in its 'illuminating' role). Matter, he supposes, contains these forms virtually; they are created
within it. The agent's role is thus
solely to bring to act what already exists potentially. It is these virtual forms he identifies as
seminal reasons. Only God can create out of nothing. [On the above see, for example, ibid. II, 7, 13, 15, and 18.]
The
composite of matter and form is the individuating factor that which
makes things what they are. Within this
it is matter which is responsible for the distinctness and multiplicity of
individual things as apart from others, while it is form that makes the
individual a specific kind. For example,
I am a man (form); I differ numerically from other men (matter): but matter and form together make me the
individual I am. Moreover, because the form is rational
the highest substantial form I am thereby made an individual person [g].
PSYCHOLOGY
[5] [See Sentences II, 17, 18, 24.] Of the numerous created
beings, the human soul is
unique in that it is created by God out of nothing. According to Bonaventura it is composed of
both form and matter, but both of these
are 'spiritual' [a]. Although an individual's soul is 'simple' in that it contains no measurable
parts, and its matter is unextended and unchangeable, it has four functions, that is, faculties which are not distinct vegetative, sensitive, rational (and its several aspects), and
volitional (will). The
rational soul animates the body and has the desire to perfect it [b] in the same way that the body has the
desire to follow the soul [ibid. II,
17, I]. The body too is composed of
matter and form, and is transmitted seminally through the generations of
men. The relationship of soul to body is thus a union of two
complete beings, each of which has its own form and matter; it is not a
relationship of soul as form and body as matter [c]. Bonaventura also distinguishes two different but inseparable
aspects of the rational soul the active
intellect, which is unique to each individual soul, and the passive or possible
intellect. There is no separate
universal active intellect. However, the possible intellect is not
completely passive, and the active intellect is not wholly 'in act' [see
under 'Knowledge' below sec. 6] [d]. Given his theological presuppositions and 'proofs', and his account of the
nature of the human soul
as simple and self-subsistent, Bonaventura took it for granted that the soul is immortal
eventually to enjoy a vision of God. But
he does also offer a number of proofs [ibid. II,
19]. Two in particular should be
mentioned. (1) Because it is the function and ultimate end of the
soul to possess God as the supreme Good, it must be made in His image and
therefore cannot be mortal. Moreover, the
spiritual matter united to the form of the body must also be immortal,
since its own satisfaction is found fully within this union. (2) The natural desire of the soul for happiness itself
constitutes a proof in its own right [e]. The soul must be immortal, for otherwise
there could be no possibility of this perfect happiness being attained.
(Bonaventura regards 'ethical' proofs as superior to more metaphysical ones
involving, for example, consideration of the soul's ability to reflect on
itself or of its incorruptibility in contrast to corporeal matter.)
KNOWLEDGE
[6] According to Bonaventura, our knowledge starts from sense
perception; the intellect when created is an 'empty tablet' (tabula rasa) and has no knowledge of sensible things. He thus rejects innate ideas as understood in
a strict sense [a]. In the process
whereby sensible knowledge is acquired the sensible object acts on the passive sense organ and produces in it a
sensible species which itself acts on the active faculty of sensation. This latter can become aware of and 'judge'
the content of the sensation and thence perceive the quality of the
object. The various sensations are unified by the imagination
acting on a 'common sense'. The job of
the passive or possible intellect (aided by the active intellect) is to
abstract the species from the imagination and to judge it. In this respect the passive intellect
exhibits activity [b]. The active intellect can itself have no knowledge unless it receives information from the possible
intellect, towards which therefore it is in a sense not 'in act' [See Sentences II, 24].
