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Philosophical Connections
Compiled by Anthony Harrison-Barbet
BUTLER
(1692 1752)
MORAL
SENSE THEORY
Joseph Butler was
born in Wantage, Berkshire. His father was a draper by trade and a Presbyterian
in religion. Butler was educated at King Alfred's School in Wantage, at
dissenting academies in Gloucester and Tewkesbury, and then at Oriel College,
Oxford, where he graduated in 1718. Having converted to Anglicanism before entering Oxford, he was ordained
priest and held a variety of ecclesiastical offices, eventually to be appointed
Bishop of Bristol (1738) and then of Durham (1751). He died in Bath.
ETHICS
[1] [See Sermons,
especially Preface, III, and XI; and Dissertation II.] Butler does not agree with the view that benevolence is
the sole or even primary virtue. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, we cannot be sure that the intended consequences of our actions
will turn out to contribute to the common good (and may even lead to
injustice). Secondly, it ignores the
fact that self-love is as
natural to man as altruistic tendencies. However, he
distinguishes between a general and natural concern for one's own happiness and
an egoistic search for, say, sensual gratification. But while the latter, which Butler calls
'immoderate' or 'supposed' self-love, conflicts with benevolence, the former
need not; one's feelings of concern for others may well themselves contribute
to one's own happiness. He often calls
this 'reasonable' or
'cool' self-love [a]. Moreover he argues that it is natural for such moderate self-love to
prevail over our passions. Happiness
arising from actions performed in the light of reasonable self-love is therefore
entirely appropriate to our nature. However, the term human 'nature' is ambiguous. It can refer to some invariable principle
common to all men, or to a man's strongest passion. But in ethics, Butler says, we must take
account of the type and degree of intensity of our passions or affections; and
he proposes a hierarchy of principles in man, at the apex of which is conscience, which he understands to be the "moral
approving and disapproving faculty" [see Dissertation I] and as including both the heart (feeling) and the understanding it is not
just a moral sense. Conscience is the
source of moral obligation; and to be virtuous is to recognise and act
'proportionately' on its authority [b]. We shall then be acting in accordance with
our (moral) nature. This is linked to
a view of personal
identity as directly intuitable and indefinable. Butler rejects the view that consciousness
should be taken as the criterion. Rather
consciousness presupposes personal identity and hence individual responsibility
for actions [Diss. I, 3-4] [c]. Butler also stresses that the principles or rules of
action as discerned by conscience should take no account of the actual
consequences of our actions (which are not easily predictable), only of
consequences as included in our intentions [d]. Nevertheless, we find that following the dictates of
conscience, without regard to any 'reward', usually leads to happiness. And even when self-love does not coincide
with virtue or self-interest with duty we can be confident that divine providence will guarantee
that the virtuous man will in the long run attain complete happiness [e]. In practice, Butler says,
the ordinary man does not find it necessary to engage in detailed analysis of
human nature or to deduce rules of conduct; for he has a kind of direct insight into the
universal or objective rightness or wrongness of a given action. The goodness or badness of actions is not to
be defined in terms of happiness or by the individual or any ruler [f]. It can be left to the moral
philosopher to examine and make explicit the nature of conscience, the criteria
for right action, the connections between self-interest and virtue, and so on.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Butler's moral philosophy
is characterized by the primacy he accords to conscience and by his placing of
the concepts of self-love and benevolence in the wider context of human nature
as a whole. However, his ethics are
inseparable from his Christian commitment; and his conviction that the
following of one's own conscience will lead to happiness is grounded in his
faith that the consequences are guaranteed by God. Perhaps the main problem (which also reflects
his reliance on theology) is that, given his emphasis on conscience, the way it
works and the standards it appeals to lack a detailed and critical treatment.
CONNECTIONS
Butler
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