SCHLICK
(1882 1936)
LOGICAL
POSITIVISM/ CRITICAL REALISM
Moritz Schlick was
born in Berlin and studied physics at the Universities of Heidelberg, Lausanne,
and Berlin from which he gained his Ph.D in 1904 (his supervisor being Max
Planck). He then pursued further studies
in the natural sciences at Göttingen and again at Heidelberg and Berlin. He
started his teaching career as lecturer in 1911 at Rostock, and after a year at
Kiel he was appointed professor of the philosophy of the inductive sciences at
Vienna in 1922. He there became the
leading figure in the 'Vienna Circle' of positivist philosophers and scientists,
and wrote prolifically in both fields. Apart from a brief period at Stanford he remained at Vienna until his
untimely death at the hands of a mentally disturbed student.
KNOWLEDGE
[1] Schlick's
epistemology was grounded in the distinction between necessary and empirical
propositions. In his early period [see General
Theory of Knowledge] he criticized two key theses:
(1) He rejected the
possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, largely because of
the incorporation of Newtonian physics within the more embracing (and arguably
more correct) theory of relativity. Influenced by contemporary suggestions that general laws of nature might
be regarded as analytic or conventional judgements, Schlick accordingly returned to the clear traditional
distinction between logically necessary propositions as analytic and a priori and contingent empirical
propositions, which are synthetic and a posteriori ['Is there a Factual A
Priori?']. (However, he
allowed that there might be a place for necessary but synthetic propositions in
logic and mathematics, though not in their application to the empirical world) [a].
(2) He disagreed
with any search for incontrovertible 'foundations' of knowledge. [See General Theory of Knowledge.] Instead he argued in favour of a reliance of 'scientific'
investigations of the phenomenal world on propositions purporting to describe
reality and which were to be accepted until they had been shown to be false [b]. Knowledge for Schlick was essentially knowledge
of 'sameness' of sense data, memory images, or conceptual structures, ordered
mathematically, as when we know something as being something else (for
example, that a cat is a mammal). Knowledge thus comes to be of
relations between phenomena and not their content. Rejecting idealism Schlick called his
position 'critical realism' [c]. Schlick subsequently changed his
views [see 'The Foundations of Knowledge']. Philosophy was no
longer to be regarded as a search for
knowledge; it is not a 'science'. Instead, he said, its
function was essentially one of logical analysis to investigate and attain an
understanding of what is involved when we say we have knowledge in a variety of
fields [d].
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
[2] Schlick was interested in the
question how language is used to articulate 'science' or knowledge. Initially [General Theory of Knowledge] he was
concerned with the meaning
of propositions which he defined as sentences (composed of written and spoken
symbols) together with the logical and linguistic rules for their use. It is as a result of our failing to attend
to these rules (as when we sometimes illegitimately formulate sentences in
subject-predicate terms) that philosophical errors arise. Violations of linguistic rules occurs also in metaphysics when attempts are made to
know the content of phenomena instead of confining attention to relations
between them [a].
After he had changed his views about the nature of the
philosophical enterprise he became interested in the different ways one could talk about the world. This approach allowed a resolution of the conflict between idealism and
realism: it was no longer a
'factual' issue. Likewise he considered
it a matter of convenience whether we should regard the data of science particles, waves, and so on as
'real' or 'unreal' ['Causality in Contemporary Physics'], and whether we should
consider the human
organism in mental or in physical terms (though he later adopted a more
'neutral monist' position) [b]. And he came to regard philosophy more generally as the
activity of seeking the meanings of
the units out of which language is constructed. These rules would, he thought, lead to
'deictic' definitions, that is, where the propositions are determined by
reference to the context of their utterance 'Facts and Propositions']. He sought now to show that it was through our ignoring the
different contexts and thus different rule systems governing the use of
ambiguous expressions that philosophical problems arise. At this stage Schlick
seemed to think it is sentences rather than propositions that have meaning
this being given by the rules for use [especially 'Meaning and
Verification'] [c]. His criterion for meaning was verifiability. Having
identified the rules, one can interpret the sentences in order to discover
whether they are meaningful, that is, whether there are circumstances or facts
which would make them true or false. In
his earlier period verifiability
was understood in terms of the relating of rules to empirical data by means of a process
of reduction. He later appealed to the idea of 'basic' sentences
as containing the ostensively definable observational terms (such as 'this',
'here', 'now', 'of this kind' and so on),and which he called 'constatations' or
'confirmations' (Konstatierungen) ['Foundations of Knowledge'][d]. Those
sentences which are in principle unverifiable for which there are no
confirmation procedures are meaningless. Either they violate the rules of use the 'logical grammar',
or they are being made to operate in the absence of rules altogether. As examples of meaningless propositions Schlick gave self-contradictory
assertions and metaphysical utterances [e]. To deal with the objection that verifiability
by experience is essentially subjective being grounded in one's own mental
states, Schlick
distinguished between the 'content' of experience and 'structural relations'
between an individual's experiences [f]. While the former are lived through and
private to each person, the latter are identical for all individuals, and are
the basis for objective scientific knowledge articulated mathematically.
ETHICS
[3] [See Problems
of Ethics.] Consistently with his
acceptance of the verifiability criterion, Schlick rejected as meaningless abstract ethical
propositions supposedly about absolute ideals, duties, obligations. Instead he advocated an ethics grounded in the human quest for
the maximization of happiness in principle empirically testable. He was not, however, thinking of a crude
hedonism but of the realization of the quiet joy we experience when we perform actions for their own sake [a].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Having rejected
'fundamentalist' approaches to knowledge, Schlick came to think of philosophy
as an investigation into what knowing in various fields involves, and more
particularly to be an examination of the various linguistic structures through
which knowledge is expressed. The
practice of philosophy therefore becomes a search for 'meanings', which Schlick
the logical positivist defined by reference to the verifiability
criterion. Most of the standard
objections to his thesis centre on the notion of verification. What is the logical status of the principle
itself? Is it verifiable, and if not how
can it be meaningful? Is the criterion
of meaningfulness perhaps too narrow? Some critics have argued that he seems to have committed himself to an
antirealist position. Schlick's attempt
to solve the problem of the alleged subjectivity of empirical verifiability by
distinguishing between 'private' contents and 'public' real structural relations has also been questioned as
entailing metaphysical assumptions which are therefore not strictly meaningful
and fail to provide proper knowledge. A
further objection has been made that there is an unresolved tension in
Schlick's account of meaning in that he seems to appeal to a 'use' theory as
well as to verifiability.
Schlick: [of many books and articles] Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918) (General Theory of Knowledge, trans. by A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl); Fragen der Ethik (1930) (Problems of Ethics, trans. D. Rynin); 'Die Kausalitt in der gegenwrtigen
Physik' (1931) ('Causality in Contemporary Physics', trans. D. Rynin in British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science); 'ber das Fundament der
Erkenntnis' (1934) ('On the Foundations of Knowledge', trans. D. Rynin) these
two articles are reprinted in Gesammelte Aufstze 1926-36 (1938) (Collected
Papers); 'Facts and
Propositions' (1935) (in Philosophy and Analysis); 'Meaning and
Verification' (1936) in Gesammelte
Aufstze; see also: 'Gibt es ein materiales Apriori?' (1930) ('Is
there a Factual A priori?', trans. W. Sellars in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds), Readings in Philosophical Analysis). Most of the
translated essays from Gesammelte
Aufstze are in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical
Positivism.
Study
There is no
full-length study in English of Schlick's philosophy, but see:
K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (passim)
Collections of
essays
B. McGuinness
(ed.), Moritz Schlick.
CONNECTIONS
Schlick