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Preface by Anthony Harrison-Barbet
Alphabetical list of philosophers
Dr Anthony Harrison-Barbet In Memoriam
Philosophical Connections
Compiled by Anthony Harrison-Barbet
SCHELLING
AESTHETIC IDEALISM
Friedrich Schelling, a Lutheran pastor's son, was born at Leonberg, near Stuttgart. He was educated at the Bebenhausen Cloister School and at the Universities of Tübingen (theology and philosophy) and Leipzig (science and medicine). At Tübingen he was a friend of Hegel and Hölderlin. His first book (1795) was admired by Fichte whose colleague he became when appointed to a professorship at Jena in 1798. While there he was in close contact with leading figures of Romanticism and was also co-editor with Hegel of the Critical Journal of Philosophy. He later lectured at Würzburg, Stuttgart and Erlangen before being appointed to the chair at Munich in 1827. He died in Switzerland.
METAPHYSICS/ KNOWLEDGE
Schelling's writings seem to show that his thought was continuously developing, with a view to achieving what he called his 'System of Absolute Identity' [Exposition of my System of Philosophy, 1801]. This work can be seen as an attempt to show that his Philosophy of Nature (in a number of early books, 1797-9) and his system of Transcendental Idealism complement each other and underlie his final views concerning the relationship of the finite world and the infinite Absolute.
[1. Philosophy of Nature — see especially On the True Concept of Nature Philosophy.]
[1] Although he started out from a Fichtean position which emphasized the primacy of an unlimited Ego, Schelling came to regard the 'objective' world of Nature (matter) and the 'subjective' Ego (spirit — Geist) as equally real and originally a unity and not distinct in Kant's sense. As he says [Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature] "Nature becomes invisible spirit; spirit becomes invisible Nature". Nature and Spirit may be regarded as developing in parallel [a]. In his early work is he is concerned principally with showing how man's conscious mind emerges from Nature seen as controlled by an unconscious, creative, intelligent active principle (Ttigskeitprinzip) or 'world-soul' [b]. The self-limitation of consciousness through reflection introduces finitude into itself and brings about a differentiation from Nature. This split has to be restored on a higher level of philosophical reflection. If mechanism and teleology are to be reconciled, we need to see Nature as a unified, dynamic, developing, self-organizing and teleological system which admits of different levels [c] — it can be seen as an early stage of Spirit. Schelling says that Nature is intrinsically intelligible — as recognised in its self-reflection (revealed through human thought). To justify this view he undertakes a 'metaphysical deduction'. He firstly distinguishes between Nature as natura naturans and as natura naturata. As the former it is 'subjective', primary, productive Nature, the 'universal pattern'. The latter is the 'objective' system of finite and temporal particular things constituting Nature's phenomenal being — the symbol, as it were, of natura naturans. Schelling thinks of Nature in both these aspects as manifestations of the Absolute in, respectively, the ('inner') ideal and the ('outer') real orders. For each of these he traces three 'moments' in the Absolute — considered as (a) a timeless and eternal act of self-knowledge, and (b) as the intuited Ground of the ideal and real. With respect to the former the Absolute is understood as 'objectifying' itself in Nature, transforming itself into subjectivity, and then achieving a synthesis of both. Considered from the second standpoint, again the Absolute passes through three phases. Nature as real objectification of the Absolute is brought into the ideal realm of 'representations' (in the human knowing mind); and the two realms are then seen to be interdependent and inseparable. The Absolute for Schelling at this stage is thus a pure identity of subjectivity and objectivity [d].
