PYRRHO
(c. 360 c. 270 B.C.)
SCEPTICISM
Founder of the
Sceptic School (skeptikos in ancient
Greek meant 'inquirer'), Pyrrho was born in Elis and studied under the Atomist
Anaxarchus. In 334 he travelled with
Alexander the Great on his expedition to India. He wrote nothing himself, and we owe our knowledge of his thought largely to his pupil Timon of Philius and to
Sextus Empiricus.
KNOWLEDGE
[1] Pyrrho can hardly be said to have had a
theory of knowledge, because his central principle was that we cannot be certain of
anything. If knowledge is possible, it
must be of appearances only which are relative. We can know nothing of a thing's 'inner
substance' [a]. (This ignorance is called akatalepsia.) How something appears to you is different from
how it appears to me. How can we know
which is correct? Only sensations are
real: but there can be no certainty in
any assertion, affirmative or negative, about them. Sense experiences contradict each other. We
must therefore try to balance opposing arguments so that they cancel out, and
then suspend our judgement and remain silent. This suspension of
judgement is referred to as the epoché [b].
ETHICS
[2] Pyrrho held a similar
relativistic and sceptical view about what is claimed to be right or wrong [a]. So, because
we cannot be sure, we must
aim at indifference or imperturbability towards life and try to achieve a state
of tranquillity (ataraxia) [b] and thence 'well-being' or
happiness [c]. Furthermore,
while recognising that we cannot cut ourselves off completely from society, we must in practice regard its
customs and standards as only probable [d].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
There is some disagreement as to the extent
or Pyrrho's indifference to external things. Some interpreters have thought of him as an ascetic avoiding any
commitment to society. Others have seen
him as exhibiting a more practical approach to life accepting things as they
are and rejecting only dogmatism and immoderacy. The key feature of Pyrrho's way of life,
however, is clearly his quest for tranquillity of mind; and his 'suspension of
judgement' must be understood as geared to achieving this end rather than as an
axiom of any strict methodological scepticism. His contribution as a philosopher must on this analysis therefore be
regarded as limited.
CONNECTIONS
Pyrrho