If thus far Bonaventura's theory of knowledge
is empirical, and if he rejects 'crude' innatism, how does he account for intelligible knowledge of
spiritual realities and virtues [see sec. 7]? His answer [see, for example, Six Days, XII; Journey of the Soul; The
Mystery of the Trinity] is that the soul has a capacity (or 'virtual innateness') to come to such
knowledge as soon as it has knowledge of the relevant ideas or species; and
this capacity may be said to be a natural light. The soul as the 'image of God' naturally
leads towards God in its desire and will for happiness a will to which the intellect is
subordinate (he calls the will the "rational affection of appetite" [Sentences III, 33]). The soul has a dim awareness of
God [c] as its object but to make
this awareness explicit to turn it into reflective (non-intuitive) knowledge, the soul must rely on the illumination provided by the activity within it of the Divine Ideas (rationes aeternae) [c]. These Ideas, although in themselves unknown to man, stimulate and
regulate the intellect so that what is unchanging, certain and real can be revealed in fallible
sensory experience [c]. The intellect is thereby enabled
to ascend the hierarchy of being. The soul thus exhibits different degrees of
reason as it comes progressively to apprehend ever 'higher' aspects of
being. It sees sensible things as the effects of God,
in which he is still present; contemplates God as active in the soul in both
its natural operations and when 'elevated' by grace; and finally contemplates God as the Good and
ultimate Being the limits of knowledge beyond which there is only mystical
experience [d].
ETHICS
[7] [See, for example, Sentences II, 25 & 28; III, 33.] As one might expect, Bonaventura's
ethics were Christian and firmly grounded in the Augustinian tradition. Morally virtuous actions are actions directed
towards the cardinal
virtues of wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice but which are, as it were, transformed and exalted through
His gifts of faith, hope, and charity [a]. To bring about good ends requires the
collaboration of the will and the subordinate intellect. Through intellectual apprehension of first principles
('synderesis') and through conscience, which is informed by the practical
intellect, the soul is habituated to judge the fundamental principles according
to which one should act [b] and which should conform to the law of
God. The will, which possesses natural 'affections' or inclinations towards ends, intends and
initiates the actions required to bring them about. It is the goodness of ends, that makes the
will good, and correspondingly, the moral goodness of actions depends on those
right ends, that is, the motives or intentions of the agent. But because of the fallibility of the conscience and the limitations of the
will in the face of vacillating sensory impressions and bodily desires man requires divine illumination if he is to do good [c]. Given this, and through habitual exercise of
the practical intellect and the good will, the soul will gradually become
morally virtuous. Human imperfection is not
considered by Bonaventura to be either good or evil: it is not good because it is not itself some thing; it is not evil because it is not a privation of a
good. Rather the imperfection arises
from the nature of the human condition [see ibid. II 7 and 34]. Evil acts result
from a bad conscience one which is directed away from God. But man remains free to respond to God's love [d].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
In Bonaventura we find
the most complete expression of medieval Augustinianism which came to be
regarded as one of the two main traditions in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries (Thomism being the other). While a number of Aristotle's ideas are accepted into his system, this
is only to the extent that they are consistent with or reinforce his
fundamentally Augustinian world view. And, as one might expect, his philosophy as a whole is subordinated to
what is revealed through faith by God's grace. For example, as a result of the spread of Aristotelian philosophy and empirical science
he found it necessary to take greater account of the sensible world than some
of his predecessors. He nevertheless regarded all created beings as 'exemplars'
or manifestations of God and as possessing both matter and form (even spiritual beings). Truth, knowledge of spiritual reality and of
virtues, properly speaking is to be attained only through the Divine Ideas the
substantial soul finds within itself though he also allows sensible knowledge
as a result of abstraction by the individual soul. It was precisely this assimilation of the
sensible world into the theological that philosophers in the opposing Thomist
tradition were to criticize. (And the
doctrine of divine illumination raises a further difficulty in that it is
questionable whether God's intervention can be sufficient to overcome man's
inherent imperfection without undermining his freedom.). But Bonaventura held fast to the Augustinian
heritage as, for example, in his acceptance of a plurality of forms and
seminal reasons. As a result his system
lacks the unity of Aquinas's synthesis and tends to be dualistic as regards the
sensible and intelligible realms.
CONNECTIONS
Bonaventure