Now, if he is to realize the unity of Nature he needs also a 'theoretical deduction' of bodies and forces — force, or 'pure activity', being the common ground of Nature and the Ego, and the manifestation of a process of infinite never ending self-activity. This is a speculative not an empirical physics; and it exhibits the teleological pattern in natura naturata. He distinguishes a 'lower' inorganic or mechanistic and a 'higher' organic level. But he rejects any attempt to 'reduce' the latter to the former. There is no opposition between them, both being continuous aspects of Nature as a whole. However, Schelling supposes that for the objective phenomenal world to emerge the infinite productive activity, organizing principle, or 'world-soul' (as act of the Absolute) has to be constrained [gehemmt]. He identifies three stages or 'potencies' (Potenzen] of Nature [e]. The first potency arises when Nature (as exhibited in repulsive forces) is controlled by a limiting (attractive) force — material bodies possessing mass then arising through the synthesis of the two forces. Through a further process of limitation the various magnetic, electrical, and chemical processes of phenomenal nature are manifested as a result of the second potency. This 'universal mechanism' also assimilates at the higher level the forces and synthesis of the first potency. The third potency occurs at the level of the organism and comes about as a result of the synthesis of the first two potencies, whereby all the forces acting through matter are exhibited in the activities of sensibility, irritability (that is, responsiveness to stimuli), and reproduction in various degrees of individual organisms — man being the highest and the point of transition between subjective representations and objective Nature.
[2. Transcendental Idealism — see System of Transcendental Idealism.]
[2] [Transc. Idealism, Part I.] In Schelling's Philosophy of Nature we move from the Objective to the Subjective. His Transcendental Idealism involves an attempt to move from the Subjective to the Objective. But he regards the two approaches as complementary in that to account for knowledge as the uniting of subject and object we must first think of the two poles as separate. He says it is the Ego, that is, "the act of self-consciousness in general", that constitutes knowledge of the identity of subject and object. This is because as an 'intellectual intuition' it produces itself as the object of transcendental thought from within itself as subject [a]. Starting from the certainty of the 'I think' (cogito) Schelling is therefore concerned primarily to trace the development of consciousness from unconscious Nature as the practical act of the Absolute Ego; and he has in effect to show that the external objective world is a necessary presupposition. Self-awareness requires awareness of other egos. In Part I he starts by distinguishing three 'epochs'. Firstly, consciousness emerges from sensation and perception and rises to the level of 'productive (creative) intuition'. (This process corresponds to the construction of matter in his Philosophy of Nature [see sec. 1].) The second epoch is the transition from productive intuition to the level of reflection. The Ego as unlimited act unconsciously limits itself by positing a non-Ego, characterized by sensible objects, distinct from the Ego, and structured by the imposed categories of space, time, and causality. Lastly, the infinite Ego returns to itself through its self-determining will abstracting itself from the non-Ego. This gives rise to individual human self-consciousness and intelligence as a free and active power [b]. Man's actions are understood as being both free and necessary. Their freedom lies in their inner necessity in that actions stem from his self-positing ego [c]. Man acts in a particular way because it is in his intelligible character to do so. [For his later account of freedom see sec. 6.]
[3. Identity Philosophy — see especially Presentation of My System of Philosophy.]
[3] In his earlier writings Schelling had argued for the identity of Nature and Spirit — the unity being attributable to the Absolute as the explanation and ground. In later works [for example, Presentation and Lectures on the Method of Academic Study] he placed more emphasis on the Absolute as the ultimate object of philosophical investigation and conceived it as the total indifference of subjective and objective. At times he also thinks of the Absolute as the supreme 'Divine' Idea which contains within itself ideas of all finite things [Bruno: a Discourse]. And he interprets the unity in various ways. It is not only the identity of opposites (the subjective and the objective), but is also the identity of the multiplicity of opposites and the unity itself (an 'identity of the identity'); or it is the identity which obtains between the finite and the infinite [see sec. 6.] Individual things are regarded by Schelling as possessing both real and ideal elements [a]. In phenomenal things the real is predominant, while in spiritual phenomena the real elements are subordinate to the ideal. We have only limited knowledge of individual things (as illusory particulars) through the imagination ('inadequate ideas'). They can, however, be grasped as ideal realities when considered as existing in the Absolute and viewed sub specie aeternitatis. However, they then lose their individualities and differences. Moreover, the Cartesian cogito is now understood as giving us no transparency; individual consciousness and thinking belongs to the Absolute Identity (or God) [b]. But we do not have access to the Absolute itself; our knowledge is confined to the relation between finite things and the Absolute. Although the Absolute is the ultimate object of philosophical speculation, we can know it only as it appears to our empirical consciousness in the two series: the real objective 'potencies' of the Philosophy of Nature and the ideal subjective 'epochs' of his Transcendental Idealism. We can, however, 'intuit' the Absolute by thinking away all finite attributes or distinctions (the negative approach) [c].
ETHICS/ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
[4] [Transc. Idealism, Pt II.] The will as 'self-idealizing activity' (which is to be distinguished from 'natural impulse') attempts to actualize in the objective world the ideal which belongs to the ego as subjective, thereby enabling the ego to realize itself as intelligence. In the first stage will appears as 'drive' (Trieb). In the second stage this splits into 'natural drive' and moral law — the Categorical Imperative: you ought to will only that which other intelligences can will; and this must be pure self-determination. For this to be achieved action in the world is required; and thereby conscious Spirit becomes objectified [a]. Finally, free will appears which facilitates choice between drive and moral law. This in turn leads to Schelling's deduction of a rational State and a system of rights which can provide the framework for the rule of law necessary for the achievement of individual freedom and self-realization, and for moral action [b]. To avoid conflicts between states he proposes a federation which must both recognise basic principles and agree to submit to fundamental law. Endless progress towards the ideal of the perfect political society which exhibits universal moral order is implicit in human history. He thus regards this as a continual revelation of the Absolute [c]. While actions in the historical process are freely chosen, Schelling argues that at the same time there is a necessity in the process, which leads to an absolute synthesis or reconciliation of human actions [d] even when they are seemingly willed for selfish ends, in which case the necessity lies at the level of the unconscious.
AESTHETICS
[5] [gen 5] Philosophy of Art [Transcendental Idealism, Part III and Philosophy of Art] is significant for Schelling not only as a field of study which is of interest in itself but also because he regards works of art as finite revelations of the infinite Absolute. Art, he says, is grounded in the power of productive intuition directed towards a concrete manifestation [a] — in the work of a creative genius. When the artist creates he is both conscious that he is producing, say, a painting, but yet his creative power originates from within his unconscious. The observer in turn contemplates the work of art and feels an 'infinite satisfaction' which is an indication of the identity of the objective real and the subjective ideal, and of the unconscious and the conscious. Although it is not actually known, this actual reality lying behind the sphere of knowledge as constituted by the one absolute 'act of self-consciousness' is revealed to the individual ego through aesthetic intuition [b]. (This is to be contrasted with Will, and with Hegelian 'Logic' and Reason as supposed sources of insight into the Real.)
As for his aesthetics as such, Schelling says particular things are beautiful in so far as they are in and accord with eternal ideas which enter in and are intuited in them. Beauty is thus identical to truth, which is the conformity of the particular to the universal idea [c]. Mediation between the universal and particular, and the production of concrete images, is effected through a symbolic world of 'poetic existence', the source of which is mythology [d]. Schelling's aesthetics is thus teleological, the purpose of art being to realize the finite through beauty thereby reconciling history and Nature, and the theoretical with the practical [e]. Moreover, in all the productive intelligent activity (unconscious but manifested in organisms) is conscious in the creating, though unconscious in the created work.
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
[6] [See especially Philosophy and Religion and Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom.] Schelling started out from a broadly Platonic view, arguing that the Divine is reflected in the Eternal Idea, which in turn is manifested in the eternal ideas of Nature — the object of human consciousness through which God knows Himself. He then seems to have oscillated between a pantheist and a transcendentalist account of God in relation to the world. His position might, however, be appropriately described as panentheistic: the world is grounded and exists in God — infinite, pure identity, indifferent to the distinction between the subjective and the objective. He attributes personality to God as arising from Himself out of an impersonal primitive 'original foundation' (Urgrund) or unconscious will to exist. God is conceived also as positing Himself simultaneously as rational subjective will or love. (Indeed in his later work [Human Freedom] he seems to identify God as 'primal being' with pure Willing — eternal, independent, self-affirming) [a]. (These positings are non-temporal, not successive. Schelling thinks of them as different 'potencies' or moments in God's activity.) This accounts for His manifestation in the world: constantly creating Himself God 'expands' Himself into finitude, as a consequence of which the unity of the subjective and objective is split. To explain the existence of finite things — the transition from natura naturans to natura naturata — Schelling introduces the idea of the Cosmic Fall (Abfall): the world is a breaking away from God through a 'leap'. This is alienation from the Absolute. However, this creative process, like the positing of unconscious will and rational will, is non-temporal and eternal [b], and through it we as created beings see the world as finite and independent. God being identity of subject and object, His acts are both free and necessary: indeed, they too are identical. Similar considerations apply to man. Freedom is an intrinsic characteristic of the conscious will. But for freedom to be activated it must operate in the context of an 'opposition'. This is what he calls the unconscious 'dark' principle. And yet these opposing principles must be in some sense identical [c]. While in God they are unified, in man they are separate [see On the Nature of Human Freedom]. What then of the existence of evil, if God is the 'ground' of the finite world? Schelling's solution seems to be that what from man's point of view is evil and real is from God's standpoint nothing. The potentiality for evil exists in the 'dark' ground even of God: but it is man alone that it is manifested in consequence of his free will. However, in the course of time through God's agency man's rational will will conquer his lower impulses [d].
Religion, is important in Schelling's scheme of things in so far as it affords a basis for what he calls 'positive philosophy' [see especially Philosophy of Revelation and Philosophy of Mythology], which he developed in his final period. It is a philosophy not based on conceptual thinking (ideas, logical deduction, which constitute 'negative philosophy') but one which involves faith in God as a personal being as a result of commitment by the will and thence self-realization. Such a philosophy works through history. And Schelling argues that successively in myth, revealed (Christian) religion, and thereby in his philosophy of religion [e], God's inner 'potencies', the Fall, and the return will be made manifest.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
While Fichte started out from Kant's second Critique, Schelling in general looked to the Critique of Judgement. Critics differ as to how his philosophy should be interpreted. (Interpretation is not helped by the frequent changes in his views throughout his prolific career.) A widely held position is that he aimed to provide a comprehensive world-view, but no final system is achieved in his writings. Rather his earlier thought can be represented as an ongoing developing process, each phase, however, perhaps emphasizing different aspects of his overall vision, culminating in what he called his 'System of Absolute Identity'. This can be seen as an attempt to show that his Philosophy of Nature and his system of Transcendental Idealism are complementary and underlie his final but incomplete views concerning the relationship of the finite world to the infinite Absolute as pure identity of subjective and objective. Arguably Schelling thus goes some way towards overcoming the dualism associated with both Kant and Fichte, and in ways which have something in common with the approach developed by Hegel. Indeed he seems to have felt that Hegel had illegitimately appropriated his own ideas. In his last period (from the 1820s onwards) he is severely critical of Hegel for passing beyond his (Schelling's) position, and in particular, for attempting to deduce from within Reason itself (that is, thought or the concept) its identification with the Real (or Being). Rather, according to Schelling, the identity of reality and rationality as the Absolute is a presupposition of philosophical thought and cannot be fully grasped by reason, which must start from that which is external to itself, namely, the realm of contingent reality, that is, being or nature.
His philosophy is of interest for a number of reasons. (1) In his 'dialectic' of knowledge he moves from sensation to perception, self-awareness in reflection, to the will. (2) He emphasizes art (a) as the means by which the activity of the organic self is rendered conscious, and (b) as making possible the revelation of the infinite in the finite. (3) He points to man's self-realization through myth and religion. Some commentators have seen as implicit in this an anticipation of existentialism. (4) In line with his developing thought Schelling offers a number of different accounts of God — as will, a personal being, perfection, the original ground of being and yet also non-being itself. However, this fourth phase of his work was criticized by Hegel for what he saw as its irrationalism and mysticism. We might also argue that his treatment of the problems of human freedom, and of God and evil are open to the charge of obscurity; and it is questionable whether he has resolved them satisfactorily. More generally (and especially from a Hegelian standpoint) it can be said that as Fichte's philosophy is one-sided in its ethical basis so is Schelling's in the primacy he accords to aesthetics. But, as against Fichte, he does restore 'objectivity' to Nature. However, for many philosophers the most serious objection is one that his system shares with all three German Idealists: it postulates both that reality is independent of mind and yet that each is determined by the other. Indeed, it would seem that the process of self-knowing is the only 'reality'.
READING
Schelling: [of many works — not all of which have been translated into English] Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft (1797) (Ideas for a Philosophy of nature as Introduction to the Study of this Science, trans. E. E. Harris & P. Heath); System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800) (System of Transcendental Philosophy, trans. P. Heath); ber den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie und die richtige Art, ihre Probleme zu lsen (1801) (On the True Concept of Nature Philosophy and the Right Way to Solve its Problems — no English translation located); Darstellung meines System der Philosophie (1801) (A Presentation of my System of Philosophy — no English translation located); Philosophie der Kunst (1802-3) (Philosophy of Art, trans. and ed. D. W. Stott), and ber das Verhältniss der bildenden Künste zu der Natur (1807) (trans. as An Oration on the Relation Between the Plastic Arts and Nature by A. Johnson); Vorlesungen ber die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1803) (Lectures on the Method of Academic Study, trans. as On University Studies by E. S. Morgan); Philosophie und Religion (1804) (Philosophy and Religion — no English translation located); Philosophische Untersuchungen ber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhngende Gegenstünde (1809) (Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. J. Gutman); Die Weltalter (1811) (The Ages of the World, trans. F. de W. Bolna, jr ); Philosophie der Mythologie (1842) (Philosophy of Mythology); and Philosophie der Offenbarung (1842-3) (Philosophy of Revelation) — no translations available for the last two but foreshadowed in Die Weltalter, and see Beach below. See also the collection of extracts from Schelling in R. Bubnner (ed.), German Idealist Philosophy.
Studies
E. A. Beach, The Potencies of the Gods: Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology.
A. Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy.
W. Marx, The Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling: History, System, Freedom.
A. White, Schelling: Introduction to the System of Freedom.
Collection of essays
K. Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism.
CONNNECTIONS
Schelling
Note: Schelling's metaphysics and theory of knowledge [see secs 1-3] were in general rejected by Schopenhauer, though there are interesting parallels in relation to the concept of force as a common ground and to Schelling's view concerning the role of art in intuition of the real (q.v.). His critique of Hegel's philosophy was admired by Kierkegaard, but Schelling's influence on the latter is a matter for debate. The Connections given below are selective and questionable.
Metaphysics and Knowledge [1a; cf. 1c d 3a] Nature (objective, material) and Ego (subjective, ideal) as a unity and equally real Kant→
[2e g]
[2c e]
[2d]
[1b]
[1a b]
[1a]
[1b c]
[1b; also 1e] Human consciousness from Nature through creative power/ 'active principle': world-soul [5f]
[1h]
[1d]
[2d]
[1b]
[1b 2b]
[5a]
[1c; cf. 1e 2b c 3a] Nature as unified dynamic system; different levels; mechanism reconcilable with teleology Kant→
[11b]
[1b]
[1b]
[2e 4a 4b 4c]
[2d 10c d]
[1b]
[2c]
[4a]
[4e]
[1d; cf. 1a 3a] Metaphysical deduction of 'moments' in the Absolute as exhibited in the real and ideal orders of Nature ( naturans and naturata) Kant→
[sec. 1]
[2e 3c]
[2d]
[1b]
[1c 3a]
[1e; cf. 1b c 2b] Theoretical deduction of bodies and forces — force as non-reductionist productive ground in (continuous) mechanistic and organic levels); three 'potencies'; force as evidence of infinite self-activity of Nature [2d]
[1b]
[2b]
[2a 4b]
[1d]
[1e]
[3c]
[3a 4a 5a]
[2c 3a 4e]
[2a; cf. 2b 4a] The infinite Ego (act of self-consciousness) is the means of knowledge of subject-object identity: as subject it has intellectual intuition of itself as object Kant→
[3b]
[1a b]
[1c 3a 5e]
[1b]
[2b; cf. 1c e 4a] Development of human consciousness — the three 'epochs': sensation → consciousness (productive intuition) → reflection (structuring by categories) → human self-consciousness; self-awareness (in certainty) of cogito presupposes one's awareness of other egos Kant→
[2a]
[6b]
[2b c 2d 3b 4a 5b]
[1b 2a 2c]
[1b]
[2a b 3c 4b 5b-f]
[3a 5b]
[4b]
[2c; also 1c 6c] Human actions both free and necessary — stem from self-positing ego Kant→
[3d]
[5h]
[5c 7a]
[3a]
[5f]
[3b]
[4e]
[3a; cf. 1a d 6a] Absolute as identity of opposites — indifference of subjective and objective, unity and multiplicity; as Divine Idea containing ideas of finite things; primary object of philosophy [1f]
[1b f]
[2b e g]
[1a]
[1c]
[5b]
[3a]
[3b; cf. 4a] Individual things both real and ideal; knowledge of them 'inadequate' unless viewed sub species aeternitatis (the Absolute); the cogito now no longer transparent; thinking and consciousness belongs to the Absolute/ God Kant→
→Mill
[2a]
[4b]
[2d 4a 3b 5b]
[1b 2a]
[1a 5b]
[1b]
[via Coleridge] [2a]
[4a]
[3c] The Absolute itself/ God not knowable — only the relation between finite and infinite (in appearance); but can be intuited negatively Kant→
→Mill
[4b]
[2d 4a]
[5b]
[1b 1d]
[2b 3a 4a]
[1b]
[via Coleridge] [2a]
[1f h]
[4a c e]
[1f]
[2a]
[1d]
Ethics & political philosophy [4a; see also 2a b] Will as self-idealizing activity; three stages: drive, moral law, free will; moral law (categorical imperative) requires action in world, thence conscious Spirit objectified Kant→
[6a 7a]
[2c 3b]
[5f 6a e]
[3a]
[7a]
[4b] The rational state and system of rights provide framework for law (needed for moral action and self-realization) →Hegel.
→Mill [possibly via W
Humboldt][4a b]
[7a c]
[4b]
[4c] Human history — endless progress towards ideal of perfect society: continual revelation of Absolute [7d 9a]
[3f]
[4d; cf. 1c 2c 6c] Historical process necessary but actions freely chosen → absolute synthesis of actions Kant→
[3c]
[5c 7a]
[4a]
Aesthetics [sec. 5; see also 6a] General comparison Hamann [Boehme as
common influence?][1e] →Heidegger [7a]
[5a] Works of art grounded in productive intuition Kant→ [9d]
[5b; cf. 2b 3c] Aesthetic intuition (contrast will and 'logic') reveals absolute identity of real and ideal, and of conscious and unconscious Kant→
[9a 10b]
[2c]
[8a b]
[2c 3c]
[1e]
[5c] Particular things beautiful because they accord with eternal ideas; beauty is truth (conformity of particular with universal) Kant→
[1c 2a 15b]
[1e]
[1i]
[9f g]
[3c]
[5d] Symbolic world of 'poetic existence' (myths) mediates particular and universal [2b]
[4c]
[2a]
[5e] Aesthetics teleological: realization of the finite through beauty; reconciles history (subjective ego) and nature, and the theoretical with the practical Kant→
[9a b f 10b]
[8b]
Philosophy of Religion [6a; see also 3a] God as reflected in Eternal Idea (manifested in eternal ideas of Nature); panentheism: Absolute as indifference of subjective and objective); personality from 'Urgrund' (unconscious will to exist); posits Himself as rational will/ love; in later work, God, primal being, as pure Willing [5b d]
[1e f]
[1b]
[2f]
[1e]
[8c e]
[1c d]
[1b]
[6a]
[1f 3a c 4d]
[2a]
[6b; cf. 1d] natura naturans → naturata as cosmic 'fall'; alienation from Absolute; creative process [4a]
[6a]
[6c; cf. 2c] Freedom and necessity in God and man; conscious and 'dark' unconscious grounds [1b]
[2b e g 3c]
[4a 5f]
[3b]
[4a]
[6d] Evil real but only for man (though potential in 'dark' ground of God); lower impulses can be overcome through rational will Kant→
[1m]
[4a]
[5a]
[5g]
[6a]
[3d]
[6f]
[6e] Distinction between:
(i) 'negative' philosophy (conceptual thinking, Reason, 'essence', logic, law, etc.) and
(ii) 'positive' philosophy ('existence', will, faith, self-realization, etc.), which works through history; God's 'potencies' shown in myth, revealed religion, and positive philosophy of religion
Kant→
→Hegel→
[gen. critique]
[gen. crit., esp. 3a 8c d f]
[1b c]
[1a b f-h]
[2a 4a]
[5